Therefore actions out of course, irregular, and time-ferving, fhould not be received as precedents decifive, in justification of powers. These prejudices being removed, let the case of obedience be stated upon the true frame and œconomy of right in the world, and particularly upon the general or common law of • England.

In all governments that ever were or can be, the fupreme power, wherever it is lodged, is and must be uncontroulable and irresistible. That is a truth included in the notion of authority or power, for the one being granted, the other follows; as two and two are equal with four, because, in the idea, they are one and the fame. Government refiftible is no government, and thofe, who fay the contrary, are to be talked with no more than fceptics in philosophy, who pretend to doubt every thing, even of their own effence, which that very doubting demonftrates. So that, in any fettled ftate, the fupreme power, whether it refides in one, a few, or many, may not be lawfully refifted, in any case whatfoever, by any coercive force.

In England, the fupreme authority is by law lodged in the crown, together with the two houses of parliament, when duly affembled. It is not at all material whether, or how, it might have been otherwife placed; though it is naturally impoffible, that, in England, it can refide in all the people (as hath been vainly pretended to by fome democratic cities of old) the people of England being feparated too far afunder, ever to be immediately joined in one action. It is enough here, that, by indubitable law and right, the crown with the ftates of parliament, are to all intents the fupreme authority, being what is termed the legislative power, which no fubject ought to gainfay or refift. This will furely be granted; for whoever pretended to gainsay or resist an act of parliament, although, by natural poffibility, it may be as iniquitous as any action of a single person can be? Lord Coke will have it, that acts of parliament against common justice are void, as (for instance) if an act were past for erecting a judicature to determine parte inauditâ alterâ. But this must be underftood in confcience and natural reafon only, and not by the fentence of the courts of law; elfe, the acts to veft and divest private eftates, and attainders of abfentees, and divers others, would run a fhrewd rifk in Weftminster-hall.

It neceffarily happens, in the actual administration of government, that by reafon the perfons invested with power cannot act

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all things directly, the business is distributed in divers manners, according to the policy of feveral states, to anfwer the ends of government. As for the making, judging, and executing laws for punishing, defending, compelling, refifting, and the like. And thefe fubdivided offices, or branches of power, may be committed to fingle perfons, or bodies of men, as laws have provided; and then all thofe perfons or authorities become parts of the fupreme power in their respective provinces. And (without regard to wrong or right) as the whole fupreme power is, fo are they, in their proper jurisdictions, irresistible by law upon any pretence whatsoever; not allowing any man even liberty of selfpreservation. For whoever thought it lawful for one accused, or condemned capitally, knowing himself to be innocent, and grofsly abused in the judgment, to kill the judge or jury, or hang up the hangman, to fave his own neck? A man kills the bailiff that attacks him with force to take him; it is an offence capital, and he cannot plead fe defendendo; and the law requires no proof of malice. These confiderations reflect ftrongly upwards, upon the fupreme power itself: for if the derivatives, in their offices, may not be refifted on any pretence, how comes the principal, or fupreme in the execution of the whole power, to be resistible by force?

But farther, in England (whatever may be elsewhere) the grand diftinction of the fupreme power is into the legislative and the executive, which latter comprifeth all actual coercion and force entirely in itself. As to the former, as the law now stands (for the opinions and modes of speaking, which took place in ancient times are dropt) it is most certain, that in real effect, the two houfes of parliament have a co-authority with the crown in making laws; or it may be more agreeable, in other words, to fay a negative voice upon all legislative acts; or a little more, that is, a fort of rogation, or power to move for, and give a spring to, new laws by petition, or otherwise, as the practice is. So as, in the main, no new law, of any fort, can be made or discharged for taxing, or otherwife, without the formal and actual concurrence of both houfes of parliament; and either diffenting or nonconfenting, no new law is or can be made. And this union of powers, in the making of laws, is that which, in England, is properly the fupreme power abfolutely and to all intents. The next thing is to consider how it is distributed, that is, between the

crown and the two houses; for there is no power or authority which is not derived from, or under them, or one of them.

And first, it is not found that the two houses, beyond this concurrent power in legiflature, claim any proper agency whatsoever in the government. As for judicature in the lords house, it depends on the executive power of the crown, as other courts of justice do. Even private perfons have often the like propriety in jurisdiction; and it is the King's justice, though administered by the lords for the writs of error, that are the foundation of the legal jurifdiction, are returnable coram rege in parliamento. And, as to them and the commons, the office of counselling, petitioning, representing, &c. in virtue of the very words, excludes acting: and it is what every private person may, and often hath a right to do. But the houses, either feverally or jointly, have this capacity in the highest degree, being the greatest council, and most univerfal representative that can be called or affembled legally in England. But yet, excepting the share in the legislative and judicature, no acts of the houses, or of either of them, are coercive, or will impeach any man at common law for difobedience; and as for matters of privilege, grown into course, the coercion is still (formally) granted by the crown, and an officer of the crown, the ferjeant of the mace, affigned to execute the houfe's orders in matters of privilege. Elfe, the commons claim no judicature, not so much as power to adminifter an oath; and in matters of accufation, are petitioners to inform, as the sense of the word impetitio is, not unlike a grand inqueft of the whole nation. All which matters are mentioned, left any of thefe particulars, if omitted, might be mistaken for an authoritative fhare in the executive government of England.

