ORIGINS OF THE SEVEN YEARS' WAR 527 imminent.1 From the deadlock emerged the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle (April 1748), with its easy and obvious solution of status quo ante bellum, penalising alike the captors of Mons and Madras and the victors of Louisbourg and the Bay of Biscay. From this unsatisfying finale could come no finality. The clamours of French soldiers (bête comme la paix) and British seamen were outdone by those of New England patriots who regarded the restitution of Louisbourg to France as a bartering away of their conquest for "a petty factory in India." But the capture of Louisbourg was mainly the work of the British Navy; and to secure the Thames against invasion by restoring the Netherlands to a friendly Power (Austria) was far more important than to retain Louisbourg, which must fall at any time to a great fleet. Moreover, the renewal of the Asiento treaty with Spain and the demolition of the seaward defences of Dunkirk benefited and secured British commerce; while the foundation of Halifax was soon to lessen the danger from Louisbourg privateers. In reality the peace of 1748 was advantageous to England and was a tribute to the work of her Navy. Yet the next governors of Canada were encouraged by the recovery of Louisbourg to push on schemes for the reconquest of Acadia and the acquisition of the Ohio Valley. Hostilities became acute in those areas in 1754-5;3 but France did not deem the war to open until Boscawen's fleet attempted with partial success to intercept French reinforcements off Cape Breton Island (June 1755). She held back during eleven months of preparation and diplomatic angling, and then suddenly struck at Minorca, which, owing to the moral cowardice of Admiral Byng, she captured (June 1756). The resulting Seven Years' War differed from the wars that had preceded it. That of 1702-13, ostensibly a dynastic struggle, was in reality waged for the restoration of the balance of power; but its issue turned largely on Mediterranean strategy, and its results in the colonial sphere were immense. The war of 1739-48, originating in trade disputes, was complicated by dynastic struggles, and its colonial results were small. The Seven Years' War (the first of our great colonial wars) originated in efforts to decide the colonial disputes left undecided in 1748, while European rivalries and hatreds served only to widen and intensify it. From the first Pitt saw clearly that the great issue was in North America; for Louis XV and la Pompadour that issue was secondary; and not until too late did the one great Frenchman of that age declare that the war in America and at sea was the true war.4 The new alignment of the Powers ranged Austria and Russia with France, Prussia alone with England. The Dutch and Italian States 1 Yorke, P. C., Life of Hardwicke, vol. 1, chap. xv; Grenville Papers, 1, 74; Carré, H., Hist. de France (ed. Lavisse), vi, 164; Broglie, Duc de, La Paix d'Aix-la-Chapelle, p. 160. 2 Yorke, P. C., Hardwicke, vol. 1, chap. xviii; Schöll, Traités, 1, 313-16. 3 Newcastle MSS, Brit. Mus., Add. MSS, 33028-9, ff. 102-3, 112 seqq., 144-61, 243-71. 4 Méms. du Duc de Choiseul, p. 383. remained neutral; so did Spain until January 1762/Thus, England had to cover Hanover and the west front of Prussia-a task less arduous than that of protecting Belgian, Dutch and Italian lands in 1744-8. As France and her allies met their match in Frederick the Great and Ferdinand of Brunswick, Pitt, on coming into power in June 1757, was able to throw his chief weight into maritime and colonial enterprises. Moreover, France was burdened by the expense of distant campaigns in Germany, where successes were Pyrrhic and defeats catastrophic. As the vices of the Pompadour régime had depleted her exchequer, she could ill support vast military and naval efforts, and, as usual, her Navy suffered first.1 Across the Channel the Anson régime made for efficiency, as was seen in the launch of that paragon of ships, the Royal George (100), and the general improvement in construction. In 1756 the Navy List comprised 142 sail of the line, if fifty-gun ships be included, as against eighty-two French. But, the crews being raw or scanty, the first two campaigns lagged. Pitt's scheme of a dash at Rochefort failed owing to the reluctance of General Mordaunt to land troops betimes (September 1757); and subsequent coastal operations against St Malo, Cherbourg and St Cast probably had little effect in holding French regulars to the coasts. Sailors and soldiers alike detested these raids, the importance of which the French soon discounted. 