Admiral Saunders, skilfully threading the dreaded Traverse, anchored off Île d'Orleans, below Quebec, and on 27 June began to land the troops. His twenty-two sail of line, five frigates and sixteen sloops at once dominated the lower river; but Montcalm mustered at Quebec and on the Beauport cliffs some 4000 regulars, 11,000 Canadian militia, and seamen from the French light craft withdrawn far upstream. Besides, owing to an inadequate watch kept on the estuary he had received stores from France. Wolfe's task therefore seemed impossible. His chief hope was that Amherst, who with the main force had gone to Lake George to repair the disaster at Ticonderoga in July 1758, would now drive the French down the Richelieu River and threaten Montreal. Amherst, however, could not keep troth until a year later. There remained the fleet and flotilla, which, operating on a great tidal river, could endow Wolfe's scanty numbers with mobility and power of sudden attack. Yet only by degrees were these advantages utilised to the full. In order to safeguard the ships when lying in the best berth, Quebec Basin, troops were landed on the south shore and soon occupied and fortified Pointe Lévis, opposite Quebec. Under cover of the new batteries light craft began on 18 July to pass above Quebec and harass Montcalm's communications.1 Nevertheless on the 31st Wolfe attacked the French left flank resting on the Montmorency River, where the ships could not help him effectively, and suffered a sharp reverse. Thereafter he fell ill and was discouraged at hearing from the upstream flotilla no news of Amherst. Still, that flotilla, under Rear-Admiral Holmes, was at work, thinning out, luring to and fro, and wearying the French forces, so that Wolfe's three brigadiers finally brought him to the resolve (previously considered and rejected) to transport the troops and attack the city from above. This he did early in September, and, modifying their plan of a landing above Cap Rouge, he prepared to land before dawn of 13 September at a cove only two miles above Quebec.2 Holmes skilfully carried out this operation, which he termed "the most hazardous and difficult I was ever engaged in". The troops, 4800 strong, began to ascend the gulley, surprised the guard, and formed on the Heights of Abraham before Bougainville with a watching force of 2100 men upstream knew what was happening; and his men and his horses. were too wearied by marching to menace the British rear (or perhaps were lured away by Holmes's boats running up with the tide).* Below the city the fleet paralysed the defence; for, early on the 13th, Saunders with the heavy ships began to threaten a landing in force below Quebec, thereby holding back at Beauport French troops that should have turned the scales of war on the Heights. Wolfe, at the 1 Kimball, п, 150-2; Wood, W., Logs of the Conquest of Canada, pp. 238-40. 2 Kimball, II, 151, 157; Doughty, A., Siege of Quebec, vol. 11, chaps. xii, i; Mahon, Life of General Murray, pp. 140-60; Waddington, m, 310-33. 3 Wood, W., Logs, p. 158. 4 Doughty, III, 96, 107. BRITISH NAVAL SUCCESSES IN 1759-60 533 hour of death, gained a glorious success, soon to be followed by the surrender of the city. Essentially, the triumph was due to the loyal co-operation of Navy and Army. Indeed military historians admit that the "credit for the fall of Quebec belongs rather to the Navy than to the Army",1 and "the strategic issue of the entire campaign, and of the battle itself, depended on the Navy".2 Successes overseas availed little unless clinched by triumph in Europe. This was assured in 1759 by the victories of Minden (1 August), Lagos (19 August) and Quiberon (20 November). The two last were the only tangible results of Choiseul's invasion schemes; for he ordered out the Toulon fleet to start them and the Brest fleet to complete them. Boscawen, completing his refit at Gibraltar, was warned by his outlook frigate of the approach of twelve French sail from the east. Hurrying out, he caught them next day scattered, and in a running fight to Lagos captured three sail and drove two ashore. The rest, after sheltering in Cadiz, finally crept back to Toulon. Undaunted, Choiseul ordered out the Brest fleet. "Sweden is waiting for us", he wrote, "I fear she will not wait long." With a foreboding of disaster, Admiral Conflans put out while Hawke was driven off by a gale; but the latter, flying back from Torbay, sighted the enemy off Quiberon; and a wild chase into the bay ended at nightfall in the destruction or disabling of half the French fleet (20 November).3 Such was the news which greeted the new Spanish monarch, Charles III, after his arrival from Naples at Madrid. On hearing of the fall of Quebec, he had felt gloomy forebodings, and resolved to offer his mediation for re-establishing the balance of power in North America. Quiberon shattered that resolve and strengthened Pitt's resolve to reject any such mediation. Charles, accepting the rebuff, pressed on naval construction.4 Pitt and