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and the Peloponnesus, where the majority of the Greek troops had already been transported at the request of the Allies. Italy, on her side, more for political than military reasons, occupied the much coveted city of Yannina, the capital of Epirus, in the hope of incorporating it with the so-called Albanian State, over which the Italian Government had declared a protectorate. On June 11th, contingents of Allied troops landed also at Piræus, but the bulk of the troops were kept in the ships ready to land and march to Athens in case of need.

Mr. Jonnart, after reaching Piræus, had an interview on board a man-of-war with Mr. Zaimis, to whom he communicated the object of his mission, and on June 11th he delivered an ultimatum to the Greek Government on behalf of the three Allies informing it that the Protecting Powers had decided to reconstitute the unity of the kingdom without impairing the institution of constitutional royalty which they had guaranteed; that as King Constantine had violated the Constitution which had been guaranteed by them, he had lost the confidence of the Protecting Powers,” and that, therefore, they demanded his abdication and the designation of his successor, to the exclusion of the heir to the throne. The ultimatum was to expire 24 hours after its delivery.37

On June 12th, the Greek Premier informed Mr. Jonnart that King Constantine being “solicitous solely for the interests of Greece, had decided to leave the country with the heir to the throne,” and that he designated as his successor his son Alexander.38 Constantine by a proclamation on the same day announced to the Greek people that, submitting to necessity and fulfilling a duty, he was departing from Greece with the heir to the throne, leaving his son Alexander on the throne.

Within fifteen days of the arrival of the High Commissioner of the Allies in Greece, Mr. Venizelos, at the invitation of the new King, again assumed the reins of government.

The forcible intervention of the three Protecting Powers in the internal affairs of Greece and the repressive measures which they adopted against that country have been commented upon by the public men and writers of both the Entente and Teutonic Powers. The spokesmen of the Allies assert that the intervention was justified both by treaty rights and the unneutral conduct of the Greek Government. Those of the Central Powers contend that the occupation of the territory of Greece by the Entente troops gave them an equal right to invade Hellas as a measure of self-protection and defense.

37 See details in M. Jonnart en Grèce et abdication de Constantin, by Raymond Recouly.

38 Ibid., p. 116-117; London Times, June 14, 1917.

The contention of the diplomatists and statesmen of the Entente Powers is in fact supported by the diplomatic instruments which created the Hellenic State and guaranteed to it both her independence and a constitutional form of government, which Constantine wantonly violated. 39

On the question, however, of the landing of the Allied troops in Salonika, Great Britain and France would have been more justified had they based their actions on the Protocol of February, 1830, rather than upon the so-called invitation of Mr. Venizelos, the Premier of Greece. Their right of intervention, by which the dethronement of Constantine was effected, is founded on the express terms of the treaty of 1863 (Article 3) which guaranteed to Greece a constitutional regime. The late King George I, and father of Constantine, was placed by the three Protecting Powers upon the throne of Greece under that express condition, and in justice to the memory of that sovereign it should be stated that during his long reign of half a century, he never deviated from the oath he took at the time of his accession to the Greek throne and discharged faithfully his royal duties in obedience both to the letter and spirit of the Constitution."

The repressive measures resorted to by the Entente Powers, such as the blockade of the Greek coast, the seizure of her fleet and merchant marine, and other acts of this character, may be considered as


39 See Part II in this JOURNAL, April, 1917, and documents in Supplement of this JOURNAL, of April, 1918, pp. 67 et seq.

40 One may, however, mention an exception to this general conduct of the late King of the Hellenes, namely, the conferring by royal decree, of the title of the Duke of Sparta upon the successor to the Greek throne, a proceeding contrary to the express terms of the Greek Constitution by which the conferring of any title is prohibited.

acts of reprisals, justified by the unneutral conduct of the government of Constantine. The various documents published in the Greek White Book, and particularly the deciphered despatches exchanged between the ex-King or his government with the German Kaiser and the Imperial Government, furnish abundant proofs that the Royal Government of Greece under the leadership of Constantine was not only aiding secretly the Central Powers, but was only waiting for an opportunity to attack the Allied armies in Macedonia, which opportunity fortunately both for the Entente Powers and the Greek people never presented itself.

