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THE INSTRUCTIONS TO CLINTON

737 operations against the southern colonies.1 A fortnight later Germain's tone was greatly changed; the French treaty had altered the situation, the recruits destined for North America must be diverted elsewhere and only three battalions could be spared from the United Kingdom. Offensive operations in North America must be abandoned and after providing 3000 men to defend Florida, Clinton was to despatch 5000 more to attack St Lucia, strategically about the most important of the French West Indies. These reductions would entail evacuating Philadelphia, and Clinton was to proceed forthwith to New York, there to "await the issue of the treaty which we have authorised our commissioners to propose". Should the negotiations fail Clinton was at liberty to evacuate New York for Rhode Island and to secure that post and Halifax, sending any surplus troops to Canada, where Haldimand was replacing Carleton.

These official "instructions" differ somewhat from Germain's private covering letter,3 which contemplates retaining New York as the base for coastal expeditions against New England, of which the instructions say nothing. The main upshot, however, is clear. Clinton was thrown back on the defensive, and any serious offensive would be directed against the French West Indies, indispensable to them as bases for carrying on the naval war. Since the King would not hear of frankly admitting American independence, even to concentrate against France, there was no better alternative. Provided that Sandwich's administration enabled the Navy to maintain local maritime superiority by preventing the French fleets quitting their ports unobserved and unfought, Canada, Rhode Island and New York need not fear the unassisted efforts of the Americans. Moreover, coastal expeditions against New England, if inglorious, were more likely to prove effective than capturing cities for which the Americans would not risk a decisive battle. In their farms and shipping they were vulnerable, and in advocating the extension of operations to the south, because its resources and trade were the financial mainstay of the rebellion, Germain was using an argument to which the peculiar circumstances lent some support.1

It was a severe winter; indeed the hardships endured at Valley Forge have become proverbial and Washington did wonders in keeping any army together. Howe has been severely criticised for leaving his enemy unmolested.5 Had he known the plight to which Washington was reduced, he might well have risked an attack. Wellington's mid-winter pounce upon Ciudad Rodrigo in 1812 was accomplished despite very similar difficulties, but Howe lacked Wellington's readiness to run big risks for a big prize and fell far

1 Germain to Clinton, 8 March 1777, C.O. v, 95; George III's Letters (ed. Donne), II, 148. • Germain to Clinton, 21 March, ibid.

• Stopford-Sackville MSS, п, 132.

Hist. MSS Comm., Castle Howard MSS, p. 393; Amherst's letter in Corresp. of George III, IV, 249.

CHBE I

Ibid. IV, 345.

47

short of him as an organiser, while the practical difficulties of supply and transport involved in moving out in winter to Valley Forge and provisioning and sheltering the troops during the reduction of a naturally strong and well-entrenched position must not be overlooked. His inactivity would be easier to defend had he taken the field directly the weather permitted. But his failure to do this1 and his notorious neglect of discipline suggest that he merely let things slide. Clinton, who relieved Howe on 11 May, was hardly the man to redeem the situation. Not without capacity, though a better critic than leader, he was querulous, lacked decision and never inspired confidence in officers or men. The immediate problem, complicated by the presence, as at Boston, of many Loyalists who could not be abandoned to their fellow-countrymen's tender mercies, was the evacuation of Philadelphia. Howe's inaction had allowed Washington, admirably assisted by a competent German officer, Steuben, to make great strides towards disciplining and improving his army, and with the spring its numbers also had increased enormously. But Washington had adhered rigidly to the defensive, though minor activities, mainly collisions between parties who were collecting supplies or raids on outposts and depôts, had been frequent. He was likely to be offered a chance of taking his enemy at a disadvantage, as Clinton had decided to return to New York by land and would be encumbered by a great accumulation of baggage, "in which”, he wrote, "I was vulnerable". The fleet was so much dispersed upon other necessary services" that Lord Howe could not say when an escort could be collected, and anyhow there were not enough transports for all the troops and the Loyalists. Moreover, if winds were unfavourable, the move by sea might take many weeks, and with the British main body immobilised while in transit, New York, which was none too strongly held, would be exposed to Washington. Whereas the march across the Jerseys should not take over ten days and would meanwhile protect New York.

