: tained at the time the intention you expressed, however soon, or for whatever reason, you afterwards change it. In the latter case, you have parted with the liberty of changing. All this is plain but it must be observed, that most of those forms of speech, which, strictly taken, amount to no more than declarations of present intention, do yet, in the usual way of understanding them, excite the expectation, and therefore carry with them the force of absolute promises. Such as "I intend you this "place."—"I design to leave you this estate."" I purpose "giving you my vote."-"I mean to serve you." In which, although the intention," the "design," the "purpose," the "meaning," be expressed in words of the present time, yet you cannot afterwards recede from them, without a breach of good faith. If you choose therefore to make known your present intention, and yet to reserve to yourself the liberty of changing it, you must guard your expressions by an additional clause, as "I "intend at present,"—" if I do not alter,"—or the like. And after all, as there can be no reason for communicating your intention, but to excite some degree of expectation or other, a wanton change of an intention which is once disclosed, always disappoints somebody, and is always, for that reason, wrong. There is in some men an infirmity with regard to promises, which often betrays them into great distress. From the confusion, or hesitation, or obscurity, with which they express themselves, especially when overawed, or taken by surprise, they sometimes encourage expectations, and bring upon themselves demands, which, possibly, they never dreamed of. This is a want, not so much of integrity, as of presence of mind. III. In what cases promises are not binding. 1. Promises are not binding, where the performance is impossible. But observe, that the promiser is guilty of a fraud, if he be privately aware of the impossibility at the time of making the promise. For, when any one promises a thing, he asserts his belief, at least, of the possibility of performing it as no one can accept or understand a promise under any other supposition. Instances of this sort are the following: The minister promises a place, which he knows to be engaged, or not at his disposal :A father, in settling marriage-articles, promises to leave his daughter an estate which he knows to be entailed upon the heirmale of his family :-A merchant promises with his daughter a ship, or share of a ship, which he is privately advised is lost at sea-An incumbent promises to resign a living, being well assured that his resignation will not be accepted by the bishop. The promiser, as in these cases, with knowledge of the impossibility, is justly answerable in an equivalent; but otherwise not. When the promiser himself occasions the impossibility, it is neither more nor less than a direct breach of the promise; as when a soldier maims, or a servant disables himself, to get rid of their engagements. 2. Promises are not binding, where the performance is unlawful. There are two cases of this; one, where the unlawfulness is known to the parties, at the time of making the promise; as where an assassin promises to despatch your rival or your enemy; a servant to betray his master; a pimp to procure a mistress; or a friend to give his assistance in a scheme of seduction. The parties in these cases are not obliged to perform what the promise requires, because they were under a prior obligation to the contrary. From which prior obligation what is there to discharge them? Their promise-their own act and deed. But an obligation, from which a man can discharge himself by his own act and deed, is no obligation at all. The guilt therefore of such promises is in the making, not in the breaking them; and if, in the interval betwixt the promise and the performance, a man so far recover his reflection, as to repent of his engagements, he ought certainly to break through them. The other case is, where the unlawfulness did not exist, or was not known, at the time of making the promise as where a merchant promises his correspondent abroad, to send him a ship-load of corn at a time appointed, and before the time ar rives, an embargo is laid upon the exportation of corn :—A wo man gives a promise of marriage; before the marriage, she discovers that her intended husband is too near a kin to her, or has a wife yet living. In all such cases, where the contrary does not appear, it must be presumed that the parties supposed what they promised to be lawful, and that the promise proceeded entirely upon this supposition. The lawfulness therefore becomes a condition of the promise; and where the condition fails, the obligation ceases. Of the same nature, was Herod's promise to his daughter-in-law, "that he would give her whatever she ask"ed, even to the half of his kingdom." The promise was not unlawful in the terms in which Herod delivered it; and when it became so by the daughter's choice, by her demanding "John "the Baptist's head," Herod was discharged from the obligation of it, for the reason now laid down, as well as for that given in the last