Similar firmness shown by Grenville in dealing with Spain resulted in a similar conclusion to an incident in the Bay of Honduras. There the vagueness of the treaty induced frequent violation of Spanish territory by British settlers, who pushed their contraband trade into the interior, even as far as Mexico. Acting upon instructions from home, the Governor of Yucatan and Commandant of Bacalar endeavoured to curb this trade and expelled British settlers from those points on the coast which were deemed beyond the limits indicated by the treaty. They ordered them to retire from Rio Hondo, and to confine themselves to the right bank of Rio Nuevo and Rio Wallis. By these aggressions 500 settlers lost their homes and property worth £27,000.1 Vigorous remonstrances were made by the British Government, and pressed in spite of military demonstrations by Spain. At last an order was obtained for restoring the settlers and censuring the Spanish officers concerned, but demands for punishment and reparation were dropped. During these negotiations Grimaldi, instigated by Choiseul, almost caused a rupture with Portugal by delay in restoring Sacramento, complaints as to contraband trade with Buenos Aires and Paraguay, and disputes as to the limits of the two colonies. The Marquis de Pombal, the Portuguese minister, appealed to Great Britain for the assistance due to Portugal from her ally. The British Government warned Spain that any attack upon the dominions of an ally would be accepted as a declaration of war. Rochford bluntly told the Spanish chargé d'affaires that he knew Spain wished to conquer Brazil, but England would not permit it. As a matter of fact Choiseul had prepared an expedition against Brazil in October 1762, instructing the admiral to capture Rio de Janeiro at all costs. Béliardi, in discussing with him the advantages of a war with Portugal, urged the necessity of first conquering Brazil, lest the King of Portugal should take refuge there and presently make himself master of South America and hand over its trade to the English. Choiseul remarked that he thought the Portuguese were more ready to march to Madrid than the Spaniards to Lisbon.5 Taken in conjunction with Choiseul's plan of campaign outlined in the previous year, one may suppose that these incidents were intended as a combination of moves in the tentative opening of a game which could be pressed or abandoned according to the energy or weakness displayed by the British ministry, or the success or failure of the dockyard plot intended to paralyse the British Navy. Grenville was less successful in his attempt to secure the payment 1 Coxe, m, 297. 2 Grenville Papers, II, 409-12; Rochford to Halifax, quoted by Coxe, III, 299 seqq.; Renaut, F., Le Pacte de Famille, etc. * Coxe, I, 306; Aff. Étr. Espagne, DLXXIV, 14 Nov. 1774. 5 Bibl. Nat. MSS Français, 10 FFO (4), pp. 106-17. THE MANILA RANSOM 693 of the Manila ransom. When the capital of the Philippine Islands had surrendered to Colonel Draper, the archbishop-governor purchased the exemption of private property from plunder by a payment of two million dollars in cash and of two more in bills drawn upon the Spanish Treasury. These bills Spanish ministers flatly refused to honour. The archbishop, Grimaldi declared, might as well have agreed to deliver up the city of Madrid. In subsequent negotiations it was urged that the agreement had been extorted by force, and broken by some looting previous to the capitulation.1 The circumstances which led to Grenville's imposition of the Stamp Act were in large measure due to our rivalry with France and Spain in the colonial sphere. For the burden of the British taxpayer, which it was meant to relieve, had been incurred by the previous war, and the maintenance of a standing army, towards which it was intended that the colonies should thereby contribute, was rendered necessary by the hostility of France. That hostility was traced in the intrigues of Choiseul's agents with the Indians, whose murderous rising in 1763-4 was partly due to their influence. It was generally believed, too, that France would soon endeavour to regain Canada, and would be aided by her former subjects. The possessions in the West Indies, which Bute had allowed her to retain in spite of Chatham's warnings, rendered the American colonies strategically of vital importance both for defence and attack. This is not mere theorising, for Choiseul explained to Louis in 1769 how Martinique and Guadeloupe had been prepared as bases of supplies and operations. It would have been plainly unwise, then, not to keep British troops in readiness in the continental colonies, and to rely for protection upon the hazardous arrival of transports from England. Resistance to the Stamp Act was fomented by Choiseul's agents in America, and the spirit of rebellion largely kept alive by them after its repeal by the Rockingham ministry. The successful issue of the revolt of the American colonies was rendered possible, first by supplies of money and munitions from France and Spain, and finally by naval and military aid without which it must have collapsed. 