Clinton, having embarked the Loyalists and all the stores he could, left Philadelphia on 18 June, and advanced steadily despite occasional opposition, making for Amboy. At Allen's Town he learned that Washington was over the Delaware and moving towards him while Gates would probably dispute the passage of the Raritan. Clinton accordingly swerved aside towards Sandy Hook, sending Knyphausen ahead with four brigades to escort his twelve miles of baggage. After allowing Knyphausen a good start Clinton had just reached Monmouth Court House when the American advanced guard under Lee appeared and opened artillery fire (27 June). Clinton promptly faced about and attacked vigorously, quickly driving Lee's men in some 1 Corresp. of George III, IV, 352.

Stuart, passim; Biddulph, "Letters 1779-1783", Am. H.R. XXIX; Corresp. of George III, IV, 367. 3 Castle Howard MSS, p. 380.

• Clinton to Germain, 23 May and 5 June, C.O. v, 96; Castle Howard MSS, pp. 379–83.

LORD HOWE THWARTS D'ESTAING

739 disorder from two successive positions. Reinforcements from their main body enabled them to rally on rising ground behind a marsh and as his troops were exhausted by the great heat-more men died from heatstroke than from wounds-Clinton decided not to press the attack. Accordingly he drew back to the first position captured, where he maintained himself with little difficulty till 10 p.m. when he marched off by moonlight unmolested to rejoin Knyphausen, who had made practically unimpeded progress.1 Both sides returned about 350 casualties, the British losses including sixty deaths from heat-stroke, but Clinton, who had achieved his object and secured his retreat to Sandy Hook, had better reason for satisfaction than Washington, who had missed a promising chance. Washington was furious with Lee, accusing him of cowardice and incompetence, but Lee had at least detained Clinton and given the American main body time to get into action.

3

Clinton reached New York only just in time. That very day (8 July) thirteen ships of the line from Toulon under d'Estaing had arrived in the Delaware. The British Government had had warnings of the preparations in time to have intercepted d'Estaing at Gibraltar, but though in March Sandwich had alleged that thirty-five of the line were ready, not even twelve could be got to sea in time, even by stripping the others, and on 18 May d'Estaing passed the Straits unhindered. Delayed by the bad sailing of his ships and the need for practising manœuvres, he spent another seven weeks crossing the Atlantic, and Howe had cleared the Delaware with ten days to spare. D'Estaing followed promptly to Sandy Hook, arriving on 22 July. He was greatly superior to Howe, whose squadron, being intended for service in the shallow coastal waters, contained nothing larger than sixty-four-gun ships.5 "On our side all was at stake", wrote one Englishman. "Had the men-of-war been defeated, the transports and victuallers must have been destroyed and the Army of course must have fallen with us." Had d'Estaing dared to risk the difficulties of the navigation, he might have anticipated by three years what de Grasse achieved at Yorktown. But though personally brave, d'Estaing lacked enterprise and resolution, and Howe's masterly dispositions increased the risks of an attack. The tradition in the French Navy discouraged risking ships and incurring losses to gain a decision, and d'Estaing sheered off to Rhode Island where 6000 men under Pigot were facing 10,000 Americans under Sullivan. Pigot had delayed Sullivan's preparations by several successful raids,' but could not prevent d'Estaing from passing into the Bay to support the

1 Clinton to Germain, 5 July, C.O. v, 96.

2 Corresp. of George III, m, 380 seqq. and IV, 90, 113.

* N.R.Š. xxxII, p. xxvii; George ÏÏÏ's Letters (ed. Donne), II, 173, 176; Parl. Hist. XIX, 1153 seqq. Lacour-Gayet, pp. 149 seqq. 5 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 383 seqq.

Castex, Les Idées Militaires de la Marine Française au XVIIIme Siècle, p. 238. ? Pigot to Clinton, 27 May, C.O. v, 96.

attack (8 August). Realising that Rhode Island would make the French a splendid base, Howe, though still weaker than d'Estaing, despite reinforcements, hastened to Pigot's help. His appearance brought the French out of the Bay at once (10 August). By clever manœuvres he avoided an unequal action but lured d'Estaing out to sea, hoping to catch him between himself and Byron's squadron, then daily expected from England.

