nothing; and innumerable beings, at a word, let it be fo, starting out of non-entity, is no object of reafon, but of faith. Here again all things are infinite; and he who can clearly discover the contrivances of omniscience, may also perform the works of omnipotence. The very hearing of creation, is by the word of God.

3dly, The creatures were fo far from leading to the Creator, that they were the cause of the first and most universal idolatry, when the world forfook and denied him. The name of God remained, with an opinion of fome fuperior excellencies belonging to it; but the nature so totally forgot, that they arbitrarily annexed the name to the most glorious of vifible objects, the univerfe, the fun, moon, and stars, which they accordingly fell down to, and worshipped, as Gods.

They alfo deified the worft and wickedeft of men; but fuch as, from their atchievements, they looked upon above the common rank of mortals; the founders of kingdoms and cities, the inventors of arts and sciences, or the benefactors of mankind. The former continued to be the gods of philofophers, the latter of the commonality, during the life of paganism,

4thly, The very act of creation was looked upon as a thing fo incredible and impoffible, that it became the common opinion of all naturalifts, that "nothing can be made out of nothing*." They therefore universally held matter to be a self-existing principle, co-eternal with God, and that its pre-existence was abfolutely neceffary to the production of things. Accordingly, Jehovah is, through the Old Teftament, diftinguished from false Gods, as the maker of heaven and earth. And in the New Teftament the Apoftles begin their inftruction of the Gentiles. (not the Jews, who ever believed it) with that distinguishing attribute, they were entirely ignorant of, the living God who made heaven and earth, and all things therein t.'

* Ariftot. Phyf. 1, 4, 8.

+ Anaxagoras held two eternal principles. Plato made his mafter's hypothefis worfe, by adding a third. And Ariftotle denied both, as having no reafon to fupport them, and held the world to be eternal. Plato indeed (in his Timæus) calls God Inμcupyòs warǹg Te, the framer and father of the leffer gods. But profeffes to have teceived it from ancient original tradition; and does not infer more, than that will warrant; at the fame time fteadily holding the eternity of matter and motion. Galen fays, the opinion of Mofes is quite different from mine, and Plato's, and all other Greeks who have wrote judiciously concerning nature. De part. in corp. hum. us. Qrat. 9. c. 13. Simplicius, if he [Mofes] thinks this to have been the first genera

Omnipotence is an effential attribute of God. That power which reacheth to the utmoft poffibility of things, or, to whatever is not contrary to the divine nature, or does not imply a contradiction, which are no objects of power. This every Heathen denied to God. And all his ways and workmanship being unfearchable by man; he, for the manifestation of his own glory, revealed, and recorded by Mofes, what only could be known to himself; the act, and order, of creation.

It must then inconteftibly follow, that no contemplation of the vifible works, could lead thofe up to an invifible Creator, who believed a creation utterly impoffible. Confequently, no relations or fitness of things could be a fufficient direction to the world, whilst ignorant of the nearest relation man can ftand in to God, that of a creature to its Creator. And the foundation being thus apparently falfe, the whole pompous fabric built thereon, falls to the ground.

Nor were any fitneffes deducible from an agent who could not work without matter prepared to his hand, as wanting the perfections of a Supreme Being. And for moderns to infer them, from an act of infinite liberty and freedom, is, at beft, an unwarrantable prefumption. In the will and works of God every thing is impenetrable, further than he declares them; except therefore a man can comprehend all the ways which infinite wisdom. hath of knowing things, and infinite power of doing things; how they were at first contrived, and by what means they now fulfil their deftined agency; it will be ever impoffible to deduce from them, a complete and undoubted rule of life.

Nor is it needful; God no where requires it, but has given another method of inftruction. And could he deceive us in his word, he might alfo by his works, and man be fubjected to perpetual delufion. The word and works are equally from him, as Creator and Law-giver: he established the courfe of things, and order of nature, but gave them not as a law to us. That is, to

tion, and beginning of time, it is a fabulous narration. Com. in Arist. Phyf. L. 8. p. 268. Celfus derides the mofaic hiftory of creation, as an incredible unphilofophical tale. Orig. cont. Celf. L. 4. p. 186. And Longinus § 7. though he admired the grandeur wherewith Mofes defcribed the creation, looked upon it as an high ftrain of rhetorick, rather than a proper expreffion of that incomprehenfible efficacy, which attends the divine will and decree. See APPAndix D.

2

love him and keep his commandments, which are to be learned from his revealed word, not from the bible of the world.

Mr. Locke, however, has the easy method, by a Pythagorean ipfe dixit, of fliding over and folving matters which do not fquare with his effay. The real effence of all things is, with him, far beyond our discovery or apprehenfion. L. 3. c. 6. § 9. Yet men have faculties to discover enough in the creatures to lead them to a knowledge of their Creator and their duty. L. 2. c. 23. § 12. L. 4. c. 12. § 11. That is, men know nothing really of matter the nearest to them; yet by that knowledge of nothing, know enough to discover a spiritual infinite, removed at the most inconceivable distance from them. They are not fitted for the leaft, yet are equal to the greatest task.

