teenth century. The county was by error, it seems, included in the list, and France sought to hold it by letters patent of 1701 and 1707 under which special prerogatives were given to the Count, constituting a voluntary submission to France, as it was held. The Empire never sanctioned these, and it seems to be clear that the illegal and compulsory act of the Count of Hanau could not change the provisions of the treaty. Another dispute arose in this connection in regard to the boundaries of Alsace, but this was rather a matter of geography and treaty interpretation than anything else. Though this case involves other types of violation, it is primarily an instance of internal laws violating political treaties and these laws (or court decrees) being invalidated by the family of nations.

2. England found herself unable to execute all of the Treaty of Utrecht of April 11, 1713, owing to a clause contrary to her commercial laws, which Parliament failed or refused to amend.17 This is usually cited as a violation, though certainly it would not now be so defined.

3. The first secret article attached to the Convention of Vienna of July 16, 1733, reveals at least an invasion of the religious provisions of the Peace of Westphalia. By it the Emperor declared that the guarantee of the States of the Elector of Saxony extended specifically not only to the bishoprics of Meissen, Merseburg, and Naumburg, but also to the cessions which the House of Hesse Cassel would have to make to the Elector after the death of the Count of Hanau, and to the fiefs which would fall to the Elector in case of decease of the titular holders. By the treaty of Westphalia the bishoprics of Meissen, Merseburg, and Naumburg were assigned to the Protestant party, but were not secularized. The episcopal chapters would continue to elect bishops or, according to the canon law, to postulate administrators from the descendants of the Elector John George I, who died in 1656. His eldest son was Elector of Saxony and administrator of Meissen, with the chapter of which he engaged in 1663 to erect a perpetual postulation by which this bishopric was forever united to the electorate; but the change of religion of the Elector August of Saxony should have served to annul this postulation, the effect of

17 Wheaton, International Law, III, II, 7; Du Mont, Corps universel diplomatique, VIII, Pt. I, 345.

which was contrary to the Peace of Westphalia. By virtue of perpetual postulations, which the chapters had signed, the bishoprics of Merseburg and Naumburg became hereditary in the branches founded by the son of John George I, Maurice William, duke or postulant bishop of Naumburg-Zeitz, who turned Catholic in 1717. The chapter, following the terms of the Peace of Westphalia, declared the seat vacant. These territories were particularly guaranteed to Saxony by the Vienna Convention.

4. On November 16, 1792, the French national convention provoked Great Britain and the States General by decreeing the liberty of the Scheldt despite Article XIV of the Peace of Münster and the convention's own mediation between the Emperor Joseph II and the States General a few years before, when, by the Peace of Fontainebleau of November 8, 1785, the closure was agreed to by the Emperor under the direct auspices of France. At that time political reasons made the States General dependent to an extent upon France, and this condition was consummated by the treaty of peace and alliance signed at The Hague, May 16, 1795. Article XVIII of the latter treaty stipulates that the navigation of the Scheldt, as well as of the Rhine, Meuse, and the Hondt, was to be free to both nations, 18 thus confirming the French decree.

5. A French decree of February 2, 1793, was directed against the English attitude as to maritime commerce. It reversed principles which Louis XVI had applauded as proclaiming the freedom of goods in neutral bottoms. It also violated the stipulations of treaties. By Article XX of the French treaty of September 30, 1749, with Denmark, the life of which was until the next treaty, both parties agreed that the liberty of navigation was to be so extended that, in case one of the contracting highnesses should find himself at war against other States, subjects of the other contractant would be left "the ability of navigating freely and surely as before the war, either in leaving their own ports or other neutral ports, to go to any port hostile to one of the contracting highnesses, or from one enemy port to another without being put to any trouble or prevention either in going or coming; nevertheless, there is excepted the case where the port into which they would 18 Schoell, Histoire Générale, IV, 218, 293; Garden, ibid., V, 190, 252.

enter might be actually besieged or blockaded from the sea side." Article XXVIII added positively that the flag covered merchandise.19

6. The English having prevented many neutral ships laden with grain from entering ports of the French Republic, a law of the latter of May 9, 1793,

authorized French warships and corsairs to arrest and bring into the ports of the Republic neutral ships which should be found laden, in whole or in part, either with eatables belonging to neutrals and destined for enemy ports, or with merchandise belonging to enemies. The latter shall be declared good prize and confiscated to the profit of the captors; the eatables belonging to neutrals shall be paid for on the basis of their value, freight included, and an indemnity shall be granted to the ships on account of their detention.

Thus France again violated the treaty of 1749 with Denmark.