Then farther, it appears, that all the fupreme power of the government of England, except only that which is lodged in the two houfes of parliament, is to be found in the crown. The general inference from thence is plain and obvious; but to purfue it by fteps. There are two conditions of the English government, the one in the fitting, and the other in the vacancy of parliament. The fitting, as to time, place, and continuance (faving the effect of the feptennial act), is known to be in the pure direction of the crown; yet confidering, that out of parliament, there may want means to petition or advise, de arduis regni, it is an act of confcientious truft and juftice in the crown to the people in general (the faid law apart), to hold frequent parliaments, and

much more fo according to that law, which turns it to a fpecificright, that the intent of it should be purfued. But in all points whatfoever, faving what has been alleged, the government of England, in and out of parliament, is exactly the fame; and none can fay, that the crown hath lefs power of government when the parliament is fitting than in vacation, nor more power in vacation. than when fitting.

To obviate an objection, that, in vacancy of parliaments, there is no fupreme power in effe, because no new laws can be made, without which capacity, the fupreme power is imperfect, and, in the fullness of that authority, ceaseth; let it be observed, that a power of pofitive legiflature is not incident to a fupreme power, but it is often perfect without any legislative power at all. As in Turkey, according to the maxims of policy there, no power upon earth can alter their laws, for the laws refult from the religion of the country; as here no power can alter the doctrines of the Gofpel. And, with them, the question is never what should be, but what is the law; and yet there is a fupreme power in the perfon of the Emperor, as must be confeffed. And the ftrains and abufes of minifters there, to ferve the turns of power, and the pleasure of great men, against justice and their laws, is no anfwer to the conftitution which, in theft, is unalter able; and yet there is a fupreme power. But to be more plain; if there were no laws at all in a country, but the will and pleafure of a potentate, or fome junto, were really and truly the law; that binds every fubject in confcience to obedience. Yet even that fupreme power is fubject to rules, or law; for there is not, nor can there be, any power upon the face of the earth, above, or without law. For where none are declared, and there is no fuperior to exact accounts, yet the law of natural juftice and equity prevail. And fo a defpotic ruler is tied up as much to the law, in duty and confcience, as any fub-governor is, who, by his commiffion, is reftricted to rules. But this duty. of all governments doth not impeach the notion of fupreme, whether it be declared, or refts in the mind by nature. Either is without coercion, and equally obligatory. If coercion be fupposed, then the power that coerceth takes the place of fupreme: and it is a pelion upon offa to fet power over power; for that which hath the coercion of others, must be incoercible itself. And fuppofing that, and no obligation but confcience and duty in the fupreme power, where is the difference, whether it be guided

by positive and declared law, or by natural justice? All that can be faid. is, that laws affift the weak capacities of fome men in power, by telling them what ought, and what ought not to be done, which their own natural skill might not perhaps have found out. Though I may fay there is fcarce a fincere perfon in the world, whom the golden rule, " do as you would be done by," will not direct: fo it is corrupt will, and not want of underftanding, which often misleads men; and takes place against pofitive law, as well as against natural juftice. So that it returns every way upon the confcience of powers; for if we admit a fuperior coercion, or in the common phrase, a liberty (with power) to refift, even that may be exercifed with as bad a conscience as the other; and then what is got by the bargain?

But it is a moft pernicious error to discharge the fupreme power of the obligation to justice for conscience fake, as they do, who fay acts of the fupreme power, or (in the forensical style) legislative acts, or acts of parliament, are always juft, and though made in partial cases, are not injurious because absolute. For a legislative or fupreme power, wherever it refides, is as much bound to common juftice and equity, in every public act, as a private man is obliged to common truft and honesty. And he that fays fuch powers do no injury, though their act is (as in poffibility it may be) moft unjust and wicked, because they cannot be contradicted, must, at the same time, allow that a private man who breaks a fecret truft, or kills his father, there being no evidence to check or convict him, is a very honest man, and hath done no wrong. Wherefore, if the confciences of men were not fome fecurity in the general among promifcuoùs focieties, and in the ordinary dealings of the world; the cafes of innocent men, who are most apt to rely on it, were very hard. But I dare fay, that however open differences make a noise, there is in the world, as bad as it is, more juftice among men, upon account of the common obligation of equity and confcience, than from all the procefs of law and coercion of the magiftrate all the world over. And these men, who argue fo ftrongly against all truft, especially that lodged in governors, which is and will be a pure truft as long as the world ftands, only fhew how little of that principle is to be found in themselves, which they think wholly wanting in others. It is most certain that numbers of men, whenever a public truft is repofed in them, may (I wish I could not as truly Lay fometimes do) break all the commandments of God, as well