and logical principles, rather than upon compromises not founded in reason which profess to grant that which no belligerent would ever concede. Of course, this means that a merchant ship loaded to the gunwale with guns and ammunition would be allowed to pass by an enemy cruiser. "Preposterous," you say. "Even on land contraband may be requisitioned and held." The thought is astounding only because it is new. The fact that private property of a neutral in a neutral country is inviolable may well interfere with the operations of a belligerent, but it has been a concept so universally accepted that no one would question it. For instance, Holland might have an ammunition factory within a hundred feet of the German border and might from that factory supply the Allies. If the Germans invaded Dutch territory to seize that factory a state of war would necessarily arise. We should all howl with indignation at the violation of Dutch territory. That is because no one would for a moment question the inviolability of private property on land in a neutral state. Of course, the sea does not belong to a neutral nation, but neither does it belong to a belligerent nation. Does the proposal for freedom of the seas necessarily depend upon the closely related propositions of limitation of armament and a league of nations to enforce the law? English opinion would make such propositions contingent. The Wilson suggestion includes them all, but rather as interrelated than as mutually conditional. The Germans seem to profess to be unable to see any connection whatever. But the struggle for the freedom of the seas in war time finds its support in inherent justice and in the fact that, irrespective of other considerations, no power owns the ocean. A league of nations would undoubtedly make the observance of the law more probable, yet the law and its enforcement are two different things. There is little doubt that in the absence of superior force, whether moral or physical, any agreement would be violated if that were to the vital interest of a belligerent; but after all even civil law, with all our vast machinery of government and our ability to punish violation, is rarely specifically enforced. The law merely fixes a measure of damage, to which a violator must respond. There are few world wars, however. Where they do exist, they ordinarily develop out of conflicts among a few nations and others are entangled because of shifting interpretations of what the law is. Unless practically all great nations are engaged, those involved would not dare to violate a definitely fixed body of law. If the rights of neutral nations were clear if the principles were on a logical foundation based upon sound reasoning, it would seldom be to the military interest of a belligerent to rouse the world over depredations which could have no possible justification or explanation. One thing seems clear: either we must accept the doctrine of immunity, or the rights of belligerents under the law must be so extended as to be of some practical benefit to them. The latter would mean rivalry in development of naval armament, because heretofore nations in regarding the value of control of the seas have had in mind only the limited rights of belligerents and the protection by law of the most considerable portion of foreign trade. Neutrals would vigorously oppose any extension of belligerent rights. The present law, based upon an illogical series of compromises, merely leads to an immoderate extension when it suits the purposes of the belligerent. The only alternative would seem to be the inviolability of private property at sea, including even contraband and enemy merchant ships. The law must be logical and definite. It must be based upon the principle that belligerent rights do not extend beyond the territory controlled or occupied. It must be founded upon the sovereign rights of nations to travel freely over the oceans, which are owned by none; on a recognition that law is as potent an instrument of protection as might. ARTHUR GARFIELD HAYS. AN EARLY DIPLOMATIC CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND BRAZIL It was two years after the United States formally declared for the recognition of the new Latin-American states and after several SpanishAmerican states had been recognized before the question of recognizing Brazil arose. When, in April, 1824, Rebello presented himself in Washington as the Brazilian chargé, a difference of opinion arose in Monroe's cabinet, because Brazil was a monarchy, while all of the other American governments were republics, and some hoped that monarchy might have no foothold on the continent. Others, however, advocated the recognition of Brazil the more strongly because it was a monarchy in order to show the world that it was the fact of independence which actuated the United States rather than the form of government. The opposition to recognition was strengthened by recent news of a formidable separatist movement in the north, with Pernambuco as a center, the purpose of which was to establish an independent republic under the name of the Federation of the Equator. This raised a serious doubt whether the government at Rio de Janeiro were really in effective control. It was reported, too, that the assistance of French naval vessels