less able to defend their organizational preserves against Congressional or Presidential directives than older, more popular, and better established agencies. Whereas HEW could mobilize specific resistance (both inside and outside the government) to almost any new procedure or proposal, neither OEO nor AID could call on an influential roster of satisfied clients to point out the perils of a new program. The lack of strong continuing political support for OEO and AID also contributed to the mistrustful Congressional pattern of annual review and authorization, which in turn, as noted earlier, insured greater access by Congress to the policy-making process.

The major innovations that were adopted internally by the various agencies were related to organization rather than to funding or programming-for example, the establishment of the Office of the War on Hunger in AID in 1967, the Center for Population Research in 1968, and the National Center for Family Planning Services in 1969. Although in part precipitated by Congressional pressure, these reorganizations were also partly precipitated by rivalry between agencies. The War on Hunger Office, for example, was established by the AID administrator partly to strengthen AID's role in agricultural assistance in the face of Agriculture Department expansion. The Center for Population Research was partly a means to head off proposals for a separate Population Institute. The National Center for Family Planning Services offered a solution to the continued competition between the Public Health Service and the Children's Bureau for control of related medical programs, including family planning.42

Other variables, of course, have influenced the development of population policy and programs in addition to these organizational tendencies. The perceived seriousness of the problem, the timing of various proposals, and the location of key individuals also have had considerable impact. The AID population program, for instance, was strengthened by the severity of the population crisis in nations like India, by the famines. that followed the failure of the subcontinent monsoon in 1965 and 1966, and by the determined leadership of the same population program director from 1966 on. HEW, on the other hand, was handicapped by less clear concern over United States population growth, by the increasing budgetary pressures of the late 1960's, and by continuing shifts in the level and leadership of various. HEW programs.

But over the long run, for each of these government agencies, the strongest governmental influence toward new programs was not the agency itself or even the President, but rather the relationships with Congress. Since Congress authorized the resources, it was clearly in

Congressional-Executive Relations in the

a position to press for the funding priority and the additional personnel that officials in the executive branch always hesitated to assign. Members of Congress, on their part, did not hesitate to use their influence to call public attention to population issues and to suggest a variety of Federal measures to deal with them. In Congress, just as in the Federal agencies, the personal factor was important-for example, the coincidence that placed a strong supporter in a key committee role, such as Fulbright as Chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, or Gruening as a subcommittee chairman or, from the opposite side, placed non-supporters in influential HEW appropriations subcommittee roles. But even then, the loose, non-hierarchical structure of Congress and the many different committees or subcommittees that had or could exert some oversight over agency programs gave members of Congress considerably more flexibility in their approach than the executive agencies. For example, the Gruening bill, S. 1676, was deliberately drafted so that it would be referred to the Senator's subcommittee. Thus, the organization of Congress, especially in dealing with a new issue that did not have an established committee jurisdiction, facilitated individual initiatives and innovation.

During the 1960's, then, explicit population policies as developed by the United States government showed the strong influence of Congress through many different channels. Substantively, attention was focused on the problem of high population growth rates both in the developing countries and among impoverished Americans. The first objective was the ready availability of publicly supported voluntary family planning programs to reduce that growth from crisis levels. Solving problems of population distribution or of population growth through abortion, or through incentives, disincentives, or coercive programs were, until the end of the decade, more often suggested by opponents as bogey-men than by sincere proponents. Yet, even as family planning received greater attention and wider support in the executive agencies, these other approaches were increasingly suggested and they too found their first support from members of Congress rather than the Administration.

At every stage of the process, as the United States shifted from a policy of "not the government's business" to one of subsidizing contraception, Congress played an increasingly vigorous role in defining the issues involved and in moving from rhetoric to resources in order to find a solution. Although the executive branch maintains an effective veto over the kinds of separate bills that can be passed and over the amounts of money that are ordinarily appropriated or expended, it has far less control over relevant amendments to other legislation

offered by individual members in committee and over earmarking procedures exercised by authorizing committees. This important policy role of the authorizing committees has been noted in the field of defense procurement and military policy, where a shift toward legislative oversight led to a new questioning of policy.43 It is clear now that a similar role has been played, although in a less conspicuous or political manner, in the formation of the beginnings of population policy.

