to withdraw under cover of night to Saratoga (8 October). But the Americans were already between them and Fort Edward, and though Burgoyne wrote to Howe, "Had all my troops been British I believe I should have made my way through Mr. Gates' army", his Germans were already showing a strong disposition to surrender. "It was notorious that they meant to have given one fire and then clubbed their muskets".1 The end came on 17 October, when Gates signed a convention by which Burgoyne's starving men, 4880 all told, capitulated on condition that they should proceed to Boston for shipment to England but should not serve again in America during the war. The terms were more favourable than Burgoyne's situation entitled him to expect, though the effect of Clinton's operations on Gates's mind must not be forgotten, and Congress was naturally furious with Gates for having conceded them, but there is no excuse whatever for the ill-faith with which on various pretexts it evaded the execution of the convention, detained officers and men in captivity, refused even to exchange them, endeavoured to seduce the men into joining their ranks and failed to carry out the stipulations for their feeding, housing and clothing. The responsibility for Burgoyne's disaster is not one man's only. That Burgoyne either failed to realise how greatly Howe's change of plan had aggravated his own difficulties or gambled on the doubtful chance of effective assistance from Clinton is arguable. Yet, despite the disclaimers of Howe and Germain, Burgoyne's orders certainly were precise and unconditional, and clearly he regarded his errand as "a forlorn hope". He should perhaps never have advanced beyond Fort Edward when he discovered how serious the transport and supply questions were: a prompt retreat after 19 September would have been justifiable and possibly successful, but one cannot better Sir J. W. Fortescue's description of what he and his men did as the "most honourable attempt to achieve the impossible on record". Howe's responsibility is much heavier: it is easier to follow his shifting schemes than to understand his motives. He was certainly disappointed in the numbers placed at his disposal;3 that he thought a direct attack on Philadelphia the shortest road to the decisive battle he desired is his main defence: but he over-estimated the extent to which it would divert opposition from Burgoyne, not realising that the New Englander would bestir himself far more for his own country than for Pennsylvania. His estimate of the time Burgoyne would take to reach Albany was fairly correct, and probably he did not wish to risk an unsupported advance up the Hudson or to condemn the main force to virtual inactivity by waiting till Burgoyne drew near. Perhaps he thought that on sanctioning his change of 1 Royal Institution MSS, 1, 140. 3 Howe to Germain, 2 April 1777, C.O. v, 94. 2 Ibid. 1, 143. 4 Corresp. of George III, m, 507. HOWE'S SUCCESS AT THE BRANDYWINE 733 plan Germain would alter Burgoyne's instructions, but it is difficult to acquit him of having violated the elementary principle of concentration of effort. Still Howe can plead that Burgoyne was not under his orders and that the co-ordination of the different forces was the minister's task not his. Certainly the heaviest responsibility is Germain's: having approved of Howe's proposal to attack Philadelphia he should have realised how vitally Burgoyne's situation was thereby affected. Germain had been a soldier, yet no inexperienced civilian ignorant of strategy ever surpassed the folly of Germain's idea that the attack on Philadelphia, which he had just authorised,1 might be executed in time for Howe to co-operate with Burgoyne. Howe had received that letter when approaching the Head of Elk: his reply (30 August)2 reveals him as already disillusioned about the expected Loyalist support, one of his main motives for moving to Pennsylvania: he could not, he declared, act up to the King's expectations in returning to the Hudson, since his progress, apart from the enemy's army, "must be greatly impeded by the prevailing hostile disposition of the inhabitants". His progress was certainly leisurely: having landed on 25 August he did not really begin his advance till 3 September or approach Washington's army, strongly posted behind the Brandywine Creek at Chad's Ford, twenty-five miles south-west of Philadelphia, till 10 September. He was slightly weaker than Washington, but boldly despatched half his army under Cornwallis round by some fords twelve miles upstream, to turn Washington's right, while the remainder under the Hessian Knyphausen advanced straight against Chad's Ford. By 11 a.m. Knyphausen had reached the creek after hard fighting with Washington's advanced troops in which he repulsed an American counter-stroke. But Cornwallis was still miles away and nearly five hours elapsed before he