had been accepted in order to repress the Pernambuco revolt. This conjured up the specter of the so-called Holy Alliance, for the exclusion of which from America Monroe's famous message of the preceding December had declared. There was also a strong suspicion, supported by persistent rumors, that Dom Pedro (who had allowed himself to be made Emperor when in 1822 Brazilian independence from Portugal was declared, who had summoned a constituent assembly and then quarreled with it and finally forcibly dismissed it because it proved too liberal to suit his ideas of prerogative, and who had appointed a council that had drawn up a fairly liberal constitution in harmony with his wishes which he had not yet taken the oath to observe) really wished to restore Portuguese sovereignty and rule Brazil as a vassal of his father, the King of Portugal. About the middle of May, however, word came that in the preceding March the Emperor had taken the oath to the constitution of the independent Brazilian Empire. After Rebello had given assurances concerning the suppression of the slave trade and the observance of treaties that had been negotiated with Portugal, he was formally received by President Monroe as Brazilian chargé on May 26, 1824. He expressed his gratitude that "the Government of the United States has been the first to acknowledge the independence of Brazil."1 This was the beginning of what for a time promised to be very cordial relations between the two Powers. On the occasion of his presentation Rebello had suggested a "concert of American Powers to sustain the general system of American independence." In January of the next year, before the mother country had yet recognized the independence of Brazil, he proposed formally that the United States should enter into an alliance with Brazil to sustain the latter's independence in case Portugal should be assisted by any other Power in an attempt to restore her former sway over Brazil. He suggested that in certain contingencies the Spanish-American countries might be invited to adhere to the proposed alliance to protect them against a similar danger.2 This very early proposal of a Pan-American league is interesting and the United States reply to it is significant as being an early interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. The proposal was made only a few weeks before the close of the Monroe administration and was not answered until shortly after the Adams administration had taken control, when Henry Clay, the Secretary of State, an enthusiastic advocate of the cause of South American independence, replied that, while the President adhered to the principles set forth in the message of his predecessor of December 2, 1823, the prospect of a speedy peace between Portugal and Brazil seemed to make such an alliance unnecessary; but, he said, if there should be a renewal of 1 Adams, C. F., Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, VI, 280, 281, 283, 285, 308, 311, 314, 317, 328, 354, 358. 2 Ibid., 358, 475. demonstrations on the part of the European allies against the independence of the American states, the President would give to that condition of things every consideration which its importance would undoubtedly demand. This did not promise anything definite, yet it could be legitimately interpreted to mean that in case the contemplated emergency should arise the executive department would be disposed, so far as it was able, to assist the new states in maintaining their independence; but, Clay explained, the executive department could not bind the United States Government to support the policy, nor could it act alone, since to engage in war to support the independence of the new countries would require the consent of Congress. 3 When the question of the recognition of Brazil by the formal reception of her chargé, Rebello, was pending, Adams, then Secretary of State, said it would be advisable to appoint at the same time, or very soon thereafter, a chargé to represent the United States at Rio de Janeiro; and suggested that the appointment be conferred on Condy Raguet, a wealthy merchant, editor, author, and political economist of Philadelphia, who since 1822 had been residing at Rio de Janeiro as commercial agent, or consul, of the United States. President Monroe, however, thought the appointment might be deferred; and did not make it before the end of his administration, in spite of the fact that Rebello had manifested an earnest desire that the post should be filled in order to complete the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Among the many diplomatic appointments sent to the Senate immediately after the beginning of the Adams administration, March, 1825, was that of "Condy Raguet of Pennsylvania, chargé d'affaires to Brazil." His instructions were prepared in April.1 When Raguet's promotion and instructions reached him dark days were approaching for the new government to which he was thus accredited; and its troubles were destined to involve him in serious Robertson, W. S., South America and the Monroe Doctrine, Political Science Quarterly, XXX, 82-105; Manning, William R., Statements, Interpretations, and Applications of the Monroe Doctrine, etc., 1823-1845, Proceedings of the American Society of International Law, 1914, 35. 4 |