or illuftrations of moral precepts, may be occafionally given, and be highly valuable, yet still they do not form the original purpofe of the miffion,

Secondly, morality, neither in the gospel, nor in any other book, can be a subject of difcovery, properly fo called. By which propofition, I mean that there cannot, in morality, be any thing fimilar to what are called discoveries in natural philofophy, in the arts of life, and in fome fciences; as the fyftem of the universe, the circulation of the blood, the polarity of the magnet, the laws of gravitation, alphabetical writing, decimal arithmetic, and fome other things of the fame fort; facts, or proofs, or centrivances, before totally unknown and unthought of. Whoever therefore expects, in reading the New Teftament, to be ftruck with discoveries in morals, in the manner in which his mind was affected, when he first came to the knowledge of the difcoveries above mentioned; or rather in the manner in which the world was affected by

them,

them, when they were first published; expects what, as I apprehend, the nature of the fubject renders it impoffible that he fhould meet with. And the foundation of my opinion is this, that the qualities of actions depend entirely upon their effects, which effects must all along have been the fubject of human experience.

When it is once fettled, no matter upon what principle, that to do good is virtue, the reft is calculation. But fince the calculation cannot be inftituted concerning each particular action, we establish intermediate rules by which proceeding, the business of morality is much facilitated, for then, it is concerning our rules alone that we need enquire, whether in their tendency they be beneficial; concerning our actions we have only to ask, whether they be agreeable to the rules. We refer actions to rules, and rules to public happiness. Now, in the formation of these rules, there is no place for discovery properly fo called, but there is

1

ample room for the exercife of wisdom, judgement, and prudence.

As I wish to deliver argument rather than panegyric, I shall treat of the morality of the gospel, in fubjection to these observations. And after all, I think it fuch a morality, as, confidering from whom it came, is most extraordinary; and fuch as, without allowing fome degree of reality to the character and pretenfions of the religion, it is difficult to account for: or, to place the argument a little lower in the fcale, it is fuch a morality, as completely repels the fuppofition of its being the tradition of a barbarous age or of a barbarous people, of the religion being founded in folly, or of its being the production of craft; and it repels alfo, in a great degree, the fuppofition of its having been the effufion of an enthufiaftic mind.

The divifion, under which the fubject may be moft conveniently treated of, is that

of

of the things taught, and the manner of teaching.

Under the first head, I fhould willingly, if the limits and nature of my work admitted of it, transcribe into this chapter the whole of what has been faid upon the morality of the gofpel, by the author of The internal evidence of Chriftianity; because it perfectly agrees with my own opinion, and because it is impoffible to fay the fame things fo well. This acute obferver of human nature, and, as I believe, fincere convert to Christianity, appears to me to have made out fatisfactorily the two following pofitions, viz.

I. That the gospel omits fome qualities, which have usually engaged the praises and admiration of mankind, but which, in reality, and in their general effects, have been prejudicial to human happiness.

II. That the gospel has brought forwards fome virtues, which possess the highest in-. trinfic

trinfic value, but which have commonly been overlooked and contemned.

The first of these propofitions he exemplifies, in the inftances of friendship, patriotism, active courage; in the fenfe in which these qualities are ufually understood, and in the conduct which they often produce.

The fecond, in the inftances of paffive courage or endurance of fufferings, patience under affronts and injuries, humility, irrefiftance, placability.

The truth is, there are two opposite descriptions of character, under which mankind may generally be claffed. The one poffeffes vigour, firmnefs, refolution; is daring and active, quick in its fenfibilities, jealous of its fame, eager in its attachments, inflexible in its purpose, violent in its refentments.

The other, meek, yielding, complying, forgiving; not prompt to act, but willing to fuffer,