the United States and the Imperial German Government which has been thrust upon the United States is hereby formally declared; and that the President be, and he is hereby, authorized and directed to employ the entire naval and military forces of the United States and the resources of the government to carry on war against the Imperial German Government; and to bring the conflict to a successful termination all the resources of the country are hereby pledged by the Congress of the United States.

It will be noticed that the distinction is here observed which was made in the President's message, between the Imperial German Government and the German people, and that, on the other hand, it is stated that the German Government has made war against both the Government and the people of the United States.

It is to be noted, also, that Congress has not specified what were the "repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States" by which war has been "thrust upon the United States."

It is hardly open to dispute that of the grounds of complaint mentioned by the President in his address, those above numbered 1, 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, and 12 may be regarded as American grievances, justifying war.

Those numbered 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 13, present a somewhat different question. In them German attacks upon the peace of the world, and the freedom of peoples; the evils of autocratic government; the liberation of the peoples of the world, the German peoples included; and the duty of making the world safe for democracy, of securing the rights and liberties of free peoples, and of seeking to set up such a concert between them as will make the whole world free, are set forth as causes for our going to war. The matters which the President here sets up touch us less directly than do the other matters to which he referred. They are questions of world politics, and of worldwide application. Congress did not see fit to put them into its list of grievances, in terms; but it does not invalidate the declaration of war, that the President and Congress have not agreed on precisely the same statements to support it. They have agreed, however, in the result of making, by the action of each, a declaration that war exists.

Such a declaration is analogous to a judgment of a court, held by several judges, which recites certain premises on which it is founded. All the judges may agree on the terms of the judgment, and yet a mi

nority may dissent from the reasons stated by the majority in support of it. Such a difference of opinion does not make the judgment any the less conclusive on the parties. The result is reached unanimously, though by different paths.

In most countries no questions of this character can arise, because a declaration of war has been with them a simple act of the executive power, though it may subsequently require parliamentary ratification. In the United States it is a dual act. It is put in words by Congress: it is then to be put in effect by the President's approval of those words and proclamation of what has been so enacted. A new international status is thus created, authorizing such action as he may deem proper in his capacity of commander-in-chief of the army and navy. In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States:

War can alone be entered into by national authority; it is instituted for national purposes, and directed to national objects. Even in the case of one enemy against another enemy, therefore, there is no color of justification for any hostile act, unless it be authorized by some act of the government giving the public constitutional sanction to it."

The manner in which our seventh foreign war (that with Germany) was declared, in April, 1917, was largely followed when, in December, 1917, our eighth foreign war was declared against Austria-Hungary. The President made an address to Congress, in which, referring to the war between the United States and Germany, he said that he should not go back to relate its causes, but desired to consider its objectives. As to what these were, he continued, he and Congress were "the spokesmen of the American people." The great and immediate object was "to make conquest of peace by arms." The United States could not regard the German Government as the spokesman of the German people. When that people should say, "through properly accredited representatives," that they would agree to a settlement "based upon justice and the reparation of the wrongs their rulers have done, the United States would regard the war as won." This country did "not wish in any way to impair or to rearrange the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Nor was any interference with the internal affairs of Germany intended. The worst that could happen to her people was that if they continued to be

'Talbot v. Janson, 3 Dall., 133, 160.

under masters interested to disturb the peace of the world, "it might be impossible to admit them to the partnership of nations which must henceforth guarantee the world's peace," or "to admit Germany to the free economic intercourse which must inevitably spring out of the other partnerships of a real peace." Finally, he recommended as a military necessity an immediate declaration that the United States was in a state of war with Austria-Hungary, now "simply the vassal of the German Government," and "not acting upon its own initiative or in response to the wishes and feelings of its own peoples, but as the instrument of another nation."

