DECLINE OF THE ENTENTE 369 King of Sicily and Naples. Meanwhile the Sea Powers laboured for peace, and hastened its coming by their refusal of financial aid. When the third Treaty of Vienna was agreed on, however, France had approached the Emperor without their knowledge. Nor was this slight the only British disaster in the war. A Family Compact between France and Spain had been signed in 1733. When peace returned, a league of continental powers against Britain had been brought appreciably nearer. In spite of George's martial zeal, the Emperor had called on her in vain to fulfil the Treaty of Vienna, while France had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. Five years before, Newcastle had reported Fleury "not dead, but dead to us", and Fleury was the least Anglophobe of Frenchmen. A war in which our sea power shielded Poland while our diplomacy favoured the Emperor could hardly strengthen the entente, though both parties resumed it with feigned enthusiasm. Above all, though with much distrust and friction, the deadly combination of France and Spain had been brought about. The territorial adjustments of the third Treaty of Vienna (1738) securing Lorraine for France, Tuscany for the Emperor, and the two Sicilies for the Spanish Bourbons, commanded the assent or at least the indifference of Britain. Its implications might well leave only the foolhardy calm. The three years after fighting ceased (1736-38) saw a general worsening of the position through the rise of our ambiguous French ally. Chauvelin, our sworn foe, the "shuffling friend" whose conduct made Walpole instruct our ambassador to "pay dissimulation with dissimulation...as all who play fair with sharpers are certainly undone", fell early in 1737, but France in that age "pushing into an universal commerce as the...way of coming at their old darling scheme of universal dominion"4 could not be truly our well-wisher. It was something that the Queen of Spain hated Fleury, the "mitred Machiavelli", but Patiño, her great commercial minister, who threatened to kill him with a staff of cotton by transferring Spanish trade to Britain,5 had died in 1736, leaving the government to "three or four mean stubborn people of little minds...but full of...the immense grandeur of the Spanish monarchy".6 The Emperor, upon the maintenance of whose power "the equilibrium" depended, and who now lost his Eugène, was drawn into a war between Russia and the Turks, in which the Austrian disasters reinforced the lesson of the Polish Succession struggle. Military failure was followed by diplomatic, and the Peace of Belgrade (1739) formed an immense triumph for France. The Turks were saved; Russia, baulked of compensation for her loss of 100,000 men; Austria, 4 Anderson, III, 216. 1 To Horace Walpole, Aug. 1730; cf. Williams, E.H.R. xvi, 448. * Delafaye to Waldegrave, Oct. 1731, in Coxe, Walpole, III, 122. 3 Ibid. m, 449. Coxe, Walpole, III, 473. Keene to Newcastle, 1739, cit. Temperley, H. W. V., "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' ear (1739)", Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc. 3rd series, III (1909), p. 3. CHBE I 24 despoiled and humbled-all by the brains and energy of a French diplomat and a French military adventurer. ""Tis Belgrade kills me", said the Emperor, when at the point of death. Austrian influence with Russia inevitably declined, while Prussia, whose Crown Prince was learning to reckon on a deep cleavage between France and Britain, proved susceptible to the blandishments of France. 3 Mistress now of Sweden, with nowhere an enemy, France seemed to be the arbiter of Europe. Meanwhile the British Government had survived the Porteous riots in Scotland, disturbances in London, an open feud within the royal house, and the lamentable death of the Queen. Still, however, it felt too weak to risk the alienation of the fundholders by converting the debt to a lower interest basis, and in 1739 the moral weakness of both Government and people was to place both in jeopardy. In that year, long-smouldering disputes with Spain issued in a needless rupture. "The conduct of England from... 1737 to the declaration of war", wrote Coxe ere the century closed, "was inconsistent, unjust, haughty and violent." It was also highly unprofitable, though the worst disasters were averted by good fortune. Both sides had just grievances arising from the high claims and lawless practices of Britain and her subjects in their relations with the Spanish Indies and from the illegal violence shown by Spanish officials towards suspected offenders. During the year 1738, negotiations in Spain were stimulated by the presence of a British fleet, but, early in 1739, so good was the Spanish disposition that a convention between the two countries was signed and an alliance was seriously thought of." Then, while a skilful French ambassador changed the feeling at the Spanish court, a wave of public opinion swept Britain into war with Spain. The South Sea Company inflamed the Government and nation; hopes of mines and galleons played their part; stories of the Inquisition found ready credence; and the Opposition made of Captain Jenkins's ear a talisman to bring them into office. Pitt stooped to use the argument of a Louis XIV that might gives right, without Louis' sincere assumption that man's might is an index of God's favour. "With more ships in your harbours than in all the navies of Europe, with above two millions of people in your American colonies", should we, he asked, accept a dishonourable convention?8 Few could be found to brave the storm, and Newcastle was certainly not among them. In March 1739 he ordered the squadron at Gibraltar to remain there, and by October, Spain and Britain were formally at war. 1 Vandal, A., Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV, 1728-41, passim. 