he so mobilised public opinion that Congress was forced to do his bidding. The Mexican policy, whatever we may think of its success, was Mr Wilson's own; he reported to Congress in his messages, and when necessary, asked for authority to intervene. Probably a majority in Congress disapproved of the President's policy so far as they understood it, but the authority to occupy Vera Cruz was granted. Later developments-the mediation with Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, at Niagara, and the recognition of Carranza-were governed solely by Mr Wilson's wishes. With regard to Pan-America, the foundations of an entente cordiale were laid, while at the same time a strong hand was manifested in Nicaragua, Haiti, and San Domingo, where revolutions were being attempted. The Senate was consulted only when treaties were necessary; and Mr Wilson has not been over-punctilious in asking the cooperation of the Senate. The Lansing-Ishii agreement, under which the United States gives Japan a rather free hand in China, was negotiated by the President without consulting the other branch of the treaty-making authority.

When the European war broke out, President Wilson dictated the course to be pursued by the United States. Our proclamations of neutrality, our silence over the rape of Belgium and succeeding violations of International Law so far as they did not affect our rights, and the policy pursued toward England and Germany which aimed at persuading them to abandon their restrictions upon American commerce, represented the will of an executive head who was not responsible to the Legislature. Had Mr Wilson desired, he could have led the country into war when the 'Lusitania' was sunk ; the crime of the 'Sussex' in April 1916, could likewise have been made a casus belli that would have been approved by the American people. The proposals of peace in December, 1916, were sent without consultation except perhaps with a few intimate friends; communications with European Governments were made through Colonel House, Mr Wilson's closest friend and adviser; the magnificent address of Jan. 22, 1917, announcing the programme that America would stand for at the settlement, and which, if satisfactory, she would pledge her faith and strength to secure, was made,

indeed, to the Senate as the council associated with me in the final determination of our international obligations,' but it was President Wilson's own policy. He broke off diplomatic relations with Germany, reporting the fact to Congress, but not asking for, or being compelled to secure, approval. When, subsequently, Mr Wilson desired to arm American ships, the Senate rules prevented him from securing this authority before the end of the session, but he found it in an old statute.

Then came the declaration of war, made by Congress as soon as the President asked for it. No formal alliance has been entered into by the United States with the other nations fighting Germany; semi-officially it is stated that the United States looks on the Entente Powers as 'cobelligerents' rather than 'allies,' and that there is a 'gentlemen's agreement' rather than a formal document. The extent of diplomatic cooperation with the co-belligerents,' the intervention in Russia, the pretence of not declaring war on Turkey and Bulgaria-all depended on the President. Mr Wilson conducted the negotiations with Germany preceding the armistice, and appointed the American peace commissioners without consulting the Senate. The terms of peace that the United States will endeavour to secure-as formulated in the fourteen points' of Jan. 8, 1918, and later addresses-represent Mr Wilson's views. Even with few international problems to be settled, an almost absolute control of foreign affairs has been gradually assumed by Presidents; and American foreign policy is conducted under conditions that are thoroughly undemocratic. There is almost as much secrecy as under European systems; nothing is yet known in the United States, for example, as to the outcome of the Lusitania' negotiations, with which the President and his Secretary of State professed themselves to be satisfied. Diplomacy proceeding 'frankly and in the public view'-the first of the war aims enumerated by Mr Wilson in his great address of Jan. 8, 1918-will mean as great a change for the United States as for its Allies.

So recently as 1908, Mr Wilson wrote that, if the President 'rightly interpret the national thought and boldly insist upon it, he is irresistible.' A President

trusted by the country can not only lead it, but form it to his own views.'* President Wilson has been irresistible, and he has formed the country to his own views. He has looked upon his rôle as the leader of American Democracy as something more than a counting of heads; and in time of war he has taken the responsibility of deciding questions, not as he thought the public at the moment wished the country to act, or even as he thought the public would wish him to act if all the facts of the situation were known. On the contrary, Mr Wilson, it appears, has made his decisions according to what his information, his judgment, and his conscience have told him will ultimately be approved. This is not to say that Mr Wilson does not pay attention to the demands of public opinion from moment to moment; they help him to steer the course which he thinks will be justified in the end. Public opinion now sanctions presidential dictatorship in the United States; and that, as I have said, makes the fact not the less true but simply the less alarming.

