The Guards, however, who had found two provisional battalions for service in America, provided a solid body of infantry, and only two of the twenty-seven cavalry regiments were overseas, while the twenty battalions whose formation had been authorised after Saratoga could now be reckoned effective, and most of the militia had been embodied in 1778 and had been some months under arms. Germain indeed informed Clinton that home defence had never been "so well provided for",1 but the fear of invasion had already caused the detention at home of most of the reinforcements Clinton was expecting and thereby kept him inactive in the summer of 1779. Warding off invasion was primarily a naval problem. Could the French and Spanish fleets be prevented from uniting, the French would hardly risk in the Channel the 50,000 troops who had been collected between Havre and St Malo, especially as a British squadron was cruising off Cherbourg and Havre and greatly impeding coastwise traffic. To prevent the junction the Channel fleet must be at sea early in the year and off Brest before the Brest fleet could get out. The situation called clearly for the maintenance, during the summer at least, of Hawke's "close blockade" of Brest, for the objection that by keeping the enemy in port this system reduced the chances of victory in battle did not apply when to prevent his putting to sea was the chief need. But Sandwich's administration was unequal to getting the Channel fleet to sea in time, and, to make things worse, the Keppel-Palliser controversy had so accentuated party feeling that no prominent admiral would take command. Ultimately the veteran Sir Charles Hardy was persuaded, but he was quite unequal to the task:3 Kempenfelt, his flag-captain, described him as one "who never thinks beforehand" and who had in him "not one grain of the commander-in-chief". Fortunately for England Hardy had Kempenfelt to assist him and confronted septuagenarians in d'Orvilliers and Cordova. Hardy with thirty-five of the line left Spithead on 16 June, a fortnight after d'Orvilliers with twenty-eight had left Brest for the Sisargas Islands, twenty miles west of Corunna. At this rendezvous the French spent six inactive weeks waiting for the Spaniards. The haste with which the fleet had been hurried to sea and the drain which this delay imposed on its supplies did not improve its efficiency, and when Cordova at last arrived (23 July) the Spaniards' unfamiliarity with the French signals and manœuvres complicated matters.5 Contrary winds then retarded their progress northward, and not till 14 August were they off the Lizard, where they interposed between Plymouth and Hardy who was cruising in "the Soundings", southwest of the Scillies. 1 Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 143. 3 Pembroke MSS, p. 382; Cornwallis MSS, p. 322. 2 Lacour-Gayet, p. 264. * Lacour-Gayet, p. 260. THE ALLIED FLEET IN THE CHANNEL 745 Could Hardy have known how long d'Orvilliers would have to await Cordova, he might well have followed him to the Sisargas and forced battle on him: now, when facing double his numbers, it was essential to avoid close action yet keep near enough to the enemy to prevent them detaching ships up Channel to cover the passage of the transports. The situation resembled that which Torrington had faced in 1690, and Kempenfelt's correspondence1 shows clearly that he had grasped Torrington's idea of the preventive possibilities of a "fleet in being". The allies' proceedings were marked by indecision. Never again were they to have such a chance of invading England, but their aged admirals were timid and sluggish and dominated by unsound strategical doctrines.2 They made no serious effort to seek out Hardy and crush him or drive him right away: they did not venture to detach a covering squadron, and after an easterly gale had driven them out of the Channel, they let Hardy, whom they sighted off the Scillies (31 August), slip past them up Channel to Spithead, thereby placing himself in position to watch the transports. Thereupon they abandoned the enterprise, the French and twenty-one Spaniards retiring into Brest (14 September), the remaining Spaniards returning to blockade Gibraltar, an occupation they would all along have preferred. Spanish lukewarmness was only one cause of the combined fleet's ineffectiveness: too large and heterogeneous to be manageable, its internal condition had been deplorable. Epidemics, due to bad sanitation and provisions, had ravaged it; indeed North said afterwards that had Hardy known his enemy's plight he would have sought an action: there were men in his fleet like Jervis and Duncan, who were longing to fight and confident of success, but the British fleet's condition was none too good. Worn-out vessels had been hastily commissioned when fitter to be condemned, four which joined