2 Ibid. p. 411. Coxe, Walpole, 1, 618. Koser, R., König Friedrich der Grosse, 1, 48. 5 Cf. Johnson, C., Lives of the most famous highwaymen, etc. (London, 1734), p. 267: "This logwood is but little better than stole". 6 Vide supra, p. 340. THE SPANISH AND AUSTRIAN WARS 371 A year later, Newcastle himself was writing, "From what I see, France will sooner or later dominate Europe, and perhaps America also". The last clause is the more significant because the war had been conducted on the lines laid down in Carteret's dictum, "Look to America...Europe will take care of itself".2 The first great plans, which included a double attack upon Manila, were indeed cut down, but the Admiralty clung firmly to its design of attacking Spanish America from the west as well as from the east.3 While Anson prepared for an expedition to the South Seas, Vernon with six men-ofwar made the almost bloodless capture of Porto Bello (November 1739). Such a success, one month after the proclamation of the war, intoxicated the Opposition and the country. Vernon became a national hero, and was entrusted with a large fleet for the reduction of the Spanish Indies. In March 1741, aided by General Wentworth and 8000 men, he turned to attack the stronghold of Cartagena. The commanders quarrelled; nearly half the troops perished of disease; and in mid-April the attempt was abandoned. It had taught the British how not to wage amphibious warfare in the tropics. Anson, meanwhile, with a host of despairing pensioners and raw marines, was labouring round Cape Horn.5 His squadron, which dwindled to a single ship, won great fame and booty, but was powerless to influence the war. In 1742, Vernon continuing impotent, it became clear that as a speculation the Spanish war had failed. Fleury, moreover, had as yet done little save guard against any diversion in Europe which could affect a struggle so profitable to France. While the British continued to lose markets, to squander manhood in the tropics, and to turn against their incomparable Walpole, the cardinal was drawing nearer to the Emperor and preparing for a triumphant mediation. At this juncture, however, death destroyed his hopes. On 31 May 1740, young Frederick of Prussia, Voltaire's disciple, but suspected of being secretly a foe to France, inherited his long-awaited crown. In October, the Russian Succession passed to a minor, an event which, as he knew well, must give him greater freedom. At the same time, Europe was startled by the Emperor's sudden death. This led to events which broke Fleury's system in pieces, set the world on fire, and caused the War of Jenkins's ear to be almost literally forgotten. For Britain, the great significance of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) was that it foiled and distracted France. As the immediate consequence of the Emperor's death, Spain turned to press her claim to Austrian Italy. In December, Frederick marched into Silesia. "The man is mad", cried the impassive Louis, but the infection soon spread to Paris. While Fleury disseminated blessings 1 To Harrington, 11 Oct. 1740, cit. Vaucher, Walpole et Fleury, p. 352. Cit. Charteris, Cumberland, p. 88. 3 Bancroft, G., Hist. of U.S. II, 440. 4 Ibid. III, 442; Richmond, H. W., The Navy in the war of 1739-48, pp. 110 seqq. Walter, R., A voyage round the world in the years 1740-4 by George Anson, Esq. (London, 1748), passim. 6 Koser, pp. 54, 119. and schemed for a judicious increase of French power, the party of action, crying, "Down with the Habsburgs", captured the King and nation. Belleisle, earnest, abstemious and soldierly in a society which lacked those virtues, led a sumptuous mission into Germany, to substitute for Austria at the head of affairs an aggrandised Bavaria crowned with the imperial crown and dependent upon France.1 French success, both in the imperial election and in war, seemed to depend on Prussia. Frederick, whose victory at Mollwitz (April 1741) proved that the only Austrian army could not drive him from Silesia, skilfully prolonged the auction at which the irreconcileables, Britain and France, "the most stupid and the most ambitious powers of Europe", bid for his support. The interference of George II, zealous for Hanover, helped to decide his Prussian rival against Britain. The British plan would have purchased by concessions in Silesia the adhesion of