Having exposed the treacherous acts of the ex-King of Greece and his various governments, which brought their country to the brink of ruin, it may not be out of place to state that the political mistakes which were made, and the blunders which were committed, by some of the statesmen of the Entente Powers were to a great extent the source of the evils suffered by the people of Greece during the three years of the Hellenic crisis. The secret treaties with the Government of the late Czar of Russia as to the disposition of Constantinople and that with Italy, assigning to her the Greek islands of Dodecanese and Epirus under the guise of a protectorate over the so-called state of Albania, furnished to Constantine and to his sympathizers the best argument to mislead Greek public opinion, which, coupled with the ubiquitous German propaganda, brought Hellas to a pass which, had it not been for the genius of its great statesman, Mr. Eleutherios Venizelos, would have resulted in a real calamity for Greece and brought a catastrophe to the armies of the Entente Powers in the Near East.

Let us hope that these mistakes will not be repeated and that the principles of justice and equity will be the guiding spirit of the international arrangements of the future Great Peace Conference.




In the United States District Court, Southern District of New York, Judge Mayer on August 23, 1918, rendered an opinion in favor of the Cunard Steamship Company, Ltd., as owner of the Steamship Lusitania, for limitation of the company's liability for loss of life and property in the sinking of the ship.

This decision reviews the events leading up to the sinking of the Lusitania, and cites some of the documents exchanged between the governments in regard to the method of the conduct of hostilities. The German memorandum of February 4, 1915, said: “On and after the 19th of February, 1915, every enemy merchantship found in the said war zone will be destroyed without its being always possible to avert the danger threatening the crews and passengers on that ac

The war zone mentioned referred to the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland and included the English Channel. This German proclamation was accompanied by a memorandum which set forth more in detail the purposes of the German Government. It was in reply to this proclamation that Secretary Bryan sent the note commonly called “the strict accountability note" of February 10, 1915.

Sir Edward Grey, in a memorandum of February 19, 1915, which is cited in the opinion, said:


It is understood that the German Government had announced their inten. tion of sinking British merchant vessels at sight by torpedoes without giving any opportunity of making any provision for saving the lives of non-combatant crews and passengers. It was in consequence of this threat that the Lusitania raised the United States flag on her inward voyage and on her subsequent out

ward voyage.

Judge Mayer says:

It will be noted that nothing is stated in the German memorandum, supra, as to sinking enemy merchant vessels without warning, but, on the contrary, the implication is that settled international law as to visit and search and an opportunity for the lives of passengers to be safeguarded, will be obeyed “although it may not always be possible to avert the dangers which may menace person and merchandise.”

On May 1, 1915, the sailing date of the Lusitania, the following advertisement, dated April 22nd, appeared in the New York daily papers:

Travellers intending to embark on the Atlantic voyage are reminded that a state of war exists between Germany and her allies and Great Britain and her allies; that the zone of war includes the waters adjacent to the British Isles; that, in accordance with formal notice given by the Imperial German Government, vessels flying the flag of Great Britain or of any of her allies are liable to destruction in these waters, and that travellers sailing in the war zone on ships of Great Britain or her allies do so at their own risk.


Washington, D. C.

Further, Judge Mayer says:

No trans-Atlantic passenger liner, and certainly none carrying American citizens, had been torpedoed up to that time. The submarines, therefore, could lay their plans with facility to destroy the vessel somewhere on the way from Fastnet to Liverpool, knowing full well the easy prey which would be afforded by an unarmed, unconvoyed well-known merchantman, which from every standpoint of international law had the right to expect a warning before its peaceful passengers were sent to their death. That the attack was deliberate and long contemplated and intended ruthlessly to destroy human life, as well as property, can no longer be open to doubt. And when a foe employs such tactics it is idle and purely speculative to say that the Captain of a merchant ship in doing or not doing something, or in taking one course and not another, was a contributing cause of disaster, or had the Captain not done what he did or had he done something else, then that the ship and her passengers would have evaded their assassins.

I find, therefore, as a fact, that the Captain and hence the petitioner, were not negligent.


This case also recognizes, as in the case of the Paquete Habana, the binding force of international law in the courts of the United States.

Secretary Lansing had said in his note of June 9, 1915, speaking of the Lusitania:Only her actual resistance to capture or refusal to stop when ordered to do so for the purpose of visit and search could have afforded the commander of the submarine any justification for so much as putting the lives of those on board the ship in jeopardy.” This principle was admitted in the German note of May 4, 1916.

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