CHAPTER XVIII SEA POWER AND EXPANSION, 1660-1763 UNDER the manifestations of national energy and growth hitherto considered there is one factor fundamental to all. Sea power alone could enable the race first to spread overseas and then to uphold vital connection with the new settlements. The former of these processes is brought about mainly by victorious war. The second raises questions of commerce, finance, law and naval and international policy, all of which, however, rest finally on the former. But sea power also depends on national spirit, good organisation and skill in leadership. With these essentials we are here chiefly concerned, so far as they conduced to the spread and the maintenance of the British Empire. Under the Commonwealth and Protectorate, England had rediscovered her naval strength. Like other revolutionary governments, that of Cromwell had to exploit all possible resources, and was the first to develop a national and professional ocean-going Navy. Well-found, well-manned, well-armed, homogeneous in design, and handled with a view to a vigorous offensive, that Navy had worsted the larger but heterogeneous and half-mercantile fleets of the Dutch Republic. Already the English admirals were feeling their way towards the line-ahead formation, for which uniformity in design and drill was essential; and behind this tactical advantage lay that invaluable strategic asset, England's position athwart the chief lines of Dutch commerce, which enabled her to enforce a strangling economic blockade. Thus, the final issue could not be doubtful. The almost self-contained island, possessing a professional Navy, could wear down, first the fleets, then the commerce, then the vital strength even of a brave maritime people too dependent on the sea. Equally clear were the imperial issues. The same orce, exerted against the wide-flung and ill-cohering dominions of Spain, easily won Jamaica, establishing a base in the heart of Spain's jealously guarded Caribbean preserve. Thus the English, having won security at home and vantage posts overseas, could view without grave anxiety the rapid growth of the French marine. Is it surprising that Charles II and James II set great store by the Navy, and that Parliament, at the beginning of the Second Dutch War, granted a royal aid "for the preservation of His Majesty's ancient and undoubted sovereignty and dominion in the seas"? The range of action of the King's ships was also extended by the acquisition of Tangier and Bombay as part of the dowry of Charles II's bride, Catherine of Braganza; for the former place, when protected by a mole, commanded the entrance to the Mediterranean and countered the efforts of Louis XIV to make of that sea a French lake;1 while the fine natural harbour of Bombay promised support both for the neighbouring British posts and for the East India Company's commerce in those waters. The pretensions of France and, still more, the arrogant exclusiveness of the Dutch in the East Indies brought about acute friction; and in 1663 Charles was applauded when, without declaring war, he ordered Sir Robert Holmes to attack Dutch posts in West Africa and on the Hudson River. The success of this raid, and the ease with which New Amsterdam (New York) and other posts were not only conquered but held, revealed the fragility of the Dutch colonial fabric, reared on a narrow trade monopoly and little real colonisation. The Second Dutch War (1665–7) also proved again the strategic and economic weakness of the United Provinces, whose oceanic trade and North Sea fisheries could readily be cut off by the British Navy. For all their stout attacks on us in home waters and almost complete renunciation of oceanic trade, the Dutch could not gain maritime supremacy; and meanwhile they were drained of their life-blood. Very different was the strategy of the French, now for a time allied to the United Provinces; for while the Dutch pressed us hard in the North Sea and did little elsewhere, the French held back in the major operations but urged on la guerre de course, especially in the West Indies, where they drove English settlers from St Christopher. Finally Harman's powerful relieving squadron beat the French under the guns of Martinique and then raided French and Dutch colonies; but that diversion of force weakened our home defence; and, still more, the rottenness of Charles's administration exposed us to de Ruyter's telling blow at the Thames and Medway. Even so, the exhaustion of the Dutch led to the Peace of Breda (July 1667) which, besides restoring the English part of St Christopher, assured Surinam to the Dutch and New York and New Jersey to the British-a proof that even amidst Caroline decadence, our people could hold their own against the Dutch and French united. The disgrace came in the Third Dutch War when Charles II and Louis XIV in unscrupulous alliance failed to overcome the heroic Dutch. Meanwhile, individuals had shown that