LINDSAY ROGERS.

*Constitutional Government in the United States,' p. 68.

Art. 9.-THE REVOLUTION IN FINLAND: ITS CAUSES AND RESULTS.

1. Finland and the Finns. By Arthur Reade. Methuen, 1914.

2. Det röda upproret i Finland. By Henning Söderhjelm. Stockholm: Albert Bonnier, 1918.

3. Republik eller konungadöme. By Johannes Hedengren. Helsingfors: Holger Schildt, 1918.

4. Brytningstid. By Eirik Hornborg. Holger Schildt, 1918.

Helsingfors :

5. Vita gardet mot röda gardet. By Erich Schüler. Helsingfors: Holger Schildt, 1918.

6. Anteckningar under krigstiden. By Emil Schybergson. Helsingfors: Holger Schildt, 1918.

7. Andra landtdagen 1917 och Finlands själfständighet. By R. A. Wrede. Helsingfors : Söderström, 1918. 8. Sigurds Minnen och intryck från medborgarkriget, 1918. By Ivar Hortling. Helsingfors: A. B. Helsingfors Bokhandel, 1918.

9. Finland i den svenska pressen. Helsingfors: Holger Schildt, 1918.

10. Hvita och röda. By Ernst Klein. Stockholm: Svenska Andelsförlaget, 1918.

And articles in Svensk Tidskrift, Finsk Tidskrift, etc.

To understand the events of 1917-18 in Finland, some knowledge of political and social conditions in that country is required. This is all the more necessary by reason of the extremely intricate politics of Finland, complicated as they are by the fact that two languages, Swedish and Finnish, are spoken side by side, while the sovereign power of Russia is a third factor to be taken into account. We propose, therefore, first of all to touch on the main features of Finnish political life.

Before the war the government of Finland was divided between the Tsar (who was Grand Duke of Finland), the Senate and the Diet. The position of Finland within the Russian Empire was unique, since its Constitution went back to the old Swedish form of government, defined in 1772 and 1789 and guaranteed by Alexander I in 1809, when Finland was ceded to Russia. The legislative

power was in the hands of the Grand Duke and the Diet, though the former was also entitled to issue certain administrative decrees on his own initiative. A special Secretary of State maintained contact between the Grand Duke and the Finnish bodies, while the Governor General presided over the civil administration. The Senate was divided into two departments-Justice and Economy. The first was a Supreme Court of Appeal but also dealt with certain questions of administration. However, most of the administration was carried on by the Department of Economy, which consisted of eight ministries with a senator at the head of each. The senators were nominated by the Grand Duke for a period of three years. It is obvious that this placed great power in the hands of the Grand Duke, especially as the Senate was not responsible to the Diet. After 1906 this latter body was a single chamber elected by universal suffrage and proportional representation, its two hundred members being chosen every three years.

The chief political parties are the Swedish party, the Old Finns, the Young Finns, the Agrarians and the Socialists. The first of these, which has behind it the ancient heritage of Swedish culture, seeks to defend the interests of the Swedish-speaking Finns and to ward off attempts at linguistic oppression by the Finnish-speaking majority. The Old Finn party expresses its ideal in the words 'one nation, one language,' and looks to Germany for its inspiration, particularly to Bismarck's work of unification. It has many followers among the peasant proprietors, above all in the south and west, and also amongst the clergy. The Young Finns broke away from the Old Finns early in the 'nineties. Their views are more radical and their political tendencies of French and English rather than of German origin. The ranks of this party contain many scientists, artists and men of letters. They have always been on good terms with the Swedish party, their programme being 'one spirit and two languages.' The two parties united to resist Russian encroachments on the Constitution, while the Old Finns were more compliant. The Agrarians, who uphold the interests of the small land-owners, are also constitutionally minded. All these parties represent bourgeois opinion and combine against the Socialists. The last-named