began to press in upon Sullivan, whom Washington, undeterred by the demonstrations to which Knyphausen had till then to confine himself, had shifted to cover his threatened flank. By 4p.m. Cornwallis was attacking with great vigour, though his men had already covered eighteen miles since daybreak: before long he had driven Sullivan headlong from his first position and was nearing Dilworth, behind Washington's right. Here, however, Washington interposed his reserve to cover Sullivan's retreat eastward and to prevent Cornwallis cutting off Knyphausen's opponents. Knyphausen had at last attacked in earnest, but though Grant's brigade forded the creek and stormed the battery which commanded the passage, it was too late for close action, and covered by the darkness and the woods the Americans escaped, though with the loss of a dozen guns, 400 prisoners and 1000 casualties. Howe's tactics have 1 Germain to Howe, 18 May, C.O. v, 94. 2 C.O. v, 94. been highly praised, but the lack of co-ordination between Knyphausen's appearance and that of Cornwallis was the main reason for the incompleteness of the victory. Brandywine was followed by a move to the left which perplexed Washington greatly and resulted in the British crossing the Schuylkill near Valley Forge on 22 September, whereupon Washington, not prepared to risk destruction for Philadelphia, retired into the hills farther north, leaving the British to occupy the town (26 September). Their immediate need was to re-open direct communications with the fleet by capturing the forts which covered the obstacles to the navigation of the Delaware. The next week saw this begun and the American flotilla driven off up river; but Washington, recently reinforced by 1500 men from the Hudson and 1000 from Virginia, ventured a night attack on Howe's main body at Germantown, now reduced by various detachments to about 8000 men. His plan, which involved the co-operation of four converging columns, was too elaborate for the training, discipline and organisation of his men; a thick fog, which developed soon after sunrise on 4 October, added complications, and finally Sullivan's column in the right centre overlapped the left centre column, which fired into it from behind. The British outposts offered a stubborn resistance, especially at a stone house just north of the village where six companies held up nearly 3000 Americans, and the delay they imposed allowed the main body to prepare its counter-stroke. This was delivered with complete success, the American right being routed, whereupon the left, which had gained some initial advantage, retired also, only just in time to evade pursuit by Cornwallis, who arrived from Philadelphia with reinforcements. Washington's venturesomeness had cost over 1000 men, including 450 prisoners, but his readiness to take the offensive again did something to cancel the effects of the defeat at Brandywine and made no small impression on Howe. There seems little substance, however, in Washington's complaint that the Americans had retreated at the moment of victory: had they stood their ground much longer, Howe might have been presented with his decisive battle. He had had 550 casualties-more, relatively to the forces engaged, than at Brandywine-but his troops had fully retained their ascendancy in battle. After Germantown Howe resumed his operations for opening the Delaware. A Hessian attempt on Red Bank (22 October) was repulsed with heavy loss, but a fresh attack in which ships co-operated3 captured Mud Island (16 November), whereupon Cornwallis crossed the Delaware and cleared Red Bank. On this the Americans dismantled and burned their shipping and abandoned further opposition. Howe had established himself solidly in Pennsylvania, but he had soon to realise that Burgoyne's disaster had neutralised his own 1 Fortescue, m, 216. 2 Washington, Works, v, 69. 3 N.R.S. Xxx, 154. THE EFFECTS OF SARATOGA 735 success. He had already written on 30 August1 that he must have more troops: in the previous year he had had enough because he had then no conquests to guard-a telling criticism of his own recent proceedings-but as things stood, he could not hope to conclude the war with his present force: on 23 October2 his demand became one for 10,000 additional men besides drafts. If operations were to be extended to the southern colonies, as Germain, trusting blindly as usual to over-confident Loyalist refugees, had already suggested,3 15,000 men would be needed besides garrisons for New York, Rhode Island and Philadelphia. He concluded by requesting his relief in view of the "little attention given to his recommendations". Germain, who received this letter early in December, replied (11 December) that no answer was possible till Howe's own campaign was finished and particulars of Burgoyne's fate had arrived, but that enough was already known to show the need for material