FLEURY, WALPOLE AND GEORGE II 367 In February 1727, Spain actually declared war on Britain, but its languid course showed only the hollowness of the Vienna league and the strength of the opposition. The timely death of the Emperor's chief ally, Catharine I of Russia, helped on the cause of peace. It was agreed to adjourn the disputes and to discuss them at a new Congress next year. Before the Congress met, at Soissons, the sudden death of George I had brought about the confirmation and enlargement of Walpole's power. His new sovereign, after first giving him the lie and his dismissal, was brought by Queen Caroline and a sense of his own interests to become his unconscious disciple and his steadfast friend. Inferior to his father in weight and vision, George II resembled him in love for Hanover and in hatred for his heir. The one made him zealous for the imperial alliance; the other had the curious effect of safeguarding the dynasty by providing the disaffected with a cynosure who was not a Stuart. The Hanoverian dynasty, however, was still far from popular, nor the Emperor yet available as its ally, while, in October 1728, tidings of Louis' smallpox evoked brisk movements on the part of Philip for claiming the succession to his throne. Fleury, Walpole and George II therefore remained at one in prolonging the entente, despite the complaints of French merchants, British planters, and diplomats and statesmen of both nations. Fleury, like Walpole, desired peace, but no French statesman could be expected to base the peace of Europe upon a guarantee of the aggrandised House of Habsburg. Since the Emperor stood out for the Pragmatic Sanction or nothing, the Congress of Soissons failed, and the next European combination embodied another revolution. Spain, resolute to re-enter Italy, and disillusioned by Vienna, achieved her purpose by accepting the yoke of Britain. In November 1729, at Seville, she flung over her imperial ally with his Ostend Company and collective guarantee of the Pragmatic Sanction, accepting from the Sea Powers and France the succession in Tuscany, Parma and Piacenza, with the right to send 6000 Spanish troops to hold them. Before the Treaty of Seville was signed, the birth of a dauphin, frustrating Philip's hopes of the succession, had removed the greatest barrier between France and Spain. The next great move for a broadbased peace, however, came from Britain. No treaty, it might well seem, could have insulted the Emperor more than that of Seville, whereby his opponents combined with his faithless ally for the forcible disposal of imperial fiefs. In the spring of 1730, the Duke of Newcastle imagined French, Hessians, Danes, British, Hanoverians and Dutch marching on Austria to safeguard the Spanish cause in Italy.1 Yet, within eleven months, a second great Treaty of Vienna was in being (March 1731) whereby the Sea Powers, soon joined by Spain, won over the Emperor by guaranteeing the Pragmatic Sanction. In the 1 To Harrington and Poyntz. Cf. Coxe, Walpole, п, 681. negotiations, conducted with haste and stealth for fear of France, Britain had been amazingly hampered by the "little, low, partial, electoral notions"1 of her King, who demanded as the price of the treaty judicial decisions by the Emperor in favour of Hanover. Their successful conclusion in the second Treaty of Vienna seemed to crown the diplomatic campaign of Britain under Walpole for peace. In support of our own Pragmatic Sanction, the Act of Settlement, we had now secured the guarantee of the Emperor, France and Spain, while Spain was bound to give privileges to our commerce, and all possible competitors in their several ways to refrain from interference. In 1732 we felt strong enough to veto a Spanish project for independent eastern trade, and to establish our new colony of Georgia on the very edge of Spain's occupied territories in Florida. The basis of the new settlement was philanthropic, though Franklin derided the prospects of an agricultural colony of "insolvent debtors taken out of the jails", and the prohibition of negro slaves and of great estates soon broke down. But France and Spain could hardly ignore the threat to themselves in a settlement which trespassed on their provinces and furnished in Savannah an obvious strategic menace to their fleets. Queen Caroline was right, however, in comparing the political combinations of Europe to the South Sea Bubble, which everyone knew was a cheat but entered to snatch a profit.3 Two years sufficed to burst the second bubble of Vienna. In 1733 France discovered that she could not look on unmoved while the eastern Powers disposed of the vacant throne of Poland. Louis cheerfully informed those who thronged the ceremony of his lever on 14 October that his troops had crossed the Rhine. By the end of November, France, Spain and Sardinia were in arms to coerce the Emperor, and Britain must tremble for Gibraltar, commerce and prestige.5 Could she stand by with folded arms while Europe was shaped by others? Walpole was determined that the War of the Polish Succession should not become a war of the British Succession, and the nation did not disagree. The ministry, weakened by the failure of the Excise bill, had rallied opinion by betrothing Princess Anne to the Prince of Orange. This stroke, however, offended the anti-monarchic Dutch, who instantly drew near to France. Thus reassured, the Emperor's threat to evacuate the Netherlands could not stir them to action, and without Dutch co-operation it would be madness for Britain to venture upon war. In 1734 and 1735 the Emperor, with Russian help, had his way in Poland, where the Saxon Augustus drove Louis' father-in-law from the throne. The Rhenish and Italian campaigns, however, went against him, and Don Carlos of Spain was crowned 1 Coxe, Walpole, II, 535, citing Horace Walpole the elder. 