WILLIAM DAMPIER 517 effective. Further the decline in the efficiency of the French Navy has probably been exaggerated by Mahan.1 In 1697 it held the Mediterranean and could probably have disputed the Channel with the allied fleets, had not Louis XIV's exchequer been exhausted by multiple efforts far beyond his strength. Peace was, therefore, patched up by the Treaty of Ryswick (September 1697), which stipulated the mutual restitution of conquests and the recognition of William III as King of England. Thus ended a struggle which in 1690 threatened disruption to the kingdom and the Empire. The skilful strategy of Torrington after Beachy Head, the indecision of Tourville, and, above all, the fundamental errors of French policy saved England and her colonies from dire danger. After La Hogue, abandoning the defensive, she could by degrees take the offensive, with results which compensated for defeats in Flanders and several mishaps overseas. Some secondary results of these struggles now claim attention. War breeds privateers; and they breed buccaneers and pirates. Amidst the turmoil of war, so-called honest traders, notably slavers and logwood-cutters, after strokes of ill luck, take up the "profession of the seas", which undoubtedly has fostered smart sailing and the daring exploration of risky waters and snug retreats. Of British sailors who made trial of all these shifts, William Dampier (1652– 1713) stands forth chief. Man-of-war's man, seaman in a West India ketch, logwood-cutter among the many Englishmen on the Moskito Coast, buccaneer, pirate and explorer, he ran the whole gamut of tropical adventure, ranging from Jamaica and Panama to Juan Fernandez, and east to Sierra Leone, the Philippines, China, New Holland and Bencoolen. Thanks to good natural gifts, an observant eye and a ready pen, he contrived, amidst all the piracies and blackguardism in which he unwillingly took part, to keep a diary recording his impressions of peoples, lands and facts of natural history. Thus he figures as a link between the times of Captain Kidd and those of Captain Cook. On his return he worked up his diary into a Voyage round the World (1697), the popularity of which induced him to write a supplement. His feline faculty for survival, and marked gifts of observation (specially notable in his Discourse of Winds) attracted the attention of the Admiralty, which accepted his offer of voyaging to New Holland and thence to New Guinea and the neighbouring islands in search of spices or other products. His voyage in the Roebuck (1699-1700) was a failure. The landfall near Shark's Bay in western Australia was in a forbidding region (the natives are "the miserablest people in the world"), and his coastwise trip to the district he named Dampier Land brought equally small hope of gain. Thence, coasting past Timor and New Guinea, he named New Britain, but found nothing to assuage the growing discontent of his crew. Finally, his 1 Mahan, The influence of sea power upon history, pp. 192-6. 2 See Clark, G. N., chap. iii. battered ship barely reached Ascension on the return; and the venture did not encourage voyages to Terra Australis incognita. Men like Dampier kept alive the spirit of adventure and interest in the Navy, whose late services silenced all opposition to William's programme of new construction. Consequently, on the resumption of hostilities with Louis XIV and his Spanish allies, England possessed some 130 sail ready or completing for sea as against about fifty French sail,1 so that she was able at once to take the offensive at sea. Such action alone could meet the need of the crisis, which was not only European but world-wide. For if Louis XIV, through his grandson, now styled Philip V of Spain, controlled the policy of Madrid, he would control also the Mediterranean, wealthy domains in Italy, and the larger part of the New World. William and his Austrian, Dutch and German allies regarded the struggle mainly as one for the preservation of the balance of power in Europe. But it also involved the ownership of the new lands overseas, by the resources of which Louis would overwhelm all rivals. Therefore, in supporting "Charles III", the Habsburg claimant to the Spanish throne, the allies sought to rescue Antwerp, Ostend, Cadiz, Barcelona and half of America from the power of France, which else would threaten the Thames, close the Mediterranean, drain the wealth of America and bestride the world like a Colossus. Such was the menace which overcame the scruples of the Tories and enabled William III in his last months to rebuild the Grand Alliance and embark England in a continental war. Anne at her accession adopted his policy and rallied English and Scots around her in sentiments of loyalty, which were to be clinched by the Act of Union (1707). On the other hand, Spain, torn by internal strife and with a rotting marine and decadent army, offered a ready target to the allied efforts; and from the dash on her galleons in Vigo Bay (1702)2 to the capture of Gibraltar (1704) and of Minorca (1708) the chief blows of the British Navy fell on her. The