Art. 14.-THE END OF THE WAR. THREE months ago, although it was plain that the war had entered on the final stage, few probably ventured to hope that it would have run its course before another campaigning season. The winter was approaching, with its short days and uncertain weather. On the western front the Germans were making a resolute defence against odds which were by no means overwhelming. They showed, as yet, no signs of general demoralisation; and their 1920 contingent, which would yield some half a million men, was intact. Indications of a weakening on Germany's home-front were naturally suspect; the resignation of Count Hertling, and the appointment of the liberal' Prince Max of Baden as Chancellor, savoured of a political manoeuvre; and the appeal to President Wilson to bring about an armistice suggested an attempt to gain time to extricate the armies in France from a difficult position, to repair the breach in the Balkans, and to re-animate the faltering Turks. The Italian front was quiet. Bulgaria's surrender was the beginning of the end. It resulted in the plain disclosure, obvious to all the world, of the inadequacy of Germany's available resources to meet her liabilities. To the Germans the re-establishment of the situation in the Balkans was a necessity hardly less vital than the maintenance of their front in France. Reinforcements were despatched in haste; but, thanks to the unrelenting pressure of the Allied armies in France, the numbers that could be spared proved powerless to stay General D'Espérey's advance. Defeated in an engagement fought, on Oct. 10, a few miles south of Nish, the Austro-German force was driven back, fighting, to the Danube, which was reached, in the neighbourhood of Semendria, by Serbian cavalry on Oct. 30. Concurrently with these events, the Austrian force in Albania, threatened in rear by an Allied column advancing through Montenegro, was in full retreat, closely pursued by the Italians. The moral effect of this defeat in the very region of Teutonic pre-war ambitions does not seem to have been generally appreciated. It advertised the fact that Germany, through military impotence, had failed in the primary object for which she had provoked the world-war. It wrecked the hopes and aspirations which had been instilled into her people as a preparation for war, and nourished, during the war, to sustain them through four years of effort and privation. It broke the last threads of the bond which, throughout a long series of defeats, had bound Turkey to the Central Empires, proving to the Turks-if proof were neededthat they could no longer hope either for help or reward from Germany. Small wonder, then, that our enemies' home-fronts began to crumble, and that discouragement spread in the ranks of their armies. The military results, though less immediate, promised to be no less decisive. General D'Espérey's attack broke the left flank of the enemy's European front, laying Austria-Hungary and Turkey open to attack in new quarters which they were powerless to defend. Germany, if able to prolong her resistance in the west, would ultimately have again to reckon with a war on two fronts, the hopelessness of which was proved by her inability to stem the advance of the comparatively small force under D'Espérey's command. The military situation was clearly desperate. Turkey, already on the brink of fresh disasters, took the only course open, and surrendered. The shattered remnants of the Syrian army, 12,000 strong, were in full retreat on Aleppo; and the forces in Mesopotamia were retiring towards Mosul, closely pressed by General Marshall. On Oct. 15, a few hours after the last 'Baghdad to Berlin Express' had left Constantinople, notification of surrender was despatched by the Porte to Washington. But, before hostilities were suspended (Oct. 31), Aleppo was occupied (Oct. 26); and, on Oct. 30, General Marshall won a decisive battle at Kalat Sherghat (50 miles south of Mosul), which resulted in the capture of the entire Turkish force in Mesopotamia. In the meantime the Austrians were engaged in a last desperate struggle with the Allied forces in Italy, which had taken the offensive between the Brenta and the Middle Piave. General Diaz's plan was to force the Piave with the 10th, 8th, and 12th Armies (in the order named from right to left), to drive the 5th Austrian Army eastwards, and interpose between it and the 6th Army (in the Monte Grappa sector), which was to be attacked simultaneously in front. On the right of the 10th Army the 3rd Army prolonged the front to the sea. The operations are of considerable interest, and deserve a closer study than is possible in this article. The forcing of the Piave by the 10th Army was a complete success. It was a formidable enterprise; for the river, which was one and a half miles wide, being swollen by recent rains, flowed with a swift current which frequently swept away the bridges; and the enemy, strongly posted on the east bank, and supported by a numerous artillery, offered considerable resistance. The course of the river is broken up by numerous islands, of which the largest, the Grave di Papadopoli, was chosen as the point of passage. This island was, at the time, some three miles in length, with a breadth of one mile; and to reach it the main channel had to be crossed by means of boats or bridges. The channel on the enemy's side was fordable by infantry. Lord Cavan decided to occupy the island before the date fixed for the general advance. Accordingly, on the night of Oct. 