2 The loss of Minorca has sometimes been declared beneficial because the war was to be mainly a colonial war;3 but, by increasing the difficulty of checking the Toulon fleet, it enabled that force to initiate operations in the ocean. An example was seen in the escape of a Toulon squadron to the West Indies early in 1757, where it beat Townshend's inferior force, thereafter harrying British commerce. Finally it proceeded to Louisbourg, and there reinforced the French concentration fatal to our attempt against that place in August 1757. By this time Pitt and Anson were in office (with Hardwicke as sage counsellor); but much leeway had to be made good; and up to the spring of 1758 British war efforts presented a dismal record everywhere except in India. There, as has appeared, British successes in home waters had assured the recovery of Madras; and peace was restored by the compromise of 1754 between the two Companies. But the flame kindled in Canada, passing into Europe, now spread a conflagration in southern India. In 1756-7 it flared up in Bengal. The preparations for the defence of Fort William (Calcutta) against an expected French fleet infuriated Siraj-ud-daula, Nawab of that province, who, 1 Waddington, R., La Guerre de Sept Ans, IV, 392. 2 Chatham MSS (P.R.O.), no. 85, printed in E.H.R. Oct. 1913; Corbett, J., England in the Seven Years' War, vol. 1, chaps. viii-xii. 3 Ibid. 1, 135. 4 Yorke, chap. xxv. THE NAVY IN THE EAST INDIES 529 swearing to expel the British, easily captured that place. Thus the war spread quickly from the Coromandel coast, whose harbourless expanse swept by the north-east autumnal monsoon hindered fleet action, to the vast and fertile delta of the Ganges, favourable to the exercise of sea power. Fortunately at Madras were two leaders equal to the emergency. Admiral Watson, with four sail of the line and three smaller craft, was under orders to go home; but on receipt of the black news, he decided to disobey orders and remain. Nay, more, at the request of the Madras council, he finally resolved to venture with his warships and transports into the Hooghly, conveying all the Madras troops under Clive for the recovery of Calcutta.1 Under the imminent menace of the arrival of a French fleet, and braving the blasts of the autumnal monsoon, the little force beat up deviously towards the Hooghly. There it rescued the survivors from Calcutta, and at Christmas 1756 neared the Nawab's forts. The ships' broadsides, aiding decisively the moves of Clive's troops on land, made short work of these defences and finally recaptured Fort William, our losses there being negligible. Far more serious was the next operation, against Chandernagore, the French stronghold upstream, which mounted some sixty guns. The defenders having partly blocked the river, the flagship Kent (70) was badly raked by the guns of the citadel; but the Tiger (60), almost alone, overpowered the defence, and the place surrendered (23 March 1757). Clive now had a sure base in case of hostilities with the Nawab, which soon reopened. For operations higher up the river the ships could not be used; but their armed boats supported his northward march, and enabled him to cross the river at Plassey and there win his dramatic triumph, thereafter covering the flank of the pursuers as far as Patna (26 July). This conquest of Bengal offers the first example of a systematic and brilliantly successful co-operation of fleet (or flotilla) with army. It foreshadowed that in the St Lawrence. Unlike the later effort of Saunders and Wolfe, the Ganges campaign was carried out under the threat of the advent of a great French fleet, which, after capturing defenceless Madras, should have bottled up Watson's fleet in the Hooghly. These chances the French lost by nine months. Sailing finally in April 1757 (still the time of lax control by Pitt's predecessors) the French fleet, after further delays, did not approach Pondicherry until 28 April 1758. Pocock, Watson's successor, awaited them near that port, for all was quiet in Bengal. With a slightly inferior force he beat them off, but could not prevent their commodore, Comte d'Aché, landing his troops. These, under General Lally, won success after success, and threatened to overrun the Carnatic. Lally's hopes of triumph were, however, dashed by the 1 Forrest, Sir G. W., Life of Clive, 1, 269–78. 2 Ibid. vol. 1, chaps. xvii-xix, vol. п, chap. i; Rose, J. H., The Indecisiveness of Modern War and other Essays (Essay 5). CHBE I 34 retreat of Aché, who, after another indecisive action with Pocock, retired to Île de France for repairs. During his absence (prolonged to a year by the lack of the usual food supplies from the Hooghly) two mishaps befell the French in India. Lally's close leaguer of Madras was broken by the arrival of Captain Kempenfelt's light squadron with reinforcements and stores (16 February 1758); and French control of the Circars district was overthrown by Clive's opportune despatch from Bengal of a force under Colonel Forde, which, landing on that coast, took the enemy by surprise, and finally, with naval help, captured Masulipatam (8 April 1759). British control was thus extended over a fertile coastal district which had nourished Pondicherry.1 Aché's reappearance off that port was brief. On 10 September 1759 with eleven ships he failed to beat Pocock's nine, and, distressed by his damages, again made for Île de France, not to return. Consequently under Eyre Coote the British