prospects of "Charles III" in Catalonia and the accession of Portugal and Savoy to the Grand Alliance turned the naval war largely towards the Mediterranean. Control of its waters, the dominant note of William's naval strategy, now sounded forth clearly in the despatches of his great pupil, Marlborough. And for the first time the fate of lands far beyond the ocean was to be determined in that ancient womb of empire. Now, as always, France struck first at our most valued and vulnerable point, the West Indies. As has been seen, she was there at her strongest, we at our weakest. Therefore, long before the outbreak of war, she despatched under Châteaurenaut to Martinique forces which early in January 1702 consisted of forty-two warships with 1 Charnock, I, 8–10, 41. Journal of Sir Geo. Rooke, ed. by O. Browning (N.R.S. 1897), pp. 227-35. A TYPICAL WEST INDIA EXPEDITION 519 1200 troops on board. A letter of one of his officers stated that, if assured of the safety of the Spanish treasure galleons, they would at once attack our colonies-as usual ill prepared and now panicstricken. But the curses of West India warfare soon blighted these lofty designs. Sickness ravaged the French crews; uncertainty about the galleons clogged those ships which could move; and finally the Spanish commander declined French escort. While some hovered about uncertain, others watched Vice-Admiral Benbow's squadron protecting Jamaica. He, too, fared ill. Stout "old tarpaulin”, " while struggling desperately for four days against a French section, was thwarted by the cowardice of two captains who were justly_condemned to death, while on 4 November he himself died at Port Royal of a wound exacerbated by anger and melancholy.1 Owing to an epidemic his successor, Rear-Admiral Whetstone, could effect little. The French losses, however, being as heavy, the major operations petered out. Except at St Christopher where Codrington from Antigua outwitted the enemy (thereupon expelling the French settlers) no conjoint expedition succeeded. Nay! his success was of doubtful value; for the French refugees, resorting to Martinique, where food was very scarce (salt fish sold at 7d. a lb.), took up privateering with the zest of Dunkirkers and swept the seas of unprotected British merchantmen. Hence the diversion of many British warships to convoying or coast protection. A more vigorous plan was to aim a blow at Martinique, which then would recall its privateers.2 A typical West India expedition was that designed for Lord Peterborough, which devolved finally on Codrington. That experienced officer hoped the force would arrive in November 1702 and capture Martinique, "which we might have had for the asking last year". Its instructions, not drafted until January 1703, pointed vaguely to the French Windward Isles, then to a rendezvous at Jamaica for consultation as to a blow, first at the Spanish Main, then at Placentia and the French Newfoundland fishing fleet, or at Quebec for the expulsion of the French from Canada. Thus all Codrington's warnings as to seasons and the danger of delay were ignored; and the sequel ran the natural course. The fleet which Commodore Walker brought to Barbados in February 1703 lost heavily during his long stay owing to spirituous hospitality, and was thereafter too weak for an attempt on Martinique; but, landing in and devastating the chief places of Guadeloupe, found itself in the heats and rains of May unable to hold that island, still less to attack the Spaniards. After causing great discontent in Jamaica by impressing men, Walker sailed away for Newfoundland, where the French had meanwhile so strengthened the forts of Placentia as to render an attack imprudent. Codrington passed the verdict-"Delays cost more men than the 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1702, pp. 47, 71, 110, 216-18, 368, 460, 673-9, 744. warmest actions". In truth, the net result was the devastation of parts of Guadeloupe, whose inhabitants thereupon took to privateering and reduced the settlers of our Leeward Isles to such straits that several fled to Pennsylvania.1 The Spaniards and French gained other privateering centres by taking and laying waste the Bahamas (1703), whence they preyed upon West Indian and American commerce. In the spring of 1706 Nevis and St Christopher were raided by d'Iberville, until an English squadron drove him off. Thereupon Codrington's successor, Parke, urged the Government to capture the source of all evil, Martinique, adding derisively-"Send me over 10,000 Scotch, with oatmeal enough to keep them for three or four months". With them he will do much (or see them knocked on the head): he will take and settle Porto Rico "a better settlement than their beloved Darien". He received the equally tart rebuke that after the Act of Union all Britons were to enjoy equal privileges.2 Though in 1707-8 some twenty-four British warships cruised in those waters, yet privateering devastated commerce. In January 1708 a Jamaican reports: "Trade in general seems at a stand and nothing on foot but privateering", which tempted away so many