FRANCE AND CORSICA 697 Cabinet, now nominally led by the Duke of Grafton, he landed an army and overwhelmed the islanders. It had been open to Great Britain to declare that the occupation of Corsica by France would be regarded as a casus belli.1 Chatham would certainly have done so, and a timely movement of the British fleet in the Mediterranean would doubtless have secured the independence of the island. But opinion in England was divided. Many felt a generous sympathy for a nation gallantly struggling for freedom. Many, like Burke, dreaded the effect of a French occupation upon the maritime position of Great Britain in the Mediterranean. "Corsica a French province is terrible to me", he declared.2 Others agreed with Dr Johnson that England should mind her own affairs, and leave the Corsicans to mind theirs. This division of opinion was reflected in the Cabinet, where Lord Weymouth and the Bedford party were strictly pacificist and held the view expressed by Dr Johnson. Shelburne, the Duke of Grafton and others of the school of Chatham, on the other hand, were for making a firm diplomatic stand. They believed that any weakness on the part of Great Britain would encourage France and Spain to make further aggressions—a view shared by Frederick the Great1— and that at the present juncture they were financially incapable of waging war. The annual accounts of France showed a deficit of thirty million livres, and war, it was realised, would mean national bankruptcy. The bellicose attitude of Choiseul was therefore rendering his political position somewhat precarious.5 Though the British Government finally acquiesced in the annexation of Corsica by France, the incident fanned the flames of popular dislike for that country. It was hinted by Burke that Shelburne was forced to resign on account of the warmth of his remonstrances, but this would seem to have been incorrect. The fears of Burke and Shelburne were destined to be confirmed in a curious way, and to make the acquisition of this new colony by France an event of paramount importance in the history of the world. For it happened just in time for Napoleon Buonaparte to be born a French subject. The annexation of Corsica (15 September 1770) was a step towards the assertion of French supremacy in the Mediterranean, which, as we have seen, formed one part of Choiseul's grandiose scheme. Another move in the same direction was the extension into Egypt of French trade and influence, already predominant in the Levant. This penetration was ardently encouraged by Choiseul, who thus anticipated, and probably inspired, the policy and campaigns of Napoleon. The next move was on the part of Spain. As the date approached 1 Lans. Ho. MSS, quoted by Fitzmaurice, 1, 362. 6 Boswell, Life of Johnson (ed. Birkbeck Hill), I, 22. * Cavendish, Debates, 1, 40. Burke, Thoughts on the present discontents; Mahon, v, 203; Fitzmaurice, Life of Shelburne, I. 386. to which Choiseul had looked forward, the weakness of the British Government became daily more evident. The affair of Wilkes and the Middlesex election was followed by the outbreak in America over the tea tax. Lord North had succeeded the Duke of Grafton. Relying upon the support of France, Spain took up the question of the Falkland Islands and acted there in a manner so high-handed that it had all the appearance of a manœuvre intended to force a war. The strategical value of these islands, and their fertility, had been recently insisted upon by Anson. He had not visited them in his voyage (1740-4), but reported enthusiastically upon them to the Admiralty. It was neither as a whaling station nor as a plantation that this archipelago was of importance. But by reason of its proximity to the Straits of Magellan, Buenos Aires and Brazil it offered strategical advantages of position as a naval base in case of war with Spain, and as a place of refreshment for ships sailing the South Seas and opening up the trade which the Spaniards so jealously guarded. First sighted by John Davis in 1592 and probably by Sir Richard Hawkins in 1594, who named them "Hawkins' Maiden Land", the islands were afterwards called "Falkland Islands" by the English. The first recorded landing was made by Captain John Strong of the privateer Farewell in 1690. By the French, whose ships from St Malo visited them in the course of trading to South America, they were called "Îles Malouines". No attempt to colonise them was made till after the publication of Anson's Voyage in 1748. A British expedition was then designed. In April 1749 the Duke of Bedford instructed the British ambassador at Madrid to explain that it was intended to send some sloops in order to make a full discovery of them, but not to settle there. Such a move, however, especially in the light of Anson's recently published praise of the islands as a fertile and strategic post, could only be regarded by Spain as a threatened invasion of the territorial integrity and commercial exclusiveness of her colonial