He then reverted to the reasons for which the United States had entered into war. It had "been forced into it" to save its political institutions "from corruption and destruction." "The purposes of the Central Powers," he added, "strike straight at the very heart of everything we believe in; their methods of warfare outrage every principle of humanity and of knightly honor; their intrigue has corrupted the very thought and spirit of many of our people; their sinister and secret diplomacy has sought to take our very territory away from us and disrupt the union of the States. Our safety would be at an end, and our honor forever sullied and brought into contempt, were we to permit their triumph. They are striking at the very existence of democracy and liberty. It is because it is for us a war of high, disinterested purpose, in which all the free people of the world are banded together for the vindication of right, a war for the preservation of our nation and of all that it has held dear of principle and of purpose, that we feel ourselves doubly constrained to propose for its outcome only that which is righteous and of irreproachable intention, for our foes as well as for our friends. The cause being just and holy, the settlement must be of like motive and quality. For this we can fight, but for nothing less noble or less worthy of our traditions. For this cause we entered the war and for this cause will we battle until the last gun is fired."

The House Committee of Foreign Affairs, on the day (December 5th) when this address was delivered, agreed unanimously to report a declaration of war with this preamble:

Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has severed diplomatic relations with the Government of the United

States of America, and has committed acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America, among which are its adherence to the policy of ruthless submarine warfare adopted by its ally, the Imperial German Government, with which the United States of America is at war, and by giving to its ally active support and aid on both land and sea in the prosecution of war against the Government and people of the United States of America; therefore, be it, etc.

On further consideration and consultation with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the Act of December 7, 1917, was passed, in which for the preamble in the original draft was substituted the following:

Whereas, the Imperial and Royal Austro-Hungarian Government has committed repeated acts of war against the Government and the people of the United States of America; therefore be it, etc.

The final draft of the declaration of war against Austria-Hungary, therefore, unlike the earlier draft of the House committee, hardly seems to comply with the spirit of the Hague Convention of 1907, if read without reference to the previous address of the President on the subject of such a war. If, on the other hand, passed as it was with substantial unanimity, it may properly be read as approving and supplementing that address, and as incorporating the gist of that into itself, any such ground for criticism would be removed. In that all-important state paper, the President, it will be remembered, used the word we to signify himself and Congress. In other words, he spoke for both. To hold that he could properly do this would be to advance little, if at all, the prerogatives of the Executive. There is no people in the world today whose chief ruler has an extent of war power equal to that of the President of the United States. He is independent of cabinet control. He can call the ministers of the different departments of executive power into council with him or not, as he sees fit. He can indicate governmental policy in unofficial correspondence or public addresses, without reserve. He has for any such address what Lord Bryce has described as "an unrivaled platform."

In 1908 the Kaiser gave permission to publish the report of an interview between him and a foreigner upon an important matter of foreign policy. At once, he was called to account before the Reichstag. The Imperial Chancellor, as president of the Bundesrath, has a right to be

present at the deliberations of the Reichstag. The Chancellor at that time appeared before it and substantially repudiated what the Emperor had said at the interview in question, practically pledging himself that in the future nothing of such a nature would be said by the Crown that had not the previous approval of the constituted authorities.

The President of the United States is subject to no such restraints. He holds an office which makes him in all other matters affecting international intercourse the spokesman of the whole country. Is he any the less such with respect to a declaration of war? He holds, not a part, but the whole, of the executive power of the United States. Its scope is not circumscribed by many limitations. Of such as there are, two are of particular importance, namely, the provision that while he alone can negotiate treaties, they are of no force until ratified by a two-thirds vote of the Senate; and that by which, while he alone can nominate to the higher public offices, the appointments can only be made with the consent of a majority vote of the Senate.

Four powers, though in their nature and history primarily of an executive character, are expressly conferred: namely, that of receiving ambassadors and other public ministers; that of commissioning all officers of the United States; that of granting reprieves and pardons; and that of a conditional veto. These four lines of authority are not strictly a part of the executive power of the United States, though, regarded as a matter of general political government, they belong in their nature to the executive power.

Two things are certain, when the functions of the President are considered with respect to their relation to a declaration of war. He has the right, and is under the duty, to communicate to Congress, before such a declaration is made, the facts and circumstances that in his opinion may call for it. It is also of no force, unless he approve it. It is certain, further, that he cannot approve it in part and disapprove it in part. He must, as in the case of any other measures of legislation, approve the whole or disapprove the whole.

There are then three stages in proceedings for declaring war by the United States. The first comes with the doings of the President in American Political Science Review, XI, 660.