General Staff. Bismarck himself was obviously reluctant to annex, and in particular to annex Metz; he disliked the inclusion of so many Frenchmen in our house,' brushed the Elsass' idea on one side as an invention of 'Professors,' and yielded only on the grounds of strategical necessity. Of Alsace, Belfort alone was saved for France; and, in order to retain its arrondissement, France was obliged to sacrifice a very valuable area near Thionville. Certain adjustments of the Alsace frontier in the Vosges were also made in favour of Germany. In Alsace the political and language frontiers practically coincided; but in Lorraine the former widely overstepped the latter and transferred a large French-speaking area to Germany-a fact that adds another to the many reasons which debar Germany from the use of the language argument.

The Treaty of Frankfort was sanctioned by the National Assembly at Bordeaux; only, however, after an impassioned protest from the Deputies of the affected area, in which they appealed both to France and to Europe and declared the transaction, by which they were bartered like chattels, to be nul et non-avenu. This protest was renewed in 1874, in a modified form and with one dissentient, when Deputies from the Reichsland first took their seats in the Reichstag.

By the Treaty of Frankfort Alsace-Lorraine was transformed into the Reichsland, and became the property of the newly-created Empire. It is perhaps legitimate to contrast the circumstances in which this transformation took place with what is taking place in the same district to-day. That there must have existed some German feeling in Alsace-Lorraine in 1871 is certain. But there was no popular demonstration of it, no civic addresses of welcome, no throwing down of statues, no flower-strewn streets and endless throngs of dancing girls-nothing in fact of that astonishing release of pent-up emotions which we are witnessing. Emotion, indeed, there was; but it was of another kind. The German entry into these 'German' provinces was effected, so far as contemporary records show, in complete silence and without any signs of popular welcome.

We have now to see what measure the Germans,

having recovered their long-lost brothers, meted out to them. They embarked at once on a policy of eradicating French culture. German was promptly imposed in the schools. French place-names were prohibited, and the pettiest persecution was resorted to; French actors being refused permission to perform in Strassburg and soldiers of the garrison forbidden to speak French in the streets. Since the war began, this prohibition has been extended to civilians. Self-government has never been granted to Alsace-Lorraine, though the Constitution has been twice revised-in 1899 and 1911; and the control of local government has been restricted. Extraordinary powers were entrusted to the Governor by the 'Dictatorship Paragraph of the law of Dec. 30, 1871, which gave to the civil ruler in time of peace the right to exercise powers usually confined to the military authorities in time of war. This law, though modified in 1891, was not repealed until 1902, a fact which shows how little trust the Germans could place in the loyalty of their new subjects. In 1887, when there was a strong recrudescence of French feeling, consequent on the Boulangist movement in France, a system of passports was introduced, by which it was made impossible for any one to enter the Reichsland from France without a passport 'viséd' by the German Embassy at Paris.

Feeling in the Reichsland has been divided since 1874. There has been, in point of fact, no party favourable to Germany; but, as opposed to the party of sheer protest (the Protestaires), there has grown up a party which advocated the acceptance of the fait accompli and, with the cry Alsace for the Alsatians,' has aimed at the autonomy of Alsace within the Empire. Until 1890 this party was in a small minority; but since that time, as France herself seemed occupied with other matters, and the prospect of reunion grew more and more remote, it has commanded a majority. The Autonomistes, however, have always avowed their ultimate loyalty to France; and the fact that they have been looked upon with disapproval by the German Government is sufficient proof that their aims have not been anti-French. Such drift as there has been away from France has been due to the anti-clerical policy of French Governments. Latterly, no doubt, the Autonomistes would have welcomed autonomy

within the Empire as a pis aller, but such autonomy it has never been the policy of Germany to grant; the lost brothers' were not sufficiently trusted. The war, with the renewal of the prospect of reunion to France, has undoubtedly rallied all Alsatians to their faith of 1871 in its fulness. The recent increase in the number of persons habitually speaking French, as recorded in the German Census, and the increase in the number of newspapers printed in French, prove that the French spirit has retained its vitality. After the Zabern affair in 1913 von Jägow said, 'The officers of the garrison of Alsace feel as if they were quartered in an enemy country.' What has happened since the outbreak of war is even more significant. No less than 5655 persons were 'deprived of their German nationality,' in 1915 and 1916. The number of desertions from the Alsatian Regiments in those years was, by the German reckoning, 30,000; and an Army Order of Jan. 11, 1916, show that the withdrawal of the Alsatian regiments from the Western Front was at one time under consideration. The 'National Zeitung' of Aug. 2, 1915, is even more candid: The Alsatian people en bloc,' it says, 'with a few exceptions, would welcome their return to France.'

Sufficient has been said to prove that France committed no breach of historical right or national sentiments in annexing the provinces; that they were quickly merged in France and became an integral part of the nation; that there was practically unanimous protest by the inhabitants, or their representatives, against the transfer of 1871; that that attitude of protest has continued with a persistency which, considering the apparent hopelessness of reunion, is remarkable; that the movement for autonomy was conducted without prejudice to the intention of ultimate return to France should opportunity occur; and that since the outbreak of war there has been ample evidence, even from the Germans themselves, of the ineradicable desire for that return.

The restoration to France of Alsace-Lorraine would involve the transfer of nearly two million inhabitants. It would also involve the loss to Germany and the gain by France of one of the richest districts in Europe. Apart from agriculture, forestry, and minor industries,

there is an important textile industry at Mülhausen, which has flourished since about 1745 and employs some 78,000 persons. But the great wealth of Alsace is the recently discovered potash field in the Mülhausen region. The value of these deposits, which are not fully worked, is estimated at the enormous figure of sixty-two milliard marks (3,100,000,0001.). Even without the Alsace beds Germany claimed a practical monopoly of the available potash deposits of Europe; and it will be a great advantage to the Allies to be made independent of German potash. Alsace also possesses considerable salt mines and a small deposit of petroleum.

The great mineral wealth of Lorraine is her coal and iron fields, especially the latter. Of the 463 square miles covered by the famous Minette ironfield-the most important on the continent and possibly in the world, France already possesses 282 (61 per cent.), Germany 166 (36 per cent.), and Luxemburg 14. Owing to the large proportion of sulphur in the ore, the value of the field was not appreciated till the discovery of the basic process in 1878, or Germany might have been even more acquisitive in 1871 than she actually was. The total production of this vast area is 48,200,000 metric tons of ore per annum, thrice as large as that of Great Britain and three-quarters of that of the United States. Its reserves are estimated at 5,100,000,000 tons, of which France possesses 3,000,000,000, Germany 1,830,000,000, and Luxemburg 270,000,000. Before the war France produced in all 21,700,000 tons per annum, of which 90 per cent. was derived from the Minette (a figure which alone exceeds the total output of Great Britain); while Germany produced 28,600,000 tons, of which 73 per cent. was derived from the Minette. At this rapid rate she would have exhausted her share of the field in eighty years, without any allowance for increased production. Deprivation of her most valuable ironfields would be a serious blow to Germany, and would make it extremely difficult for her to engage in war on a grand scale. The transference of the German Minette to France would add to her already great resources in iron and compensate her for some of her losses. But there are certain difficulties attendant on the transfer, the most serious of which is the question of coal.