23-24, detachments crossed in boats, each of which carried six men, and gained a footing on the island, surprising the Austrians who held it as an advanced post. Bridges having been thrown, the occupation of the island was completed by the close of Oct. 26. The general attack began on the following day, when the 10th Army carried the positions on the east bank, and established a bridge-head, under cover of which the bridging operations were completed. The 8th and 12th Armies having been less fortunate, part of the former was passed across by the 10th Army bridges, and, advancing northwards, cleared the left bank. One of Lord Cavan's divisions, attacking southwards, performed a similar service for the 3rd Army. On Oct. 29 the enemy was driven back on the whole of the Piave front. The 10th Army, pursuing eastwards, covered the right flank of the 8th, which moved north-eastwards through Vittorio, aiming at the Piave valley above Belluno, in order to cut the communications of the 6th Austrian Army; while the 12th Army, advancing astride of the river, reached Quero on the right bank, and, on the left bank, captured the heights north of Valdobbiadene, thus turning the hostile position in the Grappa sector. These movements were crowned with success. Oct. 30 saw the enemy in disorderly retreat across the Venetian plain, and the 6th Army, which had previously maintained a very active defence, retiring in haste up the Piave to avoid being cut off from its line of retreat. The Asiago plateau was also being abandoned. On the same day General Diaz received the request for an armistice, which was signed Nov. 3. While their allies were thus dropping out of the contest one by one, the Germans on the western front were grappling with the most difficult operation of war-the conduct of an enforced retreat before an able and enterprising enemy, flushed with success. To appreciate the full significance of the problems they had to solve, it is necessary to have a general idea of the arrangement, within the theatre of war, of their main lines of communication-the lines of railway by which supplies were brought from the bases in German territory to a great system of depôts in the field, and which, during the retreat, had to serve for the evacuation of the material thus accumulated. The principal base of the retreating armies was at Aix-la-Chapelle, whence (1) a line through Hasselt, Ghent, and Bruges supplied the submarine and coast establishments; while branch lines from (2) Bruges, and (3) Ghent, served the front between Nieuport and Armentières. The line through Liége to Brussels furnished communication with (4) Lille through Ath and Tournai, and, through Mons, with (5) Douai, (6) Cambrai, and (7) St Quentin. Lastly, a line to Namur, avoiding Liége, provided connexions through Hirson with (8) La Fère, (9) Laon, and, through Mezières and Rethel, with (10) Reims. A secondary base at Trèves, which was linked with Mezières through Luxemburg, served to supply (11) the west bank of the Meuse, (12) the Argonne and (13) Champagne, relieving congestion at Aix-la-Chapelle and Namur. Metz is also connected with this system of railways (see the map). Linking up these lines of communication, and serving for the transport of troops behind the front, were the following lateral communications: (A) Ostend-Courtrai -Lille-Douai-Cambrai-St Quentin-La Fère-Laon -Reims; (B) Ghent-Tournai (or Ath)-Valenciennes — Hirson-Mezières; (C) Brussels-Namur-Mezières; the two last-named being continued to Trèves, Thionville, and Metz. Further to the rear the Meuse and Moselle valley-railways are connected by two serviceable lines traversing the forest region of the Ardennes, and by a third of inferior capacity. It may readily be seen how vitally necessary it was for the Germans to maintain their front west of the Meuse against, the Franco-American offensive which began on Sept. 26. Whether they were defending the Hindenburg line or one of the rearward systems, it was essential, for the preservation both of the system of supply, and of the connexion between the armies in France and those in Alsace-Lorraine, that the Allies should be kept at a distance from the railway leading from Mezières to the Moselle, which, at Montmédy, was less than twenty miles from the front held by the Americans on Oct. 1. The positions about Verdun would be no less important in the event of a retreat to the Rhine; for a defeat in that region while the armies were still entangled in northern France and Belgium might have resulted in those armies being cut off from their lines of retreat, which crossed the Meuse in the comparatively narrow space between Mezières and Liége. For these reasons the Germans poured division after division into the Meuse-Argonne sector, to the detriment of their defence in other quarters, where defeat would have been less disastrous because it would not have laid bare the lines of communication. Only at the other extremity of the front-in West Flanders-were they threatened by a similar danger, though in a far less degree. King Albert's attack covered, at the first bound, one-third of the distance to the Bruges-Ghent railway, and occupied one-fifth of the space through which the Germans could retreat from the coast sector without violating Dutch territory. Accordingly, in the early days of October, they began hurriedly to evacuate the submarine bases and military supply-depots; while in the Meuse * As the main line passes some miles east of Valenciennes, throughtraffic would not be stopped by the loss of the town. |