lation manifeftly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things related, is not greater than the original improbability that such a revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it however to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to what extent, this argument is alledged. We do not affume the attributes of the Deity, or the existence of a future ftate, in order to prove the reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We affert only that in miracles adduced in fupport of revelation, there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can furmount. And, for the purpose of maintaining this affertion, we contend, that the incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in atteftation of a meffage from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that state, is not in itself greater than the event,

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event, call it either probable or improbable, of the two following propofitions being true; namely, firft, that a future ftate of exiftence should be deftined by God for his human creation, and fecondly, that, being fo destined, he should acquaint them with it. It is not neceffary for our purpose that these propofitions be capable of proof, or even that, by arguments drawn from the light of nature, they can be made out to be probable. It is enough that we are able to fay concerning them, that they are not fo violently improbable, fo contradictory to what we already believe of the Divine power and character, that either the propofitions themselves, or facts ftrictly connected with the propofitions, (and therefore no farther improbable than they are improbable) ought to be rejected at first fight, and to be rejected by whatever ftrength or complication of evidence they be attested.

This is the prejudication we would refift. For to this length does a modern objection to miracles go, viz. that no human

teftimony can in any cafe render them credible. I think the reflection above stated, that, if there be a revelation, there must be miracles; and that, under the circumstances in which the human fpecies are placed, a revelation is not improbable, or not improbable in any great degree, to be a fair answer to the whole objection.

But since it is an objection which stands in the very threshold of our argument, and, if admitted, is a bar to every proof, and to all future reasoning upon the subject, it may be neceffary, before we proceed farther, to examine the principle upon which it profeffes to be founded: which principle is concisely this, that it is contrary to experience that a miracle fhould be true, but not contrary to experience that teftimony should be falfe.

Now there appears a small ambiguity in the term "experience," and in the phrases contrary to experience," or "contradicting experience," which it may be neceffary

to

to remove in the first place. Strictly speaking, the narrative of a fact is then only contrary to experience, when the fact is related to have existed at a time and place, at which time and place we being prefent, did not perceive it to exift; as if it fhould be afferted, that in a particular room, and at a particular hour of a certain day, a man was raised from the dead, in which room, and at the time specified, we being present and looking on, perceived no fuch event to have taken place. Here the affertion is contrary to experience properly fo called; and this is a contrariety which no evidence can furmount. It matters nothing, whether the fact be of a miraculous nature or not. But although this be the experience, and the contrariety, which Archbishop Tillotfon alledged in the quotation with which Mr. Hume opens his effay, it is certainly not that experience, nor that contrariety, which Mr. Hume himself intended to object. And, fhort of this, I know no intelligible fignification which can be affixed to the term "C contrary to experience," but one, viz. that of not having

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ourselves experienced any thing fimilar to the thing related, or fuch things not being generally experienced by others. I say not generally," for to ftate concerning the fact in question, that no fuch thing was ever experienced, or that universal experience is against it, is to affume the fubject of the controversy.

Now the improbability which arises from the want (for this properly is a want, not a contradiction) of experience, is only equal to the probability there is, that if the thing were true, we should experience things fimilar to it, or that fuch things would be generally experienced. Suppofe it then to be true that miracles were wrought upon the first promulgation of Christianity, when nothing but miracles could decide its authority, is it certain that fuch miracles would be repeated fo often, and in fo many places, as to become objects of general experience? Is it a probability approaching to certainty? Is it a probability of any great ftrength or force? Is it fuch as no evidence can encounter?