On 11 August, however, a gale scattered both fleets, dismasting several vessels and preventing a battle.1 Howe returned to Sandy Hook for repairs; d'Estaing, whose crippled flagship narrowly escaped capture by a British "fifty", regained Newport (19 August), but only to inform Sullivan, who had meanwhile begun siege operations against Pigot's lines, that he must retire to Boston to refit. His departure (22 August) compelled Sullivan to quit the island, not without some difficulty in keeping off Pigot's pursuit (29 August),2 and two days later Howe arrived, bringing Clinton and 5000 men. Having missed catching Sullivan, Clinton raided the noted privateer rendezvous of Bedford successfully, destroying sixteen ships, while Howe followed d'Estaing to Boston. A fortnight later Byron reinforced the blockading squadron: notorious for his bad luck as "Foul weather Jack", Byron must have caught d'Estaing off Newport had not the gale of 11 August dispersed his fleet, and in November another gale drove him away from Boston. This allowed d'Estaing to leave for the West Indies, for which 5000 British troops under Grant sailed the same day (4 November) escorted by a squadron under Commodore Hotham.

D'Estaing left his allies disappointed and furious. The honours certainly were with Howe, whose achievement in foiling every move of d'Estaing's much superior force is "unsurpassed in the annals of naval defensive warfare". The credit is wholly his, for the Admiralty had neither reinforced him adequately nor penned the French up in their home ports. Mainly through administrative shortcomings5 Byron's start had been delayed till 9 June, while the Channel Fleet, which Keppel took to sea on 12 June, only mustered twenty of the line and had to put back for reinforcements on discovering that d'Orvilliers at Brest had nearer thirty. D'Orvilliers, therefore, got to sea unwatched (8 July), but was still within 100 miles of Ushant when Keppel, making for the "Western Squadron's" traditional cruising grounds, sighted him (23 July). Several days of clever fencing ended with an encounter (27 July) in which the fleets passed on opposite tacks, the French to windward. Much damage was done: the British firing at the hulls inflicted heavy casualties, the French firing at 1 Hist. MSS Comm., Cornwallis MSS, p. 317. Pigot to Clinton, 31 Aug., C.O. v, 96.

3 Castle Howard MSS, p. 388.

6

⚫ Mahan, in Clowes, W. L., History of the British Navy, III, 411; Cornwallis MSS, p. 317. Corresp. of George III, tv, 130 seqq. • Ibid. IV, 206.

KEPPEL'S ACTION OFF USHANT

741 the masts crippled their enemy's power of movement. After passing d'Orvilliers wore, hoping to cut off some disabled British ships, but thereby surrendered the weather gage to Keppel who interposed to cover his cripples and would have closed with the French had not his rear division under Palliser failed to support him. D'Orvilliers, however, made no attempt to renew the action, drawing off in the night and regaining Brest, rather pleased to have fought the old enemy and escaped a Quiberon. Keppel raged against Palliser's backwardness which had spoilt his chance of a victory, and a court martial followed.1 This, to the general surprise, resulted in Palliser's acquittal, for if Palliser justified himself by alleging that Keppel's orders were inconsistent with the necessity for keeping "the line", personal and party rancour evidently had their share in his inactivity. But Ushant, if usually reckoned "indecisive", was negatively important for the British failure to establish naval supremacy. Six of d'Orvilliers' ships were with de Grasse off Yorktown. Had Sandwich and Palliser allowed Keppel to make Ushant a victory, would the war have lasted till September 1781?

Both fleets were at sea again within a month but did not meet,3 and with the winter the chief centre of activity shifted to the West Indies. That archipelago's great economic importance made the mastery of its waters a vital issue, and while the Americans were determined not to let the French recover Canada, their treaty stipulated that France might acquire any of the British West Indies. France had begun well by capturing the weakly-garrisoned Dominica (September 1778), Barrington and the small British squadron on the station being expressly tied down to the defence of Barbados. It was not because Barrington lacked enterprise that Dominica had gone: directly Grant and Hotham arrived from New York (10 December) he dashed at St Lucia and landed the troops who stormed the hills which overlook the main anchorages (12 December). It was a risky stroke, for d'Estaing, who had reached Martinique on 9 December, promptly hastened to St Lucia but found Barrington's seven battleships so skilfully posted across the harbour mouth that after what Grant called a "flimsy" attack he bore off. Then, landing his 9000 troops, he hurled them at Grant's positions covering the harbours (18 December). Success would have involved Barrington's capture, but Grant's troops triumphantly repulsed the assault, inflicting 1600 casualties to their own 170. D'Estaing thereupon retired discomfited to Martinique leaving St Lucia in British keeping. Its capture was a model of naval and military co-operation and had considerable value, as from St Lucia the British could "look into the harbour of Martinique", the French naval headquarters.

1 Ibid. IV, 225 seqq.

Hist. MSS Comm., Pembroke MSS, p. 382.

3 Castle Howard MSS, pp. 370-1.

4 Grant to Germain, C.O. v, 318.

5 Ibid.

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