3 Pitt's resignation in 1761 had been hailed in France as equivalent to two victories. His return to power in 1766 had an equal and opposite effect. "Their panic", Horace Walpole observed, "at the mention of Mr Pitt's name is not to be described."4 Choiseul, after repairing the losses of the navy and reforming the army, had now resumed the direction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The two protagonists of French and British imperialism were soon at grips. Pitt, who now took the title of the Earl of Chatham, was under no illusion as to the enmity of the House of Bourbon and the ambitious 1 Coxe, III, 272, 307; Lord Mahon, Hist. of Eng. v, 57; Annual Register, Statement by Sir W. Draper. 2 Vide supra, p. 637. Diderot, Correspondance, n, 80. • Walpole to Sir H. Mann, 23 July 1766; cf. Macaulay, Essay on Chatham. schemes of Choiseul and Grimaldi. "France", he wrote, "is still the object of my mind." Her preparations for a coming war were sufficiently evident and alarming. On quitting office Chatham had left a Navy superior to the united fleets of France and Spain, the standard he laid down as necessary. On resuming it, he found that Great Britain had sixty-two ships as against eighty-three of the Bourbon allies, who had eighteen more upon the stocks. He at once took measures for improving the personnel of the Army and Navy, and increasing the number of ships of the line. With his unerring strategic foresight he decided to maintain a British garrison in the Falkland Islands (August 1766); Pensacola, the port in Florida, he ordered to be fortified as a base of operations against France and Spain.1 The question of reinforcing the Mediterranean fleet in view of French designs upon Corsica was also considered. Corsica in French hands would be a threat to the British possession of Minorca and affect the balance of power in the Mediterranean. To parry the hostile intentions of France and Spain, Chatham now endeavoured to bring into being a scheme which he had long contemplated. This was the formation of a great Northern Alliance, which should unite Russia, Prussia, Denmark, Sweden and the United Provinces in a defensive confederacy against the House of Bourbon. But foreign governments were adversely affected by the frequent changes of ministry in England. Chatham's popularity was temporarily diminished by his acceptance of a peerage, and Frederick of Prussia was still sore at having been left in the lurch at the Peace of Paris. For these and other reasons the scheme failed.2 In the meantime Chatham instructed Lord Shelburne, the Secretary of State, to insist upon an immediate settlement of the outstanding claims against France and Spain, which his predecessors had failed to secure. He was well aware that the claims and delays of the Spaniards were inspired by the French minister. Spain was still refusing to pay the Manila ransom; she was still claiming a monopoly of the South Seas, and objecting to the right of British ships to sail in the Pacific. Rockingham in the previous June had offered to renounce the Manila claim in return for the concession of the right bank of the Mississippi, but this had been rejected on the ground that it was "the key to Mexico".3 Shelburne was a statesman of broad mind and liberal views often far in advance of his era. He set his heart upon conciliating the American colonies. Misunderstood and mistrusted by his contemporaries, with whom his manner rendered him intensely unpopular, he has been described by Disraeli as one of the suppressed characters of English history. The loyal and intimate friend of 1 P.R.O., Chatham MSS, 79, 85, etc. Chatham Correspondence, m, 82-7; Œuvres de Frédéric, vi, 11, 33, 1 28: Winstanley, D., Chatham and the Whig Opposition, pp. 39. 55. Aff. Étr. Angl., Durand to Choiseul. SPAIN AND THE SOUTH SEAS 695 Chatham, his conduct of foreign affairs shows him to have been his able and devoted disciple. In pursuance of Chatham's instructions, he now began to press Prince de Masserano for the payment of the Manila ransom. He took the opportunity to add that "if the Spaniards in talking of their possessions included the American and South Seas, and our navigating there gave occasion to them to suspect a war, he had no hesitation to say that he would advise one, if they insisted on renewing such a vague and strange pretension long since worn out" (22 Aug. 1766).1 Thus the claim of the Spaniards to include the South Seas in their colonial Empire was definitely opposed. M. de Guerchy, the French ambassador in London, received a similar intimation from Shelburne that the time had come to put an end to delay in fulfilling the stipulations of the peace, including the demolition of the seaward fortifications of Dunkirk.2 Choiseul took alarm. The financial condition of France and the domestic troubles of Spain, occasioned by the expulsion of the Jesuits and the reforms of Squillaci, rendered overt action at present