The few studies that have been undertaken to date on the making of modern population policy do suggest that the influence of the legislative branch, and of what the British would call the "back-benchers" out of the partisan limelight and leadership, has been singularly strong.44 In the United States, there may be several reasons for this. On the one hand, it may be, as a British study suggests, that, "emotional issues that plumb deep-seated moral codes-for example, birth control, prostitution, homosexuality, and hanging" may have "a greater likelihood of being played out in the legislative branch of government than is true of other types of public decision-making."45 Certainly as long as population issues like abortion, sterilization, and amended tax laws continue to arouse political heat and emotion, Federal career officials, administrators, and leaders seeking the broadest policy consensus are likely to steer away from them. At the same time, the increasing size and jurisdictional complexity of the executive agencies may discourage interdisciplinary innovation of any kind and leave many initiatives to Congress merely by default. Have the great executive agencies become, like the extinct dinosaur, creatures of massive bulk but small brain unable to adapt quickly enough to a changing environment?

Both factors may be partly responsible. Probably as long as Congress continues to attract a certain number of innovative legislators who are oriented toward resolving new problems rather than maintaining existing institutional structures, their speeches, bills, and hearings in Congress will continue to publicize the unsettled questions and new programs that challenge national attention. At present, there seems little reason to doubt that Congress will maintain a notably independent role in proposing, debating, legislating, and supporting population policies that both precede in time and exceed in scope the formulations of executive agencies.

Birth control, after all, was adopted throughout much of the developed world by individuals against the express prohibition of governments and religious institutions. Similarly, the impetus today for more birth control programs or for other new United States population policies may still develop with greater force from the apparent disorder and individuality of the

legislative branch of government than from the large, routinized, hierarchical organizations of the executive branch.

REFERENCES

1. George H. Haynes, The Senate of the United States (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1938), Vol. I, pp. 62-67. Also Journal of William Maclay, Edgar S. Maclay ed. (New York: Ungar, n.d.), pp. 128-133.

2. Woodrow Wilson, Congressional Government (Cleveland: The World Publishing Co., 1956), pp. 23, 301, passim. 3. Woodrow Wilson, Constitutional Government in the United States (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1908), pp. 67-73, 141. 4. Stephen K. Bailey, Congress in the Seventies (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 37.

5. See for example, Milton C. Cummings, Jr. and David Wise, Democracy Under Pressure (New York: Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, 1971), pp. 452458, which cites half a dozen critics of Congressional "abdication of power," and even in defense of Congress cites no printed works and concedes that Congressional innovation and initiation "is perhaps underestimated." See also, James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy Making (Homewood, Illinois: Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962); Stephen K. Bailey, op. cit., Chapter III; David A. Baldwin, "Congressional Initiative in Foreign Policy," Journal of Politics, November 1966, pp. 754-773; David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: Wiley, 1959), p. 7.

6. Edward S. Corwin, The President: Office and Powers 1787-1957 (New York: New York University Press, 1957), p. 23.

7. Lawrence H. Chamberlain, The President, Congress, and Legislation (New York: Columbia University Press, 1946), pp. 458-459.

8. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Family Planning and Population Research Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1970, p. 167.

9. U.S. Congress, House, 90th Cong., 1st sess., Aug. 24, 1967, Congressional Record, pp. H11137-111340; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1968, Hearings on H.R. 15263, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, Part 1, pp. 49-55, 79-81.

10. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act, 1969, Hearings on S. 2347, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, pp. 71-72. Both Secretary Rogers and Senator Fulbright emphasized the independent resistance of the bureaucracy in this exchange about the wisdom of mandatory language for population funds: Secretary Rogers-"I think there is some advantage in having it mandatory. I suppose it will make us try to work harder to use the money for this purpose." The Chairman-"Well, the trouble is in this enormous bureaucracy, as you have observed, the bureaucracy does not always agree with the Secretary once the bill has passed. Unless there is an inducement to implement the program, even the Secretary of State does not always get his way within the Department, I dare say..."

11. Compare U.S. Agency for International Development, "An Interview with Joel Bernstein," War on Hunger, July 1971, pp. 3, 4, 12-16.

12. Compare U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, op. cit., pp. 119, 129, 151-156, 167-169; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Popu lation Crisis, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 1968, Part 3, pp. 622, 624, 626-627, 650-653; 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, Part 1, pp. 34-50;

89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, Part 4, pp. 775-792, 798-805, 856-860, 964-965, 968, 999.

13. For example, the National Advisory Commission on Rural Poverty was established by Executive Order 11306 of June 27, 1966; the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders was established by Executive Order 11365 of June 29, 1967; The National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence was established by Executive Order 11412 of June 10, 1968. The Commission on Obscenity and Pornography, however, was established by statute, PL 90-100, approved October 3, 1967. 14. Richard F. Fenno, Jr., The Power of the Purse (Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1966) pp. 402-405, 586-589.