Anson met his efforts by redoubled efforts. Thus in and after 1760 British fleets surveyed not only Brest and Toulon, but also Rochefort, thereby starving all French attempts to relieve Canada, the Carnatic and the West Indies. The results were successively the loss of Montreal, Pondicherry, Dominica, Martinique and St Lucia. After the fall of Montcalm, most of his troops fled from Quebec towards Three Rivers near which were three French frigates well guarded. With these and transports General de Lévis in April 1760 sailed downstream, and, in the absence of a covering fleet, defeated General Murray's depleted British garrison. Quebec would probably have fallen but for the opportune arrival of British warships from Halifax (9-15 May). These soon disposed of the three frigates, where1 Fortescue, J. W., Hist. of the British Army, 11, 387. Wood, W., Fight for Canada, p. 263. 3 Corbett, vol. I, chap. i; Callender, pp. 164-5; Beatson, II, 400-22. F.O., Spain, 160, 161, Bristol to Pitt, 10 Dec. 1759, Jan.-Feb. 1760; Bourguet, Choiseul et l'Alliance espagnole, pp. 64-94. 5 Grenville Papers, 1, 349. upon Murray with reinforcements proceeded up the river, compelling Lévis "to abandon all the [military] frontiers", and fall back on Montreal. On that island converged also the main force of Amherst from the south-west and Havilland's column from the south. The British flotilla facilitated landings of this overwhelming force to which Governor Vaudreuil and about 2400 regulars at once surrendered, thus ending French rule in Canada (8 September 1760).1 Despite the accession of the more pacific George III (October 1760), Pitt now resumed his former plan of reducing the French West Indies as the readiest means of forcing on a satisfactory peace. Guadeloupe having fallen in 1759, he now ordered the victors of Canada to take ship at New York and attack the "neutral" isles of Dominica and St Lucia, and thereafter Martinique.2 Admiral Sir James Douglas and Lord Rollo easily succeeded in capturing the two first. The reduction of Martinique was postponed owing to the diversion of large forces against Belleisle. The two expeditions were connected; for Pitt had resolved that at the ensuing peace negotiations Martinique or Belleisle (preferably the latter) should serve as a pledge for recovering Minorca. After a stubborn defence Belleisle fell to Captain Keppel's squadron and a landing force in June 1761, an event highly injurious to the commerce and the pride of France.3 Still, Choiseul struggled on, breaking off peace negotiations in September 1761 because Pitt demanded St Lucia and the exclusion of the French from the Newfoundland fishery. Choiseul (equally intent on naval interests) now hoped by the (third) Family Compact with Spain to bring in that Power and distract British efforts by a Franco-Spanish attack on our ally, Portugal, while, at the worst, "the losses of Spain might lighten those which France might incur".5 Pitt, suspecting some such design, urged open war with Spain; but George III replaced him by Bute, who, however, carried on the naval part of Pitt's war policy, especially against Martinique. Accordingly, Rear-Admiral Rodney's squadron sailed in October to reinforce that of Sir James Douglas. The combined British forces overpowered the French posts in succession and on 10 February 1762 captured Fort Royal. The fall of St Lucia and Grenada soon followed. These successes resulted from the naval triumphs of 1759, which enabled our squadrons in 1760-61 to seal up the French Biscay ports and prevent succours sailing even from Rochefort or La Rochelle to the West or East Indies." By the year 1762 the British Navy could easily cope with those of 1 Capt. Knox's Journal, ed. Doughty, II, 484-6; Kimball, 11, 305-41; Wood, W., The Fight for Canada, chap. x; Wrong, E. M., The Fall of Canada, pp. 165–79, 206-25. 2 Kimball, 11, 384, 408, 425, 454, 458. F.O., Spain, 163, Bristol to Pitt, 29 June 1761. 4 F.O., France, 252, Pitt to Stanley, 26 June, 25 July, 27 Aug., 15 Sept., 1761; Stanley to Pitt, 4, 6, 18, 26 Aug., 4, 19 Sept. 1761; Bussy to Pitt, 10 Aug. 1761. Méms. de Choiseul, p. 387; Renaut, F., Pacte de Famille et l'Amérique, chap. i. INCREASE OF BRITISH COMMERCE 535 France and Spain combined; and when the rupture occurred the latter fared ill, the reduction of Havana and Manila in that summer being the heaviest blows yet dealt her in the New World. Even Charles III felt the need of an accommodation, in accord with the Spanish proverb-"War with all the world, but peace with England". A last effort of Choiseul to seize Newfoundland met with only a passing success, the captors of St John's soon being captured by a squadron under Lord Colville (September 1762). The need for peace in France became imperative. It led to the Peace of Paris. On the contrary England's naval supremacy enabled her commerce to increase rapidly during this war, especially with the North American Colonies. Her exports thither in 1744-48 had risen from £640,000 to £830,000; but in 