Mr. Locke indeed fays this, but never attempts to prove it, except by fcriptural arguments, which he uses, when profeffedly treating of this fubject, L. 4. c. 10, &c. and he certainly included himself under his general rule, that moderns no way excel the ancients in ftrength of reason; and whatever they say better is from a light the others never had. His bare affertion, therefore, can be looked upon as no more than what he elsewhere calls, a confufed notion, taken up to ferve an hypothefis."

σε

And he certainly was as good a philofopher, who teaches, that "furely vain are all men by nature, who are ignorant of God; " and could not out of the good things that are seen, know him "that is; neither by confidering the works, did they acknow"ledge the work-master."Wifd. xiii. r.

$18th. So much has been faid of the knowledge of God, which is the foundation of all religion, that little need be added on other fubjects. A RESURRECTION, and the foul's IMMORTALITY, afe the ground-work of all reasonings about futurity; and if not clearly discoverable, natural law is of little worth; it being an eternity to come, that makes religion fo awful, and its motives fo powerful.

As to a RESURRECTION, it was ever looked upon as an article incredible and impoffible. The Stoics and Epicureans had never heard of fo ftrange a doctrine, and defpifed it. (Acts xvii.) Pliny fays, God cannot do all things, neither recal the dead, nor make mortal creatures immortal. N. H. L. 2. c. 7. And Celfus brands it, as the hope of worms, a filthy, abominable, impoffible thing,

what God neither will, nor can do. Orig. cont. Celf. L. 5. p. 240.

Of the foul's IMMORTALITY, it may fuffice to fay, that as the divine power and goodness are the only stability of things, by which all created beings are brought into existence, and enjoy a continuance of it: fo, whether they fhall be annihilated, or have a permanence through all eternity, depends wholly on the will of God; and what he will do cannot be learned but from revelation; no principle being clearer than this, that whatever had a beginning, may also have an end; that it fhall not, must rest on the divine teftimony.

For had the foul a natural immortality, the origin of life in itfelf, it could never ceafe to be, but would be God. If its immortality be only positive, it is a special act of the Creator; and what infinite liberty did, or would do, could only be declared by him.

But as all things beyond the grave are, to nature, a land of darkness, the best arguments it could offer were falfe and inconclufive. There never was agreement, becaufe no certainty. Some doubted, others denied, not one had an affurance of it. Whence all their difputes ended in nothing but words, and empty contentions. All they could offer was, fays Grotius, conjecturæ, incerta, vage, fragiles, doubtful, vague, and weak conjectures.

Immortality was an hearfay, which pleafed fome, convinced none. If the foul furvives, well! if not, no evil will enfue; was the utmost limit of human understandings. (See APPENDIX E.)

Of a FUTURE STATE, whofe extremes of happiness or mifery fo clofely bind the foul of man, their opinions were equally wavering and contradictory; fome broken remains of antiquity carried down the river of time, fadly defaced, and ridiculously difguifed; but what none could rectify. Yet, fays Bp. Wilkins, Nat. R. L. 1. c. II. " what bears, and wolves, and devils, would men prove to one another, without the belief of rewards and punishments in another life?" true; but were they not looked upon as children's tales, without influence or regard? Thefe things are only knowable by revelation; to that are owing humanity and civility, as well as reafon and religion. And because the voice of it was but little heard, or not at all, by fo many nations, ever was the true caufe, and still is, of their being wolves and devils.

Yet thefe articles were fteadily believed by the Hebrews. Martha knew her brother fhould rife again in the refurrection at the last day. It was the hope of Ifrael, and the promise of God made unto the fathers. A future ftate of rewards and punishments was alfo fo clearly revealed in the writings of Mofes and the prophets, that he who hearkened not to them would not be perfuaded though one rofe from the dead, and attefted the reality of it.

The fame will hold good of every other article. Some light fhone forth in darkness, amidst the few who travelled to glean up knowledge. But all primæval truths became fo miferably altered, that little more than their names remained. And of these, natural religion shall have the full benefit, in the manner and meafure they were taught by the wifeft schools.

As to their MORALS, they were of neceffity loose and inconfiftent, having no rule to try them by, or principles to deduce them from. It is agreed, that there can be no morality, except there be a God, whofe nature is the firft and great exemplar of it. Therefore, what mens notions of God are, fuch will be their morals; if one be grofs, imperfect, and false; so must be the other. The propofitions are convertible; tell us your gods, and we will tell what your morals are: tell us your morals, and we will tell what are your gods. All were alike bad, their gods were vanities, their worship accurfed, and their morals the shame of reason, and the stain of nature.

§ 19th. But it will be afked, how then can we account for what knowledge, be it more or lefs, the Gentiles had, and whence was it derived? the answer is, from TRADITION; as may appear by feveral confiderations.

ift. Nature being the fame in all, take revelation away, and mankind must have been under an univerfal light, or total darknefs; there being little difference, but what inftruction makes. This ceased, as men difperfed, and reports became daily more uncertain; like the faint twilight on the horizon, when the fun is fet, which gives fome notices, but very imperfect ones, of diftant objects: where that was quite extinguished, it was darknefs, as the fhadow of death. This our excellent Hooker confirms (Ec. Pol. L. 1. § 13.) “ To judge what hazard truth is in, when it paffeth through the hands of report, we need only con