2 Smyth, A. H., Writings of Benjamin Franklin, 1, 355. Robertson, C. G., op. cit. p. 33. 5 Coxe, Walpole, III, 147. 4 Vaucher, p. 74. DECLINE OF THE ENTENTE 369 King of Sicily and Naples. Meanwhile the Sea Powers laboured for peace, and hastened its coming by their refusal of financial aid. When the third Treaty of Vienna was agreed on, however, France had approached the Emperor without their knowledge. Nor was this slight the only British disaster in the war. A Family Compact between France and Spain had been signed in 1733. When peace returned, a league of continental powers against Britain had been brought appreciably nearer. In spite of George's martial zeal, the Emperor had called on her in vain to fulfil the Treaty of Vienna, while France had guaranteed the Pragmatic Sanction. Five years before, Newcastle had reported Fleury "not dead, but dead to us", and Fleury was the least Anglophobe of Frenchmen. A war in which our sea power shielded Poland while our diplomacy favoured the Emperor could hardly strengthen the entente, though both parties resumed it with feigned enthusiasm. Above all, though with much distrust and friction, the deadly combination of France and Spain had been brought about. The territorial adjustments of the third Treaty of Vienna (1738) securing Lorraine for France, Tuscany for the Emperor, and the two Sicilies for the Spanish Bourbons, commanded the assent or at least the indifference of Britain. Its implications might well leave only the foolhardy calm. The three years after fighting ceased (1736-38) saw a general worsening of the position through the rise of our ambiguous French ally. Chauvelin, our sworn foe, the "shuffling friend" whose conduct made Walpole instruct our ambassador to "pay dissimulation with dissimulation...as all who play fair with sharpers are certainly undone",3 fell early in 1737, but France in that age "pushing into an universal commerce as the...way of coming at their old darling scheme of universal dominion" could not be truly our well-wisher. It was something that the Queen of Spain hated Fleury, the "mitred Machiavelli", but Patiño, her great commercial minister, who threatened to kill him with a staff of cotton by transferring Spanish trade to Britain,5 had died in 1736, leaving the government to "three or four mean stubborn people of little minds...but full of...the immense grandeur of the Spanish monarchy"." The Emperor, upon the maintenance of whose power "the equilibrium" depended, and who now lost his Eugène, was drawn into a war between Russia and the Turks, in which the Austrian disasters reinforced the lesson of the Polish Succession struggle. Military failure was followed by diplomatic, and the Peace of Belgrade (1739) formed an immense triumph for France. The Turks were saved; Russia, baulked of compensation for her loss of 100,000 men; Austria, ▲ Anderson, III, 216. 1 To Horace Walpole, Aug. 1730; cf. Williams, E.H.R. xvi, 448. • Delafaye to Waldegrave, Oct. 1731, in Coxe, Walpole, III, 122. 3 Ibid. III, 449. 5 Coxe, Walpole, 1, 473. Keene to Newcastle, 1739, cit. Temperley, H. W. V., "The Causes of the War of Jenkins' ear (1739)", Trans. Roy. Hist. Soc. 3rd series, III (1909), p. 3. CHBE I 24 despoiled and humbled-all by the brains and energy of a French diplomat and a French military adventurer.1 ""Tis Belgrade kills me", said the Emperor, when at the point of death. Austrian influence with Russia inevitably declined, while Prussia, whose Crown Prince was learning to reckon on a deep cleavage between France and Britain, proved susceptible to the blandishments of France. Mistress now of Sweden, with nowhere an enemy, France seemed to be the arbiter of Europe. Meanwhile the British Government had survived the Porteous riots in Scotland, disturbances in London, an open feud within the royal house, and the lamentable death of the Queen. Still, however, it felt too weak to risk the alienation of the fundholders by converting the debt to a lower interest basis, and in 1739 the moral weakness of both Government and people was to place both in jeopardy. In that year, long-smouldering disputes with Spain issued in a needless rupture. "The conduct of England from... 1737 to the declaration of war", wrote Coxe ere the century closed, "was inconsistent, unjust, haughty and violent." It was also highly unprofitable, though the