English spirit had not decayed. In 1668-9 two explorers, Radisson and Groseillers, employed for the time by Prince Rupert, with Gillam of Boston as their navigator, renewed the old quest for the North-West Passage, and during the search for it around Hudson Bay established the post of Fort Charles. Thereupon their patrons, including Prince Rupert, obtained a charter founding the Hudson's Bay Company (2 May 1670), 1 Harris, F. R., Life of E. Mountague, first Earl of Sandwich, 1, 197, 204, пI, 82, 154-9, 165-9; Routh, E. M. G., Tangier, passim; Tedder, A. W., Navy of the Restoration, chap. iv. NEW ERA OF NATIONAL POLICY AND EXPANSION 509 primarily for the discovery of a passage into the South Sea, but also for trading in furs and minerals in "Prince Rupert's Land". It was "to have the sole trade and commerce of and to all the seas, bays, straits, creeks, rivers and sounds in whatsoever latitude they shall be that lie within the entrance of the streight commonly called Hudson's Streights together with all neighbouring lands not possessed by any Christian prince".1 The first decade of Charles II's reign, when King and people were still united, witnessed by far the greatest colonial acquisitions yet effected; but the miserable schism which followed well nigh wrecked the whole fabric of empire. Very significant was the fate of Tangier. In 1680 Parliament refused the annual vote for its maintenance because "the supplies sent thither have been in great measure made up of Popish officers and soldiers"." England's Mediterranean watch-tower was, therefore, abandoned; and its ruin lay as a sign of the paralysing disunion of King and people. The Rock of Gibraltar was soon to be the symbol of a reunion, fruitful not only in Mediterranean, but also in oceanic and imperial strategy. The accession of William, Prince of Orange, to the throne opened up a new era of national policy and expansion, for he allied the British Isles with the Protestant and Maritime Powers against the threatening might of Louis XIV, thus inaugurating the series of wars with the "natural enemy" which reached their climax at Trafalgar and Waterloo. At the start of the race for empire, France had advantages in her absolute monarchy, then at the height of splendour; in her matchless army; and in her navy, now rivalling those of England and Holland combined. Spain seemed decadent, Italy was a mere mosaic, Germany a prey to disunion, while the Dutch were past the zenith of their energy, and the British Isles felt the troubles of a disputed succession. Thus, with foresight and discretion, Louis XIV should have dominated both the Old World and the New. But, like land power, sea power possesses no infallible magic: its successful working depends chiefly on sound judgment; and here le grand monarque was lacking. A long career of success had nurtured his besetting political sin, grandiosity, and its progeny, diffuseness of aim. William, on the contrary, trained to Dutch economy of effort, made the utmost use of his far scantier resources, saw when to strike, and then struck hard. At once the contrast was startling. While the legions of France devastated the Palatinate and her Navy lay idle, William with an Anglo-Dutch fleet made for Torbay and achieved a bloodless Revolution in England. Next, while he was gaining over allies, the exacting policy of Versailles drove Spain and other Powers into his arms. The higher strategy of the ensuing war (1689-97) also called for clear thinking; and here William's choice of aims was simple and 1 Schooling, W., The Hudson's Bay Co., chap. i. 2 C.J. ix, 665; Tanner, J. R., Cat. of the Pepysian MSS (N.R.S.), iv, 558. For details see Powley, E. B., The English Navy in the Revolution of 1688, chaps. ii-v. telling. Louis, on the contrary, toyed with many schemes, whereas prudence counselled concentration either on the continental or the maritime war; that is, either on Amsterdam and Cologne, or on London, Dublin and New York. Fortunately for his neighbours, he attempted all five enterprises. Therefore, while gaining initial successes in all quarters (save that the New York design withered for lack of ships and men) he could nowhere push them home. True, in 1690, the French fleets gained off the Irish coast and Beachy Head victories which promised triumph to the Jacobite cause, yet the skilful retreat of Torrington and his retention of a "fleet in being" off the Essex coast thwarted the threatened invasion of England;1 while William, crossing the Irish Sea with an adequate army under light escort, scattered James II's forces and drove him from Ireland. Thus, by the end of 1690 the unity of the British Isles was restoredan essential preliminary to the establishment of naval supremacy and colonial security. James having strengthened the Navy and well stocked the dockyards, 100 sail of the line were ready, or completing for sea in that year.2 Meanwhile, the British Empire had been in grave