THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE OF 1717 357 and a dangerous commercial rival, to be handled, if possible, in like manner with the Dutch. Her influence abroad, notably in the Levant, her unsurpassed diplomacy, her unrivalled army-from all of these her ally might look for help. Surprises were the less likely that the old French hostility against Austria, "the poisoner of the Latin races",1 remained unabated, while her old hostility against Spain was revived in the breasts of some by the pretensions of the King of Spain to her succession. And, as our statesmen gleefully reflected, since the British connection was loathsome to the French people, the ruler who made it for his own purposes would depend on it and on themselves. This is not the place to describe the calculations of the French regent, Orleans, or of his minister Dubois, for whom George I secured as the price of his assistance the Archbishopric of Cambrai, nor can the involved negotiations in the several centres be followed out. It is sufficient to record that in January 1717, the compact was framed which linked France, Britain and the Dutch into a Triple Alliance for preserving the peace of Europe on the lines laid down four years earlier. The Hanoverian Succession and the regency of Orleans thus gained the support of the best army and the best fleets in Europe, backed, as was computed, by nearly one-half of Europe's current cash. The policy embodied in the Triple Alliance was destined during sixteen years of unexampled complexity to avert the evil which seemed always imminent-the outbreak of a general war. It is significant that in such a compact between three of the four colonial Powers of the world the colonies though implicitly guaranteed are not specifically named. How little they were regarded by the rulers of France in comparison with their own security became manifest in the amazing French career of Law. In August 1717 Louisiana was lightly handed to a Scottish adventurer who promised to make France rich. The tobacco monopoly, the Senegal, East India, China and African Companies followed. Within two years, it might be said French commerce outside Europe was in his hands. Another year (1720) and the bubble burst. It had shown how shallow by comparison with the Dutch and English were the roots of the French Companies, and it had suggested that if the French Government remained inactive British colonists and merchants had little to fear from France.4 The Triple Alliance, produced as it was by clear and simple needs of State, may be rightly regarded by posterity as the outstanding event in a period of European peace. To the actors in them, however, the years that followed the death of Louis XIV seemed anything but peaceful, and politics had never been more obscure. How could Britain think of empire while at any moment a fresh European 1 Castelar, cit. Duff, M. E. G., Miscellanies, p. 270. Cf. Wiesener, Le Régent. Based on British records. 3 Cf. Anderson, ш, 85. • Weber, H., La compagnie française des Indes (1604-1875), p. xv and passim. combination might overturn her throne? And how could her ministers ensure the prevalence of a national policy when the King, despite his dynastic interests, was indispensable? Until the close of 1718, at least, the student of British imperial history must stare at the kaleidoscope of Europe. In the summer of 1715, wrote a contemporary, "the Levant was covered with ships of war. The Sultan, judging well that he could not maintain himself upon the throne if he did not find employment for his militia,...fell upon the Venetians....France, in a state of minority, was the only Kingdom that remained neuter". For the pre-eminent result of the Sultan's move was to embroil the Emperor, already at loggerheads with the Dutch and living in a state of latent hostility against Spain. The ambitions of Spain forced him to garrison Italy, while the separatist aspirations of his Protestant subjects in Hungary constantly taxed his strength. Until the victories of Eugène brought the triumphant peace of Passarowitz in 1718, British statesmen watched with anxiety the fluctuations of the Emperor's power. But their distraction due to south-eastern Europe was as nothing in comparison with that arising in the north during the final flight of "that military meteor" Charles XII. The amazing adventures with which he had filled the whole century, and the no less amazing career of Peter, had brought about a Baltic situation which of itself was perplexing enough for Britain. Sweden was the Protestant missionary nation and our commercial friend. But should she be encouraged in clinging to her eastern Baltic provinces against Russia and Poland, to her southern Baltic provinces against the North German States, to her provinces on the Weser and the Sound against their neighbours in Germany and Denmark? Most urgent of all, what should be our attitude with regard to the intrusion into civilised Europe of Russia, an unattractive Power, but