worst disasters were averted by good fortune. Both sides had just grievances arising from the high claims and lawless practices of Britain and her subjects in their relations with the Spanish Indies and from the illegal violence shown by Spanish officials towards suspected offenders. During the year 1738, negotiations in Spain were stimulated by the presence of a British fleet, but, early in 1739, so good was the Spanish disposition that a convention between the two countries was signed and an alliance was seriously thought of. Then, while a skilful French ambassador changed the feeling at the Spanish court, a wave of public opinion swept Britain into war with Spain. The South Sea Company inflamed the Government and nation; hopes of mines and galleons played their part; stories of the Inquisition found ready credence; and the Opposition made of Captain Jenkins's ear a talisman to bring them into office. Pitt stooped to use the argument of a Louis XIV that might gives right, without Louis' sincere assumption that man's might is an index of God's favour. "With more ships in your harbours than in all the navies of Europe, with above two millions of people in your American colonies", should we, he asked, accept a dishonourable convention?8 Few could be found to brave the storm, and Newcastle was certainly not among them. In March 1739 he ordered the squadron at Gibraltar to remain there, and by October, Spain and Britain were formally at war. 1 Vandal, A., Une ambassade française en Orient sous Louis XV, 1728-41, passim. 2 Ibid. p. 411. 4 Coxe, Walpole, 1, 618. 9 * Koser, R., König Friedrich der Grosse, 1, 48. Cf. Johnson, C., Lives of the most famous highwaymen, etc. (London, 1734), p. 267: "This logwood is but little better than stole". • Vide supra, p. 340. 7 Temperley, ut cit. p. 21. 8 Cf. Thackeray, Chatham, 1, 29 (Dr Johnson's version). • Temperley, ut cit. p. 32; Hertz, op. cit. pp. 48 seqq. THE SPANISH AND AUSTRIAN WARS 371 A year later, Newcastle himself was writing, "From what I see, France will sooner or later dominate Europe, and perhaps America also".1 The last clause is the more significant because the war had been conducted on the lines laid down in Carteret's dictum, "Look to America... Europe will take care of itself".2 The first great plans, which included a double attack upon Manila, were indeed cut down, but the Admiralty clung firmly to its design of attacking Spanish America from the west as well as from the east. While Anson prepared for an expedition to the South Seas, Vernon with six men-ofwar made the almost bloodless capture of Porto Bello (November 1739). Such a success, one month after the proclamation of the war, intoxicated the Opposition and the country. Vernon became a national hero, and was entrusted with a large fleet for the reduction of the Spanish Indies. In March 1741, aided by General Wentworth and 8000 men, he turned to attack the stronghold of Cartagena. The commanders quarrelled; nearly half the troops perished of disease; and in mid-April the attempt was abandoned. It had taught the British how not to wage amphibious warfare in the tropics. Anson, meanwhile, with a host of despairing pensioners and raw marines, was labouring round Cape Horn.5 His squadron, which dwindled to a single ship, won great fame and booty, but was powerless to influence the war. In 1742, Vernon continuing impotent, it became clear that as a speculation the Spanish war had failed. Fleury, moreover, had as yet done little save guard against any diversion in Europe which could affect a struggle so profitable to France. While the British continued to lose markets, to squander manhood in the tropics, and to turn against their incomparable Walpole, the cardinal was drawing nearer to the Emperor and preparing for a triumphant mediation. At this juncture, however, death destroyed his hopes. On 31 May 1740, young Frederick of Prussia, Voltaire's disciple, but suspected of being secretly a foe to France, inherited his long-awaited crown. In October, the Russian Succession passed to a minor, an event which, as he knew well, must give him greater freedom. At the same time, Europe was startled by the Emperor's sudden death. This led to events which broke Fleury's system in pieces, set the world on fire, and caused the War of Jenkins's ear to be almost literally forgotten. For Britain, the great significance of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740-48) was that it foiled and distracted France. As the immediate consequence of the Emperor's death, Spain turned to press her claim to Austrian Italy. In December, Frederick marched into Silesia. "The man is mad", cried the impassive Louis, but the infection soon spread to Paris. While Fleury disseminated blessings 6 1 To Harrington, 11 Oct. 1740, cit. Vaucher, Walpole et Fleury, p. 352. Cit. Charteris, Cumberland, p. 88. 3 Bancroft, G., Hist. of U.S. 1, 440. Ibid. II, 442; Richmond, H. W., The Navy in the war of 1739-48, pp. 110 seqq. Walter, R., A voyage round the world in the years 1740-4 by George Anson, Esq. (London, 1748), passim. Koser, pp. 54, 119. |