Hardy in September were nicknamed the "Provincial ships", because it was said that one could only reach the Hampshire coast, another that of Dorset. If England escaped invasion in 1779, Sandwich can claim little credit. , The attack on Gibraltar had virtually begun in June when a blockade was established by sea and land. No attack was attempted, but supplies soon began to fail, and Rodney, who had been selected for the West Indian command, was ordered to relieve Gibraltar on his way thither. He was given twenty-two of the line, and, though burdened with large "trades" for Portugal and the West Indies besides convoys for Gibraltar and Minorca, discharged his task with conspicuous success. Sailing on 29 December, after encountering vexatious delays and obstructions," he captured off Cape Finisterre several Spanish store-ships with their escort, including a battleship 1 N.R.S. XXXII, 290-313. Corresp. of George III, IV, 419 seqq. Corresp. of George III, IV, 424. "Stopford-Sackville MSS, 11, 150. 2 Castex, passim, esp. p. 65. Lacour-Gayet, p. 246. • Ibid. p. 439; Pembroke MSS, p. 381. (8 January): a week later (16 January) off Cape St Vincent he sighted eleven of the line who promptly made for Cadiz. Rodney signalled a "general chase", ordering his captains to engage to leeward as they got up, regardless of "the line", and by 4 p.m. the leading pursuers, foremost among them Duncan, were in action. Neither night nor bad weather stopped the fight: by 2 a.m. five Spaniards had struck and three others had sunk. "The Moonlight Battle" was the first real victory of the war at sea, and, if the odds had greatly favoured Rodney, it was a useful success, much enhanced by the promptness and resolution of the chase. Rodney could thus revictual both Gibraltar and Minorca, Cordova's twenty-four sail lying inactive in Cadiz. On 13 February he started for the West Indies with four of the line, Digby taking the rest back to the Channel, capturing on the way part of a French convoy bound for Mauritius. For the rest of the year little happened in home waters. Half the Brest fleet, under de Guichen, an abler and more experienced officer than d'Estaing, had sailed on 3 February for the West Indies, the rest, fifteen of the line, remained mostly quiescent, while the Spaniards concentrated their forces and their attention on Gibraltar. The British Channel fleet, about thirty strong, cruised somewhat aimlessly1 near the mouth of the Channel, and even failed to prevent the allies capturing most of a big West Indian convoy. Further afield, 1780 witnessed greater activity. Clinton, after parting reluctantly with Grant and Campbell, had asked leave to resign rather than "remain a mournful witness of the debility of an army at whose head, had I been unshackled by instructions, I might have indulged expectations of rendering serious service". He had complained especially of having to part with British units, "the very nerves of this army", and had sent to Florida Germans and Provincials "whose loss will not be so much felt". Germain had refused to let him resign, promised him reinforcements and disclaimed any wish to shackle him (3 December), but the reinforcements were slow to appear and without them Clinton's activities in 1779 had been limited to making raids which achieved considerable success in destroying stores and shipping. In May he attacked and took two forts on the Hudson at Verplanck's Point and Stony Point, hoping "to stir Mr Washington" and bring on a general action,3 but without the promised reinforcements he could not follow up the blow, while Washington was not to be drawn, and even surprised and re-took Stony Point (16 July), evacuating it again at once. Despairing of forcing battle on his cautious and elusive adversary,$ Clinton turned his thoughts towards the south, where Germain was 1 N.R.S. XXXII, 326. Ibid. 10 June 1779, C.O. v, 98. 2 Clinton to Germain, 8 Oct. 1778, C.O. v, gồ. Ibid. 25 July 1779. THE CAMPAIGN IN THE SOUTHERN COLONIES 747 as usual expecting "revolutions by means of friends to the British Government".1 The belated reinforcements arrived on 25 August with a new admiral, Arbuthnot, but shortly afterwards came the news of d'Estaing's appearance off Savannah, and in face of his superiority Clinton could only stand on the defensive. He seized the occasion, however, to evacuate Rhode Island, a step Rodney was to condemn next year as "the most fatal measure that could have been taken", though it added 4000 men to the available field force. In the middle of November d'Estaing's defeat and departure were reported, and with the seas thus cleared Clinton sailed for South Carolina on 26 December 1779 with 8000 men. Bad weather delayed his voyage and it was February 1780 before he landed, thirty miles from Charleston, and 29 March before he really began his attack. Well supported