or illustrations of moral precepts, may be occasionally given, and be highly valuable, yet still they do not form the original purpose of the miffion,

Secondly, morality, neither in the gospel, nor in any other book, can be a subject of discovery, properly so called. By which propofition, I mean that there cannot, in morality, be any thing similar to what are called discoveries in natural philosophy, in the arts of life, and in some sciences; as the system of the universe, the circulation of the blood, the polarity of the magnet, the laws of gravitation, alphabetical writing, decimal arithmetic, and some other things of the fame fort; facts, or proofs, or contrivances, before totally unknown, and unthought of. Whoever therefore expects, in reading the New Testament, to be struck with discoveries in morals, in the manner in which his mind was affected, when he first came to the knowledge of the difcoveries above mentioned; or rather in the manner in which the world was affected by them,

them, when they were first published; expects what, as I apprehend, the nature of the subject renders it impossible that he should meet with. And the foundation of my opinion is this, that the qualities of actions depend entirely upon their effects, which effects must all along have been the subject of human experience.

When it is once settled, no matter upon what principle, that to do good is virtue, the rest is calculation. But fince the calculation cannot be instituted concerning each particular action, we establish intermediate rules: by which proceeding, the business of morality is much facilitated, for then, it is concerning our rules alone that we need enquire, whether in their tendency they be beneficial; concerning our actions we have only to afk, whether they be agreeable to the rules. We refer actions to rules, and rules to public happiness. Now, in the formation of these rules, there is no place for discovery properly so called, but there is ample

ample room for the exercise of wisdom, judgement, and prudence,

1.

As I wish to deliver argument rather than panegyric, I shall treat of the morality of the gospel, in fubjection to these observations. And after all, I think it such a morality, as, confidering from whom it came, is most extraordinary; and fuch as, without allowing fome degree of reality to the character and pretenfions of the religion, it is difficult to account for: or, to place the argument a little lower in the scale, it is such a morality, as completely repels the supposition of its being the tradition of a barbarous age or of a barbarous people, of the religion being founded in folly, or of its being the production of craft; and it repels alfo, in a great degree, the supposition of its having been the effusion of an enthufiaftic mind.

The division, under which the fubject may be most conveniently treated of, is that

of

of the things taught, and the manner of teaching.

Under the first head, I should willingly, if the limits and nature of my work admitted of it, transcribe into this chapter the whole of what has been faid upon the morality of the gospel, by the author of The internal evidence of Christianity; because it perfectly agrees with my own opinion, and because it is impossible to say the same things so well. This acute observer of human nature, and, as I believe, sincere convert to Christianity, appears to me to have made out fatisfactorily the two following positions, viz.

I. That the gospel omits some qualities, which have usually engaged the praises and admiration of mankind, but which, in reality, and in their general effects, have been prejudicial to human happiness.

II. That the gospel has brought forwards fome virtues, which possess the highest intrinfic trinfic value, but which have commonly been overlooked and contemned.

The first of these propositions he exemplifies, in the instances of friendship, patriotifm, active courage; in the sense in which these qualities are usually understood, and in the conduct which they often produce.

The second, in the instances of paffive courage or endurance of sufferings, patience under affronts and injuries, humility, irresistance, placability.

The truth is, there are two opposite descriptions of character, under which mankind may generally be classed. The one possesses vigour, firmness, resolution; is daring and active, quick in its sensibilities, jealous of its fame, eager in its attachments, inflexible in its purpose, violent in its refentments.

The other, meek, yielding, complying, forgiving; not prompt to act, but willing to fuffer,