danger, alike through internal dissensions and French aggressions. That William appreciated the crisis appears in an Order in Council (2 May 1689) planning the fortification of St John's as a sure base for our Newfoundland fishermen, and operations against the adjoining French ports in Newfoundland, which became nests of privateers in war time. The importance attached to the West Indies appears in his order to despatch a fleet to the Leeward Isles; "for the party superior at sea in those parts will probably prevail on land". Before the departure of this force (March 1690), bad news poured in from all quarters. The Hudson's Bay Company bemoaned the destruction of its forts by the French Canadians, who flaunted their design of capturing New York, fortifying its harbour and dominating America by sea and land. Never was there a better opportunity; for the disputed succession in England increased the spirit of dissidence in the Plantations. The rabble of New York deposed the governor, and the Bostonians-a "giddy and enraged mob"-imprisoned theirs, besides capturing the King's guardship. Governor Randolph from the common gaol smuggled to England a warning letter (29 May) that the French were everywhere encroaching, while the Jesuit fathers were winning over some of our Iroquois allies with tales of the 4000 Canadians ready to descend on the weak and distracted English. By the end of July Massachusetts had lost its fisheries and the frontier forts. 1 Colomb, P. H., Naval Warfare, pp. 110–22; Thursfield, J. R., Nelson and other Naval Studies, pp. 113–6. 2 Camden Society, XLVI, 26–36; Burchett, J., Transactions at Sea, 1688-97 (1703), pp. 3-19; Lavisse, Hist. de France, vol. vi, chap. ii; Charnock, J., Naval Architecture, vol. II, chap. xvi. 3 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 22, 32. THE STRUGGLE FOR NORTH AMERICA 511 From the middle and southern colonies came reports scarcely less gloomy. All the coast settlements beg for naval succours, even Virginia and Maryland declaring that frigates are their best protection.1 The merchants trading to New York set forth that the French, if not stoutly opposed, will capture that city "which is the centre of all the American colonies", make it a privateering centre and overrun all the mainland colonies, "which will be the ruin of our West India islands". To avert this disaster they urge the fortifying of New York. Nothing so far-seeing appears in the proceedings of the colonial Assemblies, whose mutual rivalries sapped every effort. Yet at that time Count Frontenac, returning to the scene of his former triumphs in Canada, was maturing a plan for a double attack on New York by sea, as also by land down the Champlain-Hudson rift. Insufficient support from France and the inherent difficulty of coordinating the two expeditions marred the project; but with the aid of Indian allies he organised frontier raids which terrorised New England and New York. If his object was to pin their militia to frontier defence while he prepared a blow at New York or Boston, he failed; for the Indian outrages aroused a resolve to procure assistance from England, and by means of her fleet strike at Quebec, their militia meanwhile threatening Montreal.2 As supremacy in North America depended on sea power, the New Englanders sent home requests for help, they themselves undertaking to supply 500 troops with transports. Meanwhile the militia (which on paper numbered 13,279 men) would attack Montreal and Quebec by way of Lake Champlain.3 The plan was the first of several which were tried without success until the year 1759. The same causes of failure generally appear: the reluctance of the colonies to send their quotas; desertions, delays, and quarrels as to leadership; the slowness of the Home Government to supply ships and troops, and dislocation between the maritime and land expeditions; for the former, sailing by a devious route for Quebec, was completely out of touch with the latter, aimed directly by land at Montreal; whereas the French defenders, acting on interior lines and on a fine waterway, could rally promptly at either place. In this first effort, a Boston adventurer, Sir William Phipps, collected there a force of eight vessels and 446 volunteers, with which he reduced Port Royal in Acadia (11 May 1690), but this success was soon reversed by a single French warship, which carried off the English governor. Meanwhile with a larger force of five armed ships and twenty-nine unarmed transports, manned by New Englanders, Phipps prepared to ascend the St Lawrence, while 2000 men 1 Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 45-7, 66, 82, 101, 389. 2 Lorin, H., Le Comte de Frontenac, pp. 356-62; Osgood, H. L., The American Colonies in the 18th Century, vol. I, chap. iii; Garneau, H., Hist. du Canada (5th edn, 1913), pp. 379-82. Cal. St. Pap. Col. 1689-92, pp. 240-1, 261. 4 Guttridge, G. H., Colonial Policy of Willian III, pp. 103–6, 184. |