one very difficult to assail, and mistress, if her success continued, of those naval stores upon which British armaments mainly depended? The problem was made still more difficult by the "obstinacy and inveteracy" of Charles XII, who vetoed our commercial intercourse with Baltic ports which his enemies had held for many years and seized our merchantmen who disobeyed. The difficulty was increased when the professional soldiers freed by Utrecht flocked round the foremost captain of the age, and when he found in the Holsteiner Count Goertz a volunteer but omnipotent minister who could contrive to pay them. It was increased tenfold by the compromising manoeuvres of the British King in the interest of his Hanoverian possessions. It is neither necessary nor edifying to trace the steps by which his electoral troops had occupied Bremen and Verden. What concerned Britain was that these Swedish fiefs 1 History of Cardinal Alberoni, p. 80. 2 Townshend to Stanhope, Nov. 1716, cit. Coxe, Walpole, II, 121. GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE AFTER UTRECHT 359 doubled the importance of Hanover, that to keep them George became the accomplice of Russia and even of Denmark and Prussia, his detested neighbours, and that no consideration for Britain would induce him to let them go. To draw or drive us into open war with Sweden for the aggrandisement of Russia was indeed beyond his power. But he contrived that in 1715 a British fleet aided Charles's enemies after the season for trade was over; he convinced the Swedes that a North German prince upon the throne of Britain could never be their friend; he brought it about that, early in 1717, southwestern Sweden was reported "chock full of troops", with fleets preparing for a descent on Scotland, and he uselessly embroiled Britain with Russia for a period that surpassed his life. 3 Britain, insecure at home, was thus unprofitably involved in the northern struggle at the moment when the renewal of the general war was threatened by a sudden aggression on the part of Spain. To the rulers of Spain the Peace of Utrecht was a settlement achieved without consulting the laws of God or man,1 and one which had left behind it the seeds of endless wars. 2 To the rulers of Britain it was "the indelible reproach of the age", a settlement which confounded the characters of victors and vanquished, which prompted ministers to that legal indictment of its contrivers which Walpole took five hours to read. As at the same time the regency in France, our hereditary enemy, was the particular object of Spanish detestation, it was not unnatural that the two countries moved towards an entente. In 1716 the Convention of Madrid so expanded the treaty of commerce, which they had concluded at Utrecht, that the treaty of 1667 regained its force and the subjects of each country enjoyed most-favourednation status in the other.4 British hostility to the Utrecht terms, however, was in the main to those regarding France; Spanish, to those regarding Italy. That Italy should be delivered over to the Emperor seemed to Britain advantageous; but to the Italian rulers of Spain, intolerable. Hence when, in May 1716, peace-seeking Britain made her defensive alliance with the Emperor, Spain construed it as almost a declaration of war against herself. The Triple Alliance (January 1717) between all the commercial Powers increased her indignation. To break with Britain, France and Holland would be to renounce the Indies. But neither this peril nor the victorious progress of Eugène could deter her from striving to re-enter Italy by force. In the autumn of 1717, the Emperor's island of Sardinia was seized by an expeditionary force from Spain. While the expedition was in progress, Eugène won his crowning victory at Belgrade, but without the aid of a naval Power he could not reconquer an island. Britain as the Emperor's ally was 1 Alberoni, cit. Head, Fallen Stuarts, p. 188. 2 Alberoni, Lettres intimes, p. 306, and p. 161. 3 Coxe, Marlborough, III, 334, citing with approval Pitt to Keene. thus challenged to uphold the Utrecht settlement against Spanish attack. She naturally endeavoured to end the war between Spain and the Emperor without herself taking part in it and without sacrificing her new alliance with France, Spain, on the other hand, rejected every plan for an accommodation, and sought on all sides for allies. The Jacobites, the Swedes, the Turks and the Russians might be hoped for, but the most attractive possibility lay in France. There the Regent was morally as isolated in his union with Britain as was Louis Napoleon in a later age. Until their deepest feelings are aroused, the British set gain above sentiment, knowing that through Parliament they can veto an alliance if they think it worth their while. The French had neither consolation, and those who desired the succession of Philip to their throne were now strengthened by the general anti-Austrian opinion. While France remained doubtful, Spain found an