seamen that the warships had to fill up from the troops or stay rotting in port. He foretells that the war will "leave to the world a brood of pirates to infest it". Commodore Wager might take or destroy near Cartagena Spanish galleons worth £15,000,000, and buccaneers might bring in much spoil to Kingston; but it is clear that the war impoverished all the West Indies.3 Meanwhile, the fate of the colonies was being decided largely in the Mediterranean. To that sea Louis had despatched his main force in the hope that so far from home the British and Dutch would be at a serious disadvantage. He erred; for that same consideration led them to conquer Gibraltar and Minorca. Their diffuse operations on the coasts of Spain having induced her to parcel out her feeble army, Admirals Rooke and Vanderdussen struck at Gibraltar with incisive effect. That fortress was being repaired by the Spaniards, and was not so weak as has often been stated; but the garrison did not exceed 500 men, four-fifths of them militia. The place, therefore, invited attack by a great combined fleet; and, when cut off from mainland succours by a landing party at the isthmus and overpowered in front by the ships' broadsides and boats' crews, the small garrison surrendered. At the cost of 60 killed and 216 wounded, the dream of Cromwell and the design of William were thus fulfilled (22 July 1704). To keep the key of the Mediterranean was another matter; for Louis XIV and Philip V, realising their mistake, now strove hard for its recapture. Louis hurried off the Comte de Toulouse with the 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1702-3, pp. 89, 117, 127, 132, 150, 213, 439-50, 571, 750, 817. Ibid. 1706-8, pp. 358, 426; ibid. 1708-9, pp. 191, 432. 3 Ibid. pp. 40, 191, 202, 270, 320, 402. Letters published in The Times of 17 Feb. 1926, by Morshead, O. F. GIBRALTAR AND IMPERIAL DEFENCE 521 Toulon fleet of fifty sail, which off Malaga fought an even fight with the allies' fifty-three (13 August). The Count, for all his boasts of victory, admitted a strategic reverse by retiring to Toulon, thereby leaving the allies free to strengthen their hold on Gibraltar. Rooke's battered fleet having to retire to Lisbon or Portsmouth for repairs, the French and Spaniards again assailed the place, only to be worsted by the prompt approach of Admiral Leake's succouring squadron from Lisbon (29 October). Again, in 1705, his support from Lisbon as base enabled our little garrison to hold at bay and wear down ten times their number of assailants.1 In fact imperial expansion was to be based on the Rock of Gibraltar. No place in the world offered greater strategic and tactical advantages. First, as a base to a British fleet, it enabled us to sever the French and Spanish Mediterranean forces from those in the Atlantic. After 1704, Toulon and Cartagena were, in a strategic sense, wasted enterprises; for the enemy's favourite gambit against England or her colonies from one or both of those ports was now countered at the start; and his endeavour to doff the Gibraltar incubus generally led to a battle with part of his Navy, which favoured the British war plan. Further, our frigates based on Gibraltar nearly always sighted and tracked a squadron working out to the open, and thus ended the uncertainty which had often paralysed naval operations. The tactical advantages of Gibraltar were also great. A small garrison there, supported by but few warships, could repel the attacks of a considerable army-a state of things exasperating to the enemy, who must attack that post in order to assure naval reunion, yet lost heavily in so doing, because a small force afloat or ashore at Gibraltar was a match for a far greater force of assailants. Therefore British. colonies had comparative rest because the French and Spanish forces needed for conquest in the New World were hurled in vain at the Rock. These effects were gradual and cumulative. At first Gibraltar was ill fortified and had so few docking facilities that our Mediterranean fleet perforce returned home for the winter. The need of a more spacious base farther east becoming urgent, Minorca was captured in September 1708; and its land-locked harbour of Port Mahon proved to be a far better base for the observation of Toulon.2 Thenceforth the British fleet, operating on the Gibraltar-Minorca base line, acted as a central force, linking up the allies' moves on and near the coasts of Italy and Spain, while France found the flank and rear of her armies insecure and felt the throb of her Levantine commerce die away.3 Meanwhile, as the prospects of "Charles III" brightened, the allies began to trade with the Spanish colonies in his name, with results favourable to commerce as far as New York. There and in 1 Torrington Memoirs, pp. 138-45; Life of Sir J. Leake, by Leake, S. M. (ed. Callender, G. for N.R.S.), vol. 1, chap. iv; Corbett, chap. xxxi. 2 Leake, 1, 267-9. * Colomb, P. H., Naval Warfare, p. 367; Callender, G., Naval Side of British History, chap. x. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1704-5, pp. 24, 44, 49, 69, 140. |