alterations in the plan of campaign. This necessity did not really arise out of the military situation in America. Saratoga had been but a negative success and might have been retrieved had the general situation remained unchanged. It had merely foiled Burgoyne's attempt to secure the Hudson line; it was not followed, or likely to be, by an attack on Canada or New York, and though Gates reinforced Washington with 4000 men, their arrival only emboldened him to advance to Whitemarsh, fourteen miles from Philadelphia; he did not venture another Germantown, nor could Howe draw him into fighting. Howe moved out to Whitemarsh (4 December), captured some advanced posts, repulsed a reconnaissance in force, sought for a weak spot to attack, and, finding none, withdrew to Philadelphia, letting Washington establish himself at Valley Forge in quarters far less comfortable than Howe's but which allowed him to restrict considerably the area from which the British could draw supplies and forage. Outside America, however, Saratoga had decided the doubts of France and brought her into the war. This was hardly unexpected; as far back as 14 August Germain had warned Howe that France and Spain would probably be drawn in "if this rebellion continues much longer". North's ministry is therefore doubly culpable that when France signed the treaty acknowledging American independence (6 February 1778) the British Navy was found unready for war against its old enemy. Sandwich cannot plead absence of warning or escape the main responsibility for the administrative shortcomings which largely explain the British fleet's failure to repeat its successes of the Seven Years' War and to keep the ring as clear for the army's operations overseas as when Anson inspired the Admiralty. The abandonment of the strategy of Anson and Hawke was at the bottom of naval failures on the American coast and in the West Indies, but 1 C.O. V, 94. 3 Germain to Howe, 3 Sept. ibid. 2 Ibid. the chaos in the dockyards and administrative services was mainly responsible for the Navy's inability to keep the French cooped up in their home ports. Till 1778 the Navy's part, though essential, had been secondary. After Lord Howe replaced Graves and a more adequate squadron was detailed for the work, the naval situation in America had improved appreciably. The privateers, though still troublesome, had been checked, and much damage inflicted on American commerce: one frigate alone, the Orpheus, captured thirty-three American privateers or merchantmen in two months between Rhode Island and the Bay of Fundy.1 The fleet had kept open the army's communications and had carried General Howe wherever he wished to go: if he had failed to reap full advantage of the mobility with which his troops were thus invested, Admiral Howe was blameless. Now the case was altered. Choiseul and Maurepas had made the French Navy of 1778 far more formidable than in the Seven Years' War.2 It was certainly imbued with dubious strategical and tactical doctrines, but, if its improvement must not be exaggerated, in training, administration and numbers it had never so nearly equalled the British, and it was in the happy position of having much less to guard, much more to attack. The Navy's ability to secure freedom of transit might at any moment be challenged by the appearance in American waters of a squadron equal or even superior to that on which the army's mobility depended. The despatches clearly reflect the altered situation. On 30 November 1777 Howe emphasised the vital need for large reinforcements: to find an offensive corps for 1778 he must evacuate either New York or Philadelphia or Rhode Island, though he could preserve all three by remaining on the defensive if a substantial reinforcement could not be produced till 1779. There was more prospect of such a reinforcement as the news of Saratoga had roused patriotic feeling in England: ordinary recruiting had greatly improved, and new regiments were being raised by public subscription, Liverpool, Manchester, Edinburgh and Glasgow and several leading noblemen undertaking the task.4 North's ministry also resolved to attempt again reconciliation and appointed commissioners to proceed to America for that purpose, but Germain specially warned Clinton, who had been selected to replace Howe (February 1778), not to relax military precautions on that account. He held out hopes of large reinforcements, but the war was now to be prosecuted on different lines. After securing the places in his possession Clinton was to confine himself to systematic coastal attacks on New England, to be followed by 1 Rear-Admiral James's Journal, N.R.S. vi, 42 seqq. Lacour-Gayet, La Marine Militaire sous Louis XVI; Chevalier, Histoire de la Marine Française, bk 1. 3 C.O. George III's Letters (ed. Donne), II, 98 seqq.; Corresp. of George III, ш, 511 seqq. and IV, 1-35. 95. |