active ally for her adventure in the ruler of Savoy, whose Utrecht acquisitions in Italy the Emperor was determined to possess. In 1718 the Spaniards seized on Sicily with the support of the inhabitants and the enthusiastic co-operation of their Savoyard King, eager to exchange them for Sardinia. With Europe, north and south alike, full of firebrand powers, wise action on the part of Britain, of the Emperor, and, above all, of France was essential to avert a conflagration. Thanks largely to British diplomacy, in this case assisted by Hanoverian, the danger passed as rapidly as it had arisen. Resisting all clamour, the Regent stood firm by his engagements. The Emperor made with the Turks a peace (July 1718) which set free an overwhelming force for the defence of Italy. He was even induced to join with the Sea Powers and France in a great Quadruple Alliance (August 1718) to defend the settlement of Europe.1 His reward came without delay, for in August Byng destroyed the Spanish fleet off Cape Passaro, and in November the Savoyard yielded Sicily at the price of Sardinia and the confirmation of his royal title. This prince, "whose politics were always unsearchable and always so superior to those of all other potentates", was admitted to the Quadruple Alliance and thus further fettered Spain. Rather than relinquish her Italian hopes, however, Spain attempted to kindle a world-wide war. The Jacobites, the Swedes and the Russians should be hurled at Britain or Hanover; British trade with the Spanish Empire should be plundered; Britain should be involved; and, to gain the French alliance, the regent should be overthrown. No single portion of this great scheme prospered, save the seizure of British merchant ships and goods. The French were stirred by the Spanish plot into greater energy and actually invaded Spain. Britain armed furiously and countered the Spanish negotia 1 Leclercq, H., Histoire de la Régence pendant la minorité de Louis XV, ¤, 19 seqq. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NORTHERN SETTLEMENT 361 tions with success. The accidental death of Charles XII (December 1718) removed the most incalculable danger to her peace. The new Armada never reached her shores. A Spanish landing failed to rouse the Highlands. British troops joined in the invasion of Spain and captured Vigo. Alberoni returned for ever to his native land, and, early in 1720, Spain followed her recreant ally into the Quadruple Alliance. At the same time the infinitely complex politics of the North seemed to be taking a clearer form. In the Baltic region, however, Britain, hampered by Hanover, had played a poorer part than on the continent and in the Mediterranean, and was emerging with a less reward. Her Baltic problem had been to secure a general peace on terms which should be both fair to Sweden and defensible against the sinister and victorious Peter. It was complicated by the facts that Bremen and Verden must be secured for Hanover; that Prussia, which hated Hanover, must have Stettin; that Denmark subordinated everything to her revenge;1 that the Saxon King of Poland was hopelessly untrustworthy; and that the King of Prussia was filled with an abiding terror of the Tsar. In general the complaint made earlier by Goertz was to prove well-founded, that "If...the Swedes must give up everything that the insatiable greed of their neighbours demanded, they would not...be sure of their shirts".2 The death of Charles and the execution of his minister, however, had left no Swedish champion to contend with fate, and British diplomacy, which had found in Russia the chief hindrance to a settlement, was aided by the fact that, next to Denmark, Russia was the greatest bugbear of the Swede. Lavish bribery and the expectation of British naval help and of a strong coalition to coerce Russia procured Bremen and Verden for Hanover (July 1719) and for Prussia the region of Stettin (August 1719). At the same time, with infinite pains, the choleric and timid King of Prussia was brought into harmony with Hanover and into opposition to the Tsar. Britain now hoped that with the aid of France, Prussia, the Emperor and the King of Poland, Russia might be forced to concede a righteous and abiding peace. This would leave her Petersburg and the window towards the west, but would restore to Sweden Finland and those provinces south of the Gulf of Finland which were at once the granary of Stockholm and the chief centre of British trade. In February 1720, Britain, Prussia and Sweden were in line, and it seemed probable that Denmark would be coerced into concluding peace. To have thus stemmed, even for a time, the advancing tide of Muscovy, would have brilliantly crowned a series of services to Europe which had already made the first years of the Hanoverian dynasty remarkable, and which must have strengthened its hold upon the British people. 1 Cf. Chance, J. F., British Diplomatic Instructions, 1689–1789 (III. Denmark), pp. 51 seqq. 2 Chance, Northern War, p. 179. |