paragraph. "This rule," that promises are void, where the performance "is unlawful," extends also to imperfect obligations; for, the reason of the rule holds of all obligations. Thus, if you promise a man a place or your vote, and he afterwards render himself unfit to receive either, you are absolved from the obligation of your promise; or if a better candidate appear, and it be a case in which you are bound by oath, or otherwise, to govern yourself by the qualification, the promise must be broken through. And here I would recommend to young persons especially, a caution, from the neglect of which many involve themselves in embarrassment and disgrace; and that is, "never to give a "promise, which may interfere in the event with their duty;" for, if it do so interfere, the duty must be discharged, though at the expense of their promise, and not unusually of their good name. The specific performance of promises is reckoned a perfect obligation. And many casuists have laid it down in opposition to what has been here asserted, that where a perfect and an imperfect obligation clash, the perfect obligation is to be preferred. For which opinion, however, there seems to be no reason, but what arises from the terms "perfect" and "imperfect," the impro-" priety of which has been remarked above. The truth is, of two contradictory obligations, that ought to prevail which is prior in point of time. : It is the performance being unlawful, and not any unlawfulness in the subject or motive of the promise, which destroys its validity therefore a bribe, after the vote is given; the wages of prostitution; the reward of any crime, after the crime is committed, ought, if promised, to be paid. For the sin and mischief, by this supposition, are over; and will be neither more nor less for the performance of the promise. In like manner, a promise does not lose its obligation merely because it proceeded from an unlawful motive. A certain person, in the lifetime of his wife, who was then sick, paid his addresses, and promised marriage to another woman;-the wife died; and the woman demanded performance of the promise. The man, who, it seems, had changed his mind, either felt or pretended doubts concerning the obligation of such a promise, and referred his case to Bishop Sanderson, the most eminent, in this kind of knowledge, of his time. Bishop Sanderson, after writing a dissertation upon the question, adjudged the promise to be void. In which, however, upon our principles, he was wrong for, however criminal the affection might be, which induced the promise, the performance, when it was demanded, was lawful; which is the only lawfulness required. A promise cannot be deemed unlawful, where it produces, when performed, no effect beyond what would have taken place had the promise never been made. And this is the single case, in which the obligation of a promise will justify a conduct, which, unless it had been promised, would be unjust. A captive may lawfully recover his liberty, by a promise of neutrality; for his conqueror takes nothing by the promise, which he might not have secured by his death or confinement; and neutrality would be innocent in him, although criminal in another. It is manifest, however, that promises which come into the place of coercion, can extend no further than to passive compliances; for coercion, itself could compel no more. Upon the same principle, promises of secrecy ought not to be violated, although the public would derive advantage from the discovery. Such promises contain no unlawfulness in them, to destroy their obligation; for, as the information would not have been imparted upon any other condition, the public lose nothing by the promise, which they would have gained without it. 3. Promises are not binding, where they contradict a former promise. Because the performance is then unlawful; which resolves this case into the last. 4. Promises are not binding before acceptance; that is, before notice given to the promisee; for, where the promise is beneficial, if notice be given, acceptance may be presumed. Before the promise be communicated to the promisee, it is the same only as a resolution in the mind of the promiser, which may be altered at pleasure. For no expectation has been excited, therefore none can be disappointed. But suppose I declare my intention to a third person, who, without any authority from me, conveys my declaration to the promisee; is that such a notice as will be binding upon me? It certainly is not; for I have not done that which constitutes the essence of a promise,-I have not voluntarily excited expectation. 5. Promises are not binding, which are released by the prom isee. This is evident but it may be sometimes doubted who is the promisee. If I give a promise to A, of a place or vote for B; as to a father for his son; to an uncle for his nephew; to a friend of mine, for a relation or friend of his; then A is the promisee, whose consent I must obtain, to release me from the engagement. If I promise a place or vote to B by A, that is, if A be a messenger to convey the promise, as if I should say, "You may tell |