out of the question, although at this time Shelburne makes mention of a plot to seize Gibraltar. Guerchy was, therefore, instructed to gain time by giving assurances of the ardent desire of the French King for peace. For Choiseul's policy was now to delay the settlement of outstanding questions with Great Britain and to ménager les esprits en Angleterre until the Bourbon allies should be strong enough to challenge a rupture. In a letter to Merci, dated 22 December 1766, which came to the knowledge of British ministers, he congratulated himself that he had persuaded Spain to fall in with his plans. He believed that by the year 1770-the date is memorable-France would be in the desired position, with the finest army, a respectable navy, and money in the Treasury. His chief fear was that Chatham might precipitate matters and endeavour to retrieve failing popularity by plunging into another great and popular war with the House of Bourbon.5 Influenced by these ideas Choiseul busily conducted negotiations on behalf of Spain. By November they had reached a point at which Chatham deemed it necessary to interview the French and Spanish ambassadors himself. When Guerchy assured him (20 November 1766) that the Family Compact desired peace, he demanded why, in that case, France did not induce her partner to honour her obligations, and to withdraw her objections to the British right of sailing in the South Seas. "England", he declared, "would sooner consent to give up the Tower of London than abandon that right." In a subsequent interview (23 November), when he had learned that Choiseul was suggesting that, if Great Britain would abandon the idea of settling the Falkland Islands, the Manila ransom might be paid 1 Fitzmaurice, 1, 287. * Koch et Schöll, Traités, 1, 315. Shelburne to De Visme, 20 Dec. 1766; Fitzmaurice, 1, 285. 3 Choiseul to Guerchy, 11 Aug. 1766, etc., quoted by Fitzmaurice, 1, 282, 283, 288. subject to the arbitration of France as to the amount, he plainly declared that he regarded all idea of accommodation by France as absolument évanouie. But he made it clear to both parties that, if the Manila ransom were paid and the claim of England to sail the Southern Seas were admitted, he was prepared to desist from settling on the Falkland Islands.1 Circumstances, however, combined to enable the Bourbon Powers to continue their policy of delay until the chosen moment came.2 The illness of Chatham and his consequent withdrawal from public affairs left the stage vacant for the brilliant and irresponsible genius of Charles Townshend. Changes in the Cabinet, including the partial eclipse of Lord Shelburne, now marked the preponderance of the Bedford party. Their ascendancy was interpreted abroad as indicating a policy of peace with France and Spain and of vigorous action against the colonies. With Chatham out of action and the colonies exasperated by the new import duties, the moment had come for Choiseul to move. He could not flatter himself that the time was ripe for a rupture with Great Britain. But he still clearly foresaw and prepared for that eventuality, and made haste to fish in troubled waters and to keep them stirred. He sent French agents in disguise to North America to foment disaffection amongst the colonists, and to prepare schemes for helping them when the rebellion should break out which he plainly foretold. He carefully scanned the American newspapers, the resolutions of Assemblies and even the sermons of Puritan clergy. He learned with satisfaction that the English had no cavalry and barely ten thousand infantry in America. Meanwhile plans were again being prepared for the invasion of England, and French spies were again surveying the English coast. Their instructions as well as their minute reports presently found their way into Chatham's hands (1767-8). Confident that Great Britain had her hands full and that the Bedford party were for peace at any price, and praying with Grimaldi that the divisions among the Whigs and anarchy in England might last for ever, Choiseul turned his attention to the aggrandisement of France in the south of Europe. Whilst he redoubled his assurances of friendship to Great Britain, he put a stop to naval preparations in the dockyards and arsenals of France, hoping thereby to strengthen the tottering finances of the kingdom. Then, availing himself of the action of the Pope upon the expulsion of the Jesuits, he seized Avignon and the Comtat Venaissin. Next, he turned his attention to Corsica. Taking advantage of the weakness and dissensions of the British 1 Fitzmaurice, 1, 290-3; Lansdowne House MSS, vol. 30 (Shelburne to Rochford, 29 Nov., 12 Dec. 1766) and Aff. Étr. Angl. 471, Corr. Pol. CDLXXI. 2 Grimaldi to Masserano, 23 March 1767; Rochford to Shelburne, 7 March 1767. Quoted by Lord Mahon, Hist. Eng. Appendix, vol. v; cf. Chatham MSS, 86; Morison, M. C., Trans. R. Hist. Soc. 3rd Ser. iv, 82-115; and Bancroft, G., Hist. U.S. m, 100-200. ♦ Fitzmaurice, 1, 320–33. 361; Durand to Choiseul, ap. Bancroft, VI, 31. |