by the Navy3 Clinton pressed Charleston hard: Huger's cavalry, who were keeping open its communications, were routed on 12 April by Clinton's light troops under Tarleton, a brilliant if erratic leader; Fort Moultrie was taken on 6 May and five days later Charleston capitulated, over 6000 combatants becoming prisoners of war. But Clinton could not pursue this success; rumours that French troops were bound for America made him nervous for New York5 and compelled his return thither with 4000 men (5 June), leaving Cornwallis to command in the south with 8000 men all told, none too many for his task, for as in Spain conquests were easier to make than to retain, and the more territory the British recovered the more their offensive power was reduced. At first, however, things went well. Tarleton routed the only organised force still in the field (29 May), and when the hot season stopped operations South Carolina seemed secured. But before major operations could be resumed sporadic opposition had developed, and when, in August, Gates led 2000 "Continentals" whom Washington had detached to the south into South Carolina his advance, in Rawdon's words," "unveiled to us a fund of disaffection of which we could have formed no idea": many who had joined the militia mainly to obtain arms and ammunition deserted and guerrilla bands appeared everywhere. Sickness and the necessity of garrisoning various posts prevented Cornwallis from collecting more than 2200 men, whereas Gates had twice that force and was believed to have 7000. Nothing daunted, Cornwallis advanced and, meeting Gates near Camden (16 August), attacked and routed him completely, taking 1000 prisoners and seven guns and inflicting another 1000 casualties, his own loss being only 300. Two days later Tarleton 1 Germain to Clinton, 25 Aug. 1779, C.O. v, 98. 2 Stopford-Sackville MSS, II, 191. Stuart, p. 168. Biddulph Papers (Am. H.R. xXIX) and Russell's "Journal" (Am. H.R. Iv). • Stevens, B. F., Clinton-Cornwallis Controversy, 1, 272. surprised and routed Sumter, the most troublesome of the guerrilla leaders, and Cornwallis, greatly encouraged, entered North Carolina, simultaneously urging Clinton to take its defences in the rear by a diversion against Virginia. He had penetrated to Charlottetown, despite considerable guerrilla opposition, when he learned that on 6 October 1100 of his light troops under Major Ferguson, an able leader, in trying to cut off a party which had attacked the British outpost at Augusta, had been routed at King's Mountain by overwhelming numbers of riflemen from the backwoods. This reverse drove Cornwallis back towards Camden. Not only was his invasion of North Carolina checked, but the hostile elements in the occupied territories were greatly encouraged, and the guerrillas redoubled their activities. The invasion of the southern colonies seemed to be merely increasing the demands on the army; yet in default of vital points in the American position for which Washington must risk a decisive action, it is hard to suggest a more effective alternative policy: Cornwallis's operations had at least reduced the area from which crops could be exported to Europe to maintain American credit and purchase munitions. So unpromising indeed were the American prospects at this juncture that in May 1780 the French, believing that the American cause was nearly collapsing for want of troops,1 decided to despatch 6000 men under Rochambeau to America. The British Admiralty, though warned of Rochambeau's destination, failed to intercept the convoy, which had only seven sail of the line under de Ternay as its escort, and its safe arrival at Newport (12 July) rendered Clinton's situation far more anxious than when New York had only Washington to fear. However, before Rochambeau could join Washington, reinforcements from England enabled Arbuthnot to blockade Newport with ten battleships (21 July), while Clinton at once collected 6000 men to attack Rhode Island. But Arbuthnot and Clinton were on bad terms, delays over the transports gave Rochambeau time to secure himself against a coup de main and Washington meanwhile had concentrated his forces and was threatening Kingsbridge. But clearly it was Arbuthnot's dilatoriness and obstruction, rather than fear of Washington, that made Clinton abandon the attack on Rochambeau and return to New York to betake himself to his correspondence with Arnold, now in command at West Point, which important post he was for private reasons prepared to betray. These negotiations were still in progress when Rodney unexpectedly arrived at New York (16 September) with ten sail of the line from the West Indies. Rodney had passed a disappointing summer in the West Indies. 1 Chevalier, 1, 195. Clinton to Germain, 14 Aug. 1780, C.O. v, 100. * Biddulph Papers; Clinton to Germain, 25 Aug. 1780, C.O. v, 100. |