illustrate at once by their breadth of view and scholarship the lucid processes of Mr. Root's mind.

International law and the principles which govern the intercourse between separate and independent peoples, their specific rights and obligations as neutrals or belligerents, in war or in time of peace, supply the theme, and very naturally so, of these discourses. So that, by reading them with careful attention, the student may traverse a very large part of the whole field, we may say, of foreign relations and reap at the same time the benefit to himself of having the directly expressed opinion of a statesman by whom many of these important questions have been argued and determined, during the last twenty years, in the foreign policy of our government.

If, on the one hand, the active practice of nearly half a century in the courts of law has produced that high degree of intellectual training with which he takes up and disposes of every legal problem that presents itself to him, the mature judgment, on the other, and the experience developed through his years in the United States Senate and through his service as Secretary of War and Secretary of State in the Cabinets of two Administrations entitle Mr. Root to speak on international subjects with an authority not exceeded by any public man, certainly in America, of our day.

It is interesting to note that, at the outset, in treating of foreign relations, under the head of "The Need of Popular Understanding of International Law," he asks for a clear comprehension of international legal questions, as also of the legally defined rights of a people. He insists too upon a conciliatory attitude toward the recognition of the rights of others in dealing with foreign states. This desirable condition, he says, is to be brought about by increasing "the general public knowledge of international rights and duties" and by promoting "a popular habit of reading and thinking about international affairs. The more clearly the people of a country understand their own international rights the less likely they are to take extreme and extravagant views of their rights and the less likely they are to be ready to fight for something to which they are not really entitled."

International law is conciliatory, then, and pacifying as long as the rights and obligations of each party in interest are fairly weighed and

kept in view, to the ends of justice and equity; and its rules of conduct are law so long as each party submits to them with a willingness to see them applied, for, says Mr. Root:

The true basis of business is not the sheriff with a writ of execution; it is the voluntary observance of the rules and obligations of business life which are universally recognized as essential to business success. Just so, while it is highly important to have controversies between nations settled by arbitration rather than by war, and the growth of sentiment in favor of that peaceable method of settlement is one of the great advances in civilization to the credit of this generation; yet the true basis of peace among men is to be found in a just and considerate spirit among the people who rule our modern democracies, in their regard for the rights of other countries, and in their desire to be fair and kindly in the treatment of the subjects which give rise to international controversies.

It is impossible, he says, that the human mind should be addressed to questions better worth its noblest efforts, offering a greater opportunity for usefulness in the exercise of its powers, or more full of historical and contemporary interest, than in the field of international rights and duties.

In this connection, and continuing in regard to the study and understanding of the law of nations, Mr. Root has developed his thought yet a step farther in the address which he delivered before the American Society of International Law, in 1915, entitled, "Should International Law be Codified?" the reply to which he made in his own declaration that, whilst codification is now already in process, step by step, as, for example, through the Declaration of Paris, the Treaty of Washington and the Conventions of Geneva and The Hague, "it must be pressed forward and urged by all possible means.'

The very fact that there are no courts to establish precedents and no legislatures to make laws makes this necessary [says he]. All international law is made, not by any kind of legislation, but by agreement. The agreement is based upon customs, but the ascertainment and recognition of the customs is the subject of the agreement; and how can agreement be possible unless the subject-matter of the agreement is definite and certain?

The discussion of these and similar questions, pertinent to and arising out of the legal rights or obligations of independent states, ex

tends itself, under different forms amidst the widely different circumstances which present themselves with each particular case, throughout the whole series of these addresses. One traces everywhere in reading them that large comprehension of detail and the liberal and just readiness to admit into consideration the rights and privileges on both sides of the controversy which are, in fact, characteristic of Mr. Root's method in discussing questions of international law.

It is not necessary for us to do more at this time than to refer the reader to the numerous articles contained in the volume itself. We cannot pass by without referring, however, to one or two of these, as well because of the peculiar interest with which they will be read by students of international questions as on account of the intrinsic value of the investigations made by Mr. Root into the merit of the questions to which they directly relate and of the conclusions arrived at by him.