1754-58 they rose from £1,246,000 to £1,832,000. Those to the West Indies in 1744-48 declined from £796,000 to £734,000; but in 1754-58 rose from £685,000 to £877,000. The increases were equally remarkable in 1759–62, and enabled the Government to spend larger sums on the Navy. Thus, whereas Choiseul in 1759 had hoped to exhaust England, he found France much more exhausted; and when, during the first peace discussions at Paris in June 1761, he stated that after all the longest purse would win the war, our diplomat, Hans Stanley, retorted that, however doubtful the issue in Germany, yet "a maritime war, with expeditions against the French colonies, lays within (sic) 6 or 7 millions per annum, which Great Britain, fed with your trade and her own, together with that of many neutral nations...can for many years support".1 The forecast was just; for Great Britain ended the struggle with undisputed supremacy at sea. As happened after other victorious wars, keen interest was now taken in the discovery of new lands. Curiosity centred chiefly in the unveiling of the mysterious Terra Australis incognita, and after the Peace of Paris the Admiralty despatched Commodore Byron to the South Sea. On his way he annexed the Falkland Islands, but in the South Sea discovered nothing. More successful was Captain Wallis, R.N., who in 1767 sighted and stayed long at Tahiti, which he named George III Island. Spain meanwhile had fortified Juan Fernandez, the usual place of call after Cape Horn-a sign that she intended to keep her Pacific preserve closed. France however now pressed in, sending her great sailor Bougainville. He touched at the Falklands and Tahiti, then discovered the Samoan, New Hebrides and Solomon groups, thence sailing for Batavia, and finally reaching St Malo in March 1769. News of French activities in the Pacific spurred on the Admiralty to solve the mystery of the legendary Southern Continent; and it resolved to act with the Royal Society which was about to send an expedition to Tahiti to observe the transit of Venus. Selecting Lieutenant James Cook, R.N., and the Whitby-built barque 1 1 F.O., France, 251, Stanley to Pitt, 12 June 1761. Endeavour, it issued to him secret instructions (dated 30 July 1768) which have lately been published. After fulfilling his duty at Tahiti, he will "proceed to the southward in order to make discovery of the Continent above mentioned until you arrive in the latitude of 40 and if he fails to find it, he is to sail westwards between lat. 40° lat. 35° "until you discover it or fall in with the eastern side of the land discovered by Tasman and now called New Zealand....You are also with the consent of the natives to take possession of convenient situations in the country in the name of the King of Great Britain; or, if you find the country uninhabited, take possession for His Majesty by setting up proper marks and inscriptions, as first discoverers and possessors". Finally, he will thoroughly explore the coast of New Zealand, will annex other islands "that have not hitherto been discovered by any Europeans", enjoining secrecy on the crew as to his discoveries until permission is given to divulge them.1 These instructions were signed by Hawke, Peircy Brett and C. Spencer. Brett had served as lieutenant under Anson in H.M.S. Centurion in her famous circumnavigation and probably was the directing spirit prompting our Pacific enterprises of 1764-79, which prepared the way for Britain's new colonial Empire in the very years when the Old Empire was slipping away. Thus Anson's voyage was destined to lead on to efforts aiming primarily at the discovery of the great Southern Continent which was believed to balance the Northern Continents. This, not New Zealand or New Holland, was Cook's chief objective. After demonstrating the feasibility of the voyage round Cape Horn and thus completing the work of Drake, he performed his duties at Tahiti and then sailed far to the south without success. Then he sighted, thoroughly explored and finally annexed New Zealand, and later (22 August 1770) the east coast of New Holland, which he was sure the Dutch had not visited.2 Again, in his second voyage (1772-5), the elusive continent foiled even his dogged perseverance. The chief object of the third voyage (1776–9) was to find the equally elusive North-West Passage from the Pacific coast, and after baffling many stout voyagers from Drake and Frobisher onwards, it baffled even Cook. Nevertheless, before his lamented death in Hawaii, he had prepared the way for the Nootka Sound trade, and had secured for his country prior claims to New Zealand and Australia.3 Thus, in peace as in war, Great Britain had now won a decided naval supremacy, which brought with it possibilities of expansion in the west, east and south. Her rise to supremacy had been rapid. 1 Admiralty, 2/1332 (Secret Orders), printed in the Naval Miscellany (N.R.S.), m, 343-64. 2 The Journal of Capt. Cook (ed. Wharton, W. J L., 1893), p. 312 3 For details see vol. vn, chap. II. |