Prussia to a league with Austria, the Sea Powers, Russia and other States to uphold the Pragmatic Sanction, for, apart from treaty obligations, a strong Austria seemed a necessary bulwark against France. The party of no surrender at Vienna, however, relied on King George and our guarantees, and Frederick cheerfully bound himself to lay Germany and the Habsburgs at the feet of France. In a three days' struggle at Versailles, speaking for seven hours on one of them, Belleisle battered Fleury into compliance.2 In August, cheered by the news of our reverse at Cartagena, French troops crossed the Rhine, while the Swedes, prompted by France, marched against Austria's ally, Russia. Claimants to the Habsburg dominions threatened almost every province. Vienna itself, where many hoped that the Bavarian Charles Albert would drive out Maria Theresa's detested husband, Francis of Lorraine, was described as being in the state prayed for by the Scotch preacher "who asked of God to spread confusion over the earth that He might show His omnipotence in restoring order". But worse was yet to come, for the French advance and the menaces of Prussia drove George to approach Versailles, to declare Hanover neutral, and to promise the Bavarians his vote. British diplomacy might still be used to reconcile Frederick with Maria Theresa; Britain might raise an auxiliary army for her defence; her personality and the justice of her cause were not to be despised; and bandits like the Kings of Prussia and Sardinia were poor material for an enduring coalition. France, moreover, whose hegemony seemed to be assured when her accomplice Elizabeth seized the throne of Russia (December 1741), was justly suspected by her German confederates of aiming at their permanent subjugation. Belleisle, indispensable in the field, could not always coerce Fleury into decisive and dangerous action. French 1 Cf. Coxe, W., Memoirs of Horatio, Lord Walpole, 1678-1757 (London, 1802), p. 232. 2 Koser, pp. 115 seqq., 3 Charteris, Cumberland, p. 109. Kluchevsky, V. O., Hist. of Russia (trans. Hogarth), IV, 314; Hildebrand, E., Sveriges historia, VII, 135 etc. AUSTRIAN RECOVERY: TREATY OF WORMS 373 troops, none the less, wintered in Prague, and, in January 1742, the Bavarian protégé of France became the Emperor Charles VII. How the tide turned and flowed swiftly in Austria's favour; how the Prussians and Saxons left the divided and distracted French to save themselves and their Bavaria as best they could; how the Spanish Bourbons were foiled in Italy and the Swedes in Finland-all this belongs to the chequered history of 1742. For Britain, the great event was the fall of Walpole, a peace minister forced to preside over impolitic and ineffective war. Although the King still looked to him for counsel and his former followers remained in power, the resolute Carteret became the steersman of belligerent Britain, and we turned to fight in Europe for the Protestant Succession and America. The detachment of Prussia and Saxony from the hostile coalition was a British success. Britain helped to detach Sardinia also and enabled its King to fight the better for the Pragmatic Sanction by threatening Naples with bombardment and forcing the Spanish Bourbons to be neutral. When Fleury died at ninety, in January 1743, France was already meditating a descent upon our shores to induce us to leave Germany and Italy alone. The campaigns, both military and diplomatic, of the year 1743, however, went strongly in favour of the Hungarian Queen. While her own troops conquered Bavaria, British, Hessians and Hanoverians moved south from Flanders to shield her from the new French army of Noailles. By sheer good fortune, our stout-hearted but ill-led "Pragmatic Army" escaped destruction at Dettingen and won a resounding victory. "The devil take my uncle," wrote Frederick, "let no one name the French troops and generals in my hearing."1 He had not made peace to look on while the Austrians and Hanoverians became supreme in Germany, and he preferred to head a union of imperial States with German liberty as its watch-word. This line of thought was soon to find its parallel in Britain, though for the moment Carteret went from strength to strength. In September 1743, at Worms, he brought Sardinia into league with Austria and Britain for the more vigorous prosecution of the war, and the Dutch, Saxony and Russia took the same side. To its author, the Treaty of Worms seemed destined to end the struggle. In reality, it immediately provoked France to surrender herself to Spain, and to wage open and earnest war with Austria and Britain. At the same time it disgusted the British public with Austria, and augmented their disgust with Hanover. The miracle which saved the Habsburg at the opening of the Thirty Years' War had been repeated for his descendant, and at that "good Englishmen" rejoiced. But to lead another Grand Alliance into a Thirty Years' War for Habsburg and Guelph aggrandisement was far from their intention. Twelve years 1 To Podewils, July 1743, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen, 11, 380. |