Empire, which was a cardinal point in her national policy. The Spanish minister, therefore, firmly expressed his dissent. The South Seas, declared General Wall, were the exclusive dominion of Spain. Any intrusion such as was contemplated would be regarded as an act of war. Without admitting the Spanish right, the British Government abandoned their scheme for the present. Soon after the Peace of Paris Choiseul despatched Monsieur de Bougainville to make a settlement there. Whilst he was establishing himself at Port St Louis on East Falkland (1764), Commodore Byron, as the result of Anson's recommendations, was secretly despatched by Lord Egmont, First Lord of the Admiralty, to survey the islands. He entered the harbour of West Falkland, named it Port Egmont (15 January 1765) and continued his voyage. His report being favourable, 1 Brit. Mus., Harleian MSS, 5101; Sloane MSS, 86, 3295. 2 Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 35503, f. 188, etc. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 699 Captain Macbride was sent out to take formal possession of the islands. A blockhouse was erected and a small British garrison established (January 1766), to support which another vessel was sent out with stores. In the same year, as the result of Spanish protests against the presence of the French, Choiseul handed over Port St Louis to the Spaniards, who renamed it Port Soledad (October 1766). They appear to have held it mainly with the idea of expansion in the direction of the Magellan Straits. The presence of the English on West Falkland was apparently not yet known to them. But the existence of an English settlement somewhere in the South Seas was vaguely rumoured. The Spanish Minister of Marine accordingly instructed Don Francisco Bucarelli, the Governor of Buenos Aires, to expel any such settlement, by force if necessary, when it should be located (February 1768).1 In December 1769 a Spanish schooner, sent out to reconnoitre from Soledad, met H.M.S. Tamar (Captain Hunt) on a similar cruise from Port Egmont. Hunt ordered the Spaniard to return, and threatened to fire upon her if she continued to approach Port Egmont. The Spanish Governor of Soledad thereupon called upon the British to evacuate the island. Hunt returned the compliment, and asserted the British title by both discovery and settlement. On hearing of this incident, the Governor of Buenos Aires sent two ships with troops to Soledad, which put into Port Egmont for water (February 1770). Hunt then sailed for England, and on his arrival in June gave the British Government their first intimation of the Spanish protest. After Hunt had left, Bucarelli proceeded to put his instructions into execution. He sent from Buenos Aires an expeditionary force consisting of five frigates and sixteen hundred men to turn the British out of Port Egmont. Resistance to a force so overwhelming was out of the question. After a few shots had been fired, the British garrison capitulated (10 June 1770). The Spanish commander then removed the rudder of H.M. sloop-of-war Favourite. He thus made certain that the news of the affair should reach Madrid before it could be known in London. It was announced to the British ministers in London in a somewhat truculent tone by the Spanish ambassador, Prince de Masserano. The news of this insult to the British flag aroused intense indignation in England. Instructions were at once sent to James Harris, afterwards Earl of Malmesbury, who was acting as chargé d'affaires at Madrid, to demand in peremptory terms the restitution of the Falkland Islands and the disavowal of Bucarelli's action. A fleet was assembled at Spithead. Harris formed a very clear idea of the man he had to deal with. He saw in Grimaldi a statesman of no very 1 Angelis, Pedro de, Memoria Historica, pp. 19–27. 2 Ibid.; Harris, J., Diaries, etc. * Duke of Grafton, Autobiography, 1, 254. 4 Cal. Home Office Papers, nos. 63, 64, 104-6. extraordinary talents, but dexterous in chicanery, whose principle was "never to do but what he is obliged to conform to, and not even then till he has had recourse to every kind of subterfuge".1 With such a minister it was necessary to act with great firmness and accordingly, on 28 September, Harris told him that the only way of preventing the most fatal consequences was to accept the British demands. Grimaldi replied that Spain had so little to gain and so much to lose by war, that nothing but the last necessity would drive her to it. But whilst denying that Bucarelli had received any particular instructions to dispossess the English, he admitted that he had acted agreeably to his general instructions. He presently accepted the British proposals, but Masserano was instructed to negotiate about the terms.2 Harris on the same day assured Lord Weymouth that there was not the least reason to doubt the sincere desire of the Spaniards for peace, "as well from their inability to support a war, as from the dread they have of its