7. Great Britain followed the same system for a considerable time, and an instruction, issued June 8, 1793, to British maritime interests, authorized the arrest of any vessel laden in whole or in part with corn, wheat, or flour destined to a port of France or a port occupied by the French army, and the sending of such vessels into the most convenient port so that their foodstuffs might be bought for the British Governmental account. The ship having been released, the captain, after being cautioned, might obtain permission to take his goods to the port of a friendly country. The second article authorized the arrest of all ships, whatever their burden, which attempted to enter a blockaded port, and their sending to England for condemnation with cargo, except the ships of Denmark and Sweden, which were only to be prevented from entering on the first attempt, but condemned on the second. The third article proclaimed a paper blockade. This decree resulted in correspondence between Minister Hailes of England at Copenhagen and Count Bernstorff, Minister for Foreign Affairs, who in a note of July 28, 1793, said:

[Denmark] is the suffering party, but she does not comprehend how his Majesty the King of Great Britain has been able to give to commandants of his ships, and this without asking its advice, an additional instruction entirely contrary to the preceding instructions and to his treaties with Denmark.20

19 Schoell, op. cit., VI, 9, 10; Garden, op. cit., VI, 305–307.

20 Schoell, op. cit., VI, 21; Garden, op. cit., VI, 316.

The treaty principally referred to is that of July 11, 1670, Article XX of which, establishing in an imperfect manner the rights of neutral commerce, was explained by a convention of July 4, 1780. The latter recites a list of merchandise to be considered contraband and expressly excepts wheat, flour, corn, and other grain. The instruction consequently was a violation of this provision, though it did not happen to be a violation of the almost identic treaty of October 23, 1661, with Sweden. There followed a diplomatic correspondence between Russia and Denmark, French decrees in abundance, and considerable British diplomatic activity, including an English instruction of November 6, 1793, that all French colonial goods in any bottom were to be seized. These measures forced Sweden and Denmark into the alliance of March 27, 1794, and there was no real solution of the matter until the Convention of London of July 25, 1803.

8. Article XI of the Peace of Basel of April 5, 1795, between France and Prussia, engaged France to welcome the good offices of the King of Prussia in favor of the princes and States of the Germanic Empire that might desire to enter directly into negotiations with it and that to this end had asked or should ask the mediation of the King of Prussia. The French Republic consented not to treat as enemy country for a period of three months after the ratification of the treaty those states and principalities on the right bank of the Rhine in behalf of which the king had interested himself. This treaty opened to the States of the Empire a method of avoiding the burden of war by making their peace individually with France. Schoell 21 states that the method was unconstitutional and contrary to the obligations which the States had contracted as members of the Germanic Confederation; and that therefore only a few profited by the opportunity, while most of them remained faithful to their engagements either out of attachment for the cause they defended or out of fear for the resentment of the Emperor, whose troops occupied their territory and whose protection would be necessary to them on the arrival of the general peace to prevent losses of territory to the Emperor. The Landgrave of Hesse Cassel was the first to make a special peace with France. By Article III of his treaty of August 28, 1795, the Landgrave specifically renounced the treaty n Op. cit., IV, 300; Garden, op. cit., V, 287-8.

of subsidies which he and the Margrave of Baden had concluded with Great Britain at Langencandel on October 5, 1793.22

9. Article 4 of the provisional treaty of peace concluded at Paris on November 30, 1782, and of the definitive treaty of peace of Paris concluded on September 3, 1783, between Great Britain and the United States provides:

It is agreed that creditors on either side shall meet with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full value in sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore contracted.

The following facts, said the Supreme Court,23 were of the most public notoriety, at the time when the treaty was made, and therefore must have been very well known to the gentlemen who assented to it. 1st. That British debts, to a great amount, had been paid into some of the State Treasuries, or loan offices, in paper money of very little value, either under laws confiscating debts, or under laws authorizing payment of such debts in paper money, and discharging the debtors. 2d. That tender laws had existed in all the States; and that by some of those laws, a tender and a refusal to accept, by principal or factor, was declared an extinguishment of the debt. From the knowledge that such laws had existed there was good reason to fear that similar laws, with the same or less consequences, might be again made (and the fact really happened), and prudence required to guard the British creditor against them. 3d. That in some of the States property, of any kind, might be paid, at an appraisement, in discharge of any execution. 4th. That laws were in force in some of the States, at the time of the treaty, which prevented suits by British creditors. 5th. That laws were in force in other of the States, at the time of the treaty, to prevent suits by any person for a limited time. All these laws created legal impediments, of one kind or another, to the recovery of many British debts, contracted before the war; and in many cases compelled the receipt of property instead of gold and silver.

A bond between Ware and Hylton was dated in 1774, that is, before the outbreak of the Revolution. In 1777 Virginia passed an Act for sequestrating British property, providing that full discharge of the debt should be created by the payment of the sum due to the commonwealth. In 1780 payment was made by Hylton in accordance with this Act. "When the British creditors under such circumstances, after the establishment of peace, sought to proceed in the State courts 23 3 Dallas 238.

22 Martens, Recueil, VI, 548.