15. Robert Gillette, "Population Act: Proponents Dismayed at Funding Levels," Science, March 26, 1971, Vol. 171, pp. 1221-1224.

16. Compare U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Report No. 92374 on HR 10061, 92nd Cong., 1st sess., 1971, p. 36.

17. As quoted in Gillette, op. cit., p. 1222.

18. Samuel Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961), pp. 151-152.

19. Population Crisis Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 94-95.

20. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Family Planning Programs, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., May 10, 1966, pp. 18-30.

21. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, The Effects of Population Growth on Natural Resources and the Environment, Hearings, before the Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 15, 1969, pp. 31-43.

22. John Wahlke and Heinz Eulau, The Legislative System: Explorations in Legislative Behavior (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962) pp. 254-256, 266.

23. On the influential role of "in-and-outers" in the United States government, see Richard Neustadt, "White House and White Hall," The Public Interest, Winter 1966, pp. 59-61.

24. Karl Sax, Standing Room Only: The Challenge of Overpopulation (Boston: Beacon Press, 1955, 1960 edition) p. xv.

25. United States President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Composite Report, Aug. 17, 1959, Vol. I, p. 96.

26. New York Times, December 3, 1959, pp. 1, 18.

27. Ibid., November 29, 1959, p. 1; January 4, 1960, p. 33; April 20, 1960, p. 28; July 20, 1961, p. 10; July 15, 1962, p. 10. 28. U.S. Dept. of State, Population Growth: A World Problem, Statement of U.S. Policy, January 1963, p. 13.

29. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Science and Public Policy, The Growth of World Population, (Washington, D.C., 1963) and John Rock, The Time Has Come, a Catholic Doctor's Proposals to End the Battle Over Birth Control (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1963).

30. New York Times, April 25, 1963, pp. 15-16.

31. Ibid., January 5, 1965, p. 16.

32. Ibid., November 29, 1965, p. 1.

33. U.S. Agency for International Development, Population Program Assistance, October 1970, p. 17.

34. The text of the Message is reprinted in U.S. Dept. of State, Department of State Bulletin, August 11, 1969.

35. National Academy of Sciences, Committee on Resources and Man, Resources and Man (San Francisco: Freeman, 1969).

Congressional-Executive Relations in the

36. U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Family Planning Programs, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., May 10, 1966, pp. 18-30.

37. Population Crisis Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1965-1966, Part 1, p. 361; Part 2-A, pp. 728, 799, 834, 844; Part 2-B, p. 1266.

38. Three other Federal agencies with different responsibilities have initiated smaller family planning programs that represent in some ways exceptions to the generalizations applying to the major agencies: The District of Columbia Department of Public Health was encouraged by the Senate Appropriations Committee to proceed with a family planning program in 1964; the Interior Department announced a family planning policy for Indian reservations in 1965 but remained dependent on the Public Health Service for implementation; the Defense Department in 1971 initiated a policy of abortion on request for military dependents regardless of state law, but after protests from Catholics and several bills and amendments in Congress, President Nixon, in a statement reminiscent of President Eisenhower's 1959 ban on birth control, rescinded the policy. The last case may be a revealing example of what can happen if administrative agencies do assume leadership in controversial population fields.

39. Population Crisis Hearings, 90th Cong., 2nd sess., 95-107.

1968, pp.

40. Oscar Harkavy, "Implementing DHEW Policy on Family Planning and Population" reprinted in part in Population Crisis Hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, Part 1, pp. 202-270. Also U.S. President's Committee on Population and Family Planning, Population and Family Planning, The Transition from Concern to Action, 1968, pp. 16-20, 43.

41. Population Crisis Hearings, 89th Cong., 2nd sess., 1966, p. 775; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, Family Planning and Population Research 1970, Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st and 2nd sess., 1970, pp. 109-181; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Family Planning Services Hearings, 91st Cong., 2nd sess., 1970, pp. 77-109.

42. This conclusion is based on contemporary interviews with many of the persons involved in each of these reorganizations. 43. R.H. Dawson, "Congressional Innovation and Intervention in Defense Policy," American Political Science Review, 1962, Vol. LXVI, pp. 42-57.

44. Sagar Jain and Steven Sindig, North Carolina Abortion Law: 1967: A Study in Legislative Process (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1968); and R. Dowse and J. Peel, "The Politics of Birth Control," Political Studies, 1965, Vol. 13, pp. 179-197.

45. James B. Christoph, Capital Punishment and British Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962) pp. 173, 174.