consequences". The Spanish Government, he represented, were afraid of a popular rising if the troops were removed. The army was ill-equipped and ill-disciplined. The navy, though improved by the Frenchman Gaultier, was discontented and lacked seamen, and the financial position was never worse. But if these were the views of the King and several of his ministers, there was nevertheless a strong war party among Spanish statesmen, who shared the designs of Choiseul and were eager to attack Great Britain. Among these were Conde d'Aranda and General O'Reilly. This party gradually gained the ascendancy. The pride and obstinacy of Charles III were roused by British insistence that he should own himself in the wrong and throw over his governor. In the meantime Grimaldi had been seeking support from France. He reminded the Spanish ambassador in Paris of a plan concerted with Choiseul in 1766 for concentrating a force at San Domingo, and proposed that Jamaica should now be seized by a coup de main (10 September 1770). The French replies, however, were highly discouraging. Choiseul said he could do nothing. He urged Grimaldi to gain time, even if he secretly did intend to make war, for France needed at least three months for the return of her trade fleets and sailors employed in the Newfoundland fishery. The course pursued by Choiseul is exceedingly difficult to understand. His correspondence shows that when Grimaldi was at first apologetic, and Spain, as Harris said, obviously afraid of war, he denounced him as too timid. When, later, the insistence of Great Britain began to rouse the temper of Charles, and Grimaldi himself became infected with the war spirit of Aranda, Choiseul rebuked his tone as too military. At the beginning of the incident he had shown 1 Harris, Diaries, etc. 2 Ibid. 1, 63 seqq.; Cal. H.O. Pap. nos. 242, 390, 391, 485, 492. 4 Aff. Étr. Esp. DLX, DLXI. THE FALKLAND ISLANDS 701 that he was ready to make trouble by raising questions about the French right of fishing at Newfoundland, and the action of the British in India, who had stopped an attempt to fortify Chandernagore in contravention of the Treaty of Paris. On 7 July he had written to the French ambassador at Madrid that he had instructed the ambassador in England to present a memorial on the Chandernagore affair, demanding reparation for the insult to the French flag.1 If satisfaction were refused, France would know how to obtain it. He enquired what Spain was going to do. Charles III and Grimaldi, came the reply, were infinitely anxious for peace, because Spain needed at least two more years before she could be in a position to go to war. But now, when the Spaniards were making active naval and military preparations and the danger of a rupture increased, he expressed his dread of it, and even went so far as to suggest to Masserano that he should throw over his instructions from Madrid and act under his own pacific directions. Was he playing a double game, as has been alleged, and, whilst ostensibly striving for peace, secretly stimulating the obstinacy of Charles through the agency of the Marquis d'Ossun? Most probably he was shaken by his information of the unpreparedness of Spain, or by the sudden realisation of the strength of the opposition to himself in France. Although Grimaldi had not received the encouragement he had expected from France, the issue long hung in the balance. He continued to make offers of reparation while haggling over the terms. Much play was made over the insult offered to Spain by Captain Hunt in threatening to fire upon the Spanish schooner. When Parliament met (13 November 1770), the Government prided itself on the firmness with which it had handled the situation. Chatham, however, who had recovered his health, and the Opposition poured scorn upon its vacillation and pusillanimity. Lord Weymouth resigned in December, in response to this clamour, and was succeeded by Lord Rochford. It is to be remembered that ministers were secretive as to what was happening. Chatham was indignant with their "little policy of concealments", and denounced our utter unreadiness for the war which on both sides of the Channel was now deemed to be inevitable. Ministers hardly made a pretence of answering his questions, and he complained that his eloquence fell dead against the faded hangings on which Flemish art had portrayed the defeat of the Armada-that tapestry which, "mute as Ministers, still told more than all the Cabinet on the subject of Spain, and the manner of treating with a haughty and insidious power". The French envoy hastened to assure Choiseul that Chatham was correct 1 It was presented 26 Sept. 1770; see Col. St Paul of Ewart, Correspondence (ed. G. G. Butler), II, 98 seqq. Aff. Etr. Esp. DLXI, 14 Dec. 1770; Carré, H., Le règne de Louis XV, pp. 388-90. 3 Chatham, Speeches, Nov. 1770-Feb. 1771; Johnson, Falkland's Islands; Rochford, Correspondence; Williams, B., Life of Chatham; Trevelyan, G. O., Life of C. J. Fox, p. 327. |