troops gradually gained the upper hand, the campaign ending early in 1761 by close naval and military co-operation that ensured the capture of Pondicherry. Events thus justified Clive's forecast of 7 January 1759 that our naval supremacy, if rightly used, must lead to supremacy India.3 in Meanwhile the vigour of Pitt and Anson had retrieved the situation in Europe and America. By degrees the covering operations in home waters (the key to the whole overseas problem) were more efficiently conducted. In February 1758 Vice-Admiral Osborn with an efficient fleet, based on Gibraltar, thwarted the efforts of La Clue and the Toulon force to pass out to Louisbourg. Another blow, struck by Hawke in April 1758 at the Rochefort convoy, for the same destination, virtually sealed the doom of the fortress. At the end of 1757, Pitt prepared a triple attack on Canada. The chief force was to sail early in 1758 against Louisbourg and thence against Quebec, the French being distracted by attacks on Montreal and their western forts. The thirteen colonies were urged to do their utmost, England supplying pay, arms and artillery. In May Boscawen mustered at Halifax twenty-three sail, eighteen frigates or sloops and 150 transports, with 11,600 regulars under General Amherst and about 3000 colonial levies. Several French warships having gone to protect Quebec, there lay at Louisbourg only six sail, seven frigates and about 3000 regulars, with as many seamen and irregulars.4 The landing of the British through high surf in Gabarus Bay on 8 June was deemed by Colonel James Wolfe "a rash and ill-advised attempt"; but, owing to the passivity of the French main force, it succeeded. With 1 Forrest, II, 76-84, 104-116; Cambridge, R. O., War in India (1750–61), 1762, pp. 256, 268-86; Beatson, II, 118-26. 2 Cambridge, ad fin.; Corbett, vol. I, chap. iv; Clowes, m, 197–200. 3 Malcolm, Life of Clive, 11, 119. Corresp. of Pitt with Colonial Governors, ed. Kimball, G. S., п, 94–106; Corbett, vol. I, chaps. xv, xvi, vol. п, chap. vii. CHOISEUL'S PLAN OF INVASION 53I Boscawen's close blockade the siege could have but one result; and a dashing boat attack by night on the French warships in the harbour brought about the surrender on 26 July, though too late for the projected attack on Quebec. Île St Jean (renamed Prince Edward Island) was also reduced. Pitt soon decided to dismantle Louisbourg and partly block the harbour-mouth so that thenceforth Halifax became the sole naval base in those waters.1 A new phase of the war opened at the end of 1758, with the advent to power at Versailles of a statesman rivalling Pitt in foresight and firmness. Like him the Duc de Choiseul resolved to snatch victory from defeat. "The war is not lost", he burst out, "nothing is lost but your heads." He now resolved to concentrate on the maritime and American war much of the strength which France had devoted to the German campaigns. Instead of throttling Frederick, he would invade England, recover Louisbourg and save Canada. To this end Prince Charles would land in the Firth of Clyde with 20,000 Frenchmen, and at Edinburgh meet 10,000 Swedes (perhaps also 10,000 Russians) landed at Leith. A league of the neutrals was further to fluster the islanders and compel them to centripetal moves fatal to their world projects. On the surface the scheme looked well; for the chief neutrals, especially Spain and Sweden, chafed at the new "Rule of 1756" and at high-handed seizures of ships by British privateers. A general maritime league against England seeming imminent, Pitt acted cautiously, as was indeed necessary; for not until the conquest of Canada could the Navy dispense with the naval stores coming mainly from the Baltic.5 Therefore, at his instance, Parliament forbade harsh and unjust action by the privateers (June 1759), but maintained the rule as fair and just. Above all Anson, Hardwicke and he knew that Choiseul's terrorising mechanism could not move so long as Hawke and Boscawen countered the Brest and Toulon fleets, thereby nullifying the vast apparatus of French transports and troops at Quiberon, the flotilla at Havre, Jacobite schemes, and Swedish and Russian invading armies. Anson and his compeers had not lived through the years 1745 and 1746 for naught. They saw through the landsman's bluff, and their experience now added to the sound body of naval doctrine which was to save England and her Empire in 1805 and 1914-16. When, on 4 June 1759, Pitt assured the British ambassador at Madrid that the French plans would make no difference to His Majesty's conduct of the war, a great fleet, convoying some 8500 troops under General Wolfe, was nearing the St Lawrence. Vice 1 Kimball, 1, 260-75, 281-309, II, 250. 6 2 Waddington, 11, 483-5; Méms. du Duc de Choiseul, p. 383. 3 Vide infra, p. 551. F.O., Spain, 159, Earl of Bristol to Pitt, 26 Feb. 1758; Yorke, II, 312-14; Jenkinson, C., Conduct of Gt. Britain to Neutral Nations (1758). • Albion, R. G., Forests and Sea Power, chaps. iv, vi. 6 F.O., Spain, 160, Pitt to Earl of Bristol, 4 June 1759. |