Certain of these, as, for instance, "The Real Monroe Doctrine," may be accepted as amongst the most decisive pronouncements that have been formulated upon the subject in recent times. It is not too much to say that, in this particular address, which was delivered before the American Society of International Law, in April, 1914, we have an authoritative declaration of the policy of the United States Government itself in regard to its attitude towards foreign Powers in their relations with the American Continent. The scholar or diplomatist of any country, who seeks to inform himself, could not do better than to take it into attentive consideration and study.

The events of the last three years in Europe have changed considerably, no doubt, the actual relationship between the European States and the Republics of South America; and they have substantially removed, for the duration at least of the lives of those of us who are living today, any menace of colonization or aggression upon the part of foreign governments that might cause apprehension to us. But we have this statement, made by Mr. Root in the most emphatic terms, that, whilst it is undoubtedly true that the specific occasions for the declaration of Monroe no longer exist,—the Holy Alliance long ago disappeared, the nations of Europe no longer contemplate the vindication of monarchical principles in the New World, and France, the most active of the Allies, is herself a republic, yet

The declaration, however, did more than deal with the specific occasion which called it forth. It was intended to declare a general principle for the future, and this is plain not merely from the generality of the terms used but from the discussions out of which they arose and from the understanding of the men who took part in the making and of their

successors.

As the particular occasions which called it forth have slipped back into history, the declaration itself, instead of being handed over to the historian, has grown continuously a more vital and insistent rule of conduct for each succeeding generation of Americans.

No one ever pretended that Mr. Monroe was declaring a rule of international law. . . . It is a declaration of the United States that certain acts would be injurious to the peace and safety of the United States and that the United States would regard them as unfriendly.

The doctrine is not international law, but it rests upon the right of self-protection and that right is recognized by international law.

So, also, in "The Ethics of the Panama Question" we have what may be taken in the same manner as an authoritative statement in regard to American policy, of extraordinary value to those who seek the point of departure and the real forces which, having been brought to bear through a series of years, reached finally an effective and determining governmental action. This address, delivered before the Union League Club of Chicago, in 1904, bears the imprint of a complete mastery of the subject and of the views upon it that were held by the Administration at the time, as these were reflected from Mr. Root's own participation, not only in the discussions which took place, but undoubtedly in the decisions arrived at, whilst the impression was still fresh upon his mind.

He announced in opening the address that he intended to present some of the fundamental facts bearing upon "the question of right in the Panama business," in the hope that they might thus reach the attention of those of our citizens who were troubled about the matter.

There remain [said he] good and sincere men and women who have thought our course to be wrong, and many others, whose character and patriotism entitle them to the highest respect, are troubled in spirit. They would be glad to be sure that our country is not justly chargeable

with dishonorable conduct. May the time never come when such men and women are wanting, or are constrained to remain silent, in America.

He made it evident that the relations of the United States Government to the Republics of New Granada and Colombia for many years before must not be left out of sight, nor their logical and inevitable consequences neglected, if the situation at the time of the actual construction of the Panama Canal is to be understood and the measures taken by the Administration are to be clearly described as a means toward the carrying out of that tremendous undertaking. Mr. Root has defined these in a manner to allay apprehension, not only on the part of those who listened to him in Chicago, but of those also, now and hereafter, who shall read his addresses contained in this volume. It throws an exceedingly illuminating side-light upon the whole subject as it was regarded by the authorities in Washington at that time, and is undoubtedly so regarded now.

The United States considered that "by the rules of right and justice universally recognized among men and which are the law of nations, the sovereignty of Colombia over the Isthmus of Panama was qualified and limited by the right of the other civilized nations of the earth to have the canal constructed across the Isthmus and to have it maintained for their free and unobstructed passage." By the treaty of 1846, New Granada applied to the Government of the United States to engage to protect that country against the seizure of the Isthmus by other foreign Powers. "In effect, she acknowledged the right of way and asked the United States to become the trustee of that right which qualified her sovereignty." Mr. Root declared that New Granada recognized by this transaction the subordination of her sovereignty to the world's easement of passage by railroad or by canal, and, apprehending that other nations might seek to exercise that right through the destruction of her sovereignty and the appropriation of her territory, she procured the United States to assume the responsibility of protecting her against such treatment.

The United States received a grant of power and assumed a duty herself to keep the transit free and uninterrupted and unmolested, and to keep the territory of the transit neutral.