whatever modern research pronounces erroneous or doubtful. Some of his statements need guarding; others supplementing. Not to interrupt too much the progress of the text, some questions of interest, the discussion of which appeared inconsistent with the limits of a note, have been thrown into an Appendix. E. A. L.

NAUNTON,

December 8, 1871.

EVIDENCES OF CHRISTIANITY.

PREPARATORY CONSIDERATIONS.

I DEEM it unnecessary to prove that mankind stood in need of a revelation, because I have met with no serious person who thinks that, even under the Christian revelation, we have too much light, or any degree of assurance which is superfluous. I desire, moreover, that in judging of Christianity, it may be remembered, that the question lies between this religion and none: for, if the Christian religion be not credible, no one, with whom we have to do, will support the pretensions of any other.

Suppose, then, the world we live in to have had a Creator; suppose it to appear, from the predominant aim and tendency of the provisions and contrivances observable in the universe, that the Deity, when He formed it, consulted for the happiness of His sensitive creation; suppose the disposition which dictated this counsel to continue; suppose a part of the creation to have received faculties from their Maker, by which they are capable of rendering a moral obedience

B

to His will, and of voluntarily pursuing any end for which He has designed them; suppose the Creator to intend for these, His rational and accountable agents, a second state of existence, in which their situation will be regulated by their behaviour in the first state; by which supposition (and by no other) the objection to the Divine government in not putting a difference between the good and the bad, and the inconsistency of this confusion with the care and benevolence discoverable in the works of the Deity, is done away; suppose it to be of the utmost importance to the subjects of this dispensation to know what is intended for them, that is, suppose the knowledge of it to be highly conducive to the happiness of the species, a purpose which so many provisions of nature are calculated to promote; suppose, nevertheless, almost the whole race, either by the imperfection of their faculties, the misfortune of their situation, or by the loss of some prior revelation, to want this knowledge, and not to be likely, without the aid of a new revelation, to attain it: under these circumstances is it improbable that a revelation should be made? is it incredible that God should interpose for such a purpose? Suppose Him to design for mankind a future state; is it unlikely that He should acquaint them with it?

Now in what way can a revelation be made, but by miracles?1 In none which we are able to conceive. Consequently, in whatever degree it is probable, or not very improbable, that a revelation should be communicated to mankind at all; in the same degree is it probable, or not very improbable, that miracles should be

The con

1 This statement appears to need some qualification. We are not judges whether a revelation could only be made by miracles. We can see that they are the natural and fitting accompaniments of a revelation; but beyond that we cannot go. A distinction, too, must be made between the communication of a revelation to the first recipient and its publication for the use of mankind. The power of working miracles may be more necessary in the latter case than in the former. The Prophet, or the Apostle, did not necessarily need this power to convince himself that he was inspired: ordinarily "the Word of the Lord" manifested itself to him as such by a self-evidencing process, whether dream, vision, or direct instruction. sciousness of being the Christ did not reach maturity in Jesus of Nazareth from the miracles which He performed, but preceded them: the miracles were the efflorescence of it. There is no doubt, however, that when the revelation was to be propounded to others, for their acceptance, an external guarantee became necessary, and miracles form the appropriate one; for the Prophet's conviction of his own inspiration could not be transferred to other minds, and therefore he must present visible credentials. "What sign showest thou? What dost thou work?" is a natural question; and the demand must be satisfied. In this sense Paley's remark is true, that a revelation needs miraculous authentication. For some further remarks on the evidential force of miracles see Appendix I.-EDITOR.

wrought. Therefore, when miracles are related to have been wrought in the promulgating of a revelation manifestly wanted, and, if true, of inestimable value, the improbability which arises from the miraculous nature of the things related, is not greater than the original improbability that such a revelation should be imparted by God.

I wish it, however, to be correctly understood, in what manner, and to what extent, this argument is alleged. We do not assume the attributes of the Deity, or the existence of a future state, in order to prove the reality of miracles. That reality always must be proved by evidence. We assert only, that in miracles adduced in support of revelation there is not any such antecedent improbability as no testimony can surmount. And for the purpose of maintaining this assertion, we contend, that the incredibility of miracles related to have been wrought in attestation of a message from God, conveying intelligence of a future state of rewards and punishments, and teaching mankind how to prepare themselves for that state, is not in itself greater than the event, call it either probable or improbable, of the two following propositions being true namely, first, that a future state of existence should be destined by God for His human creation; and, secondly, that, being so