dience. They say, require anything of us which we can do in our unregenerate state, and we will do it. With such a heart as we have, and from a regard to our own happiness, we can wish and resolve to repent and to love God. And this we do. But if you say, this will not answer, and insist upon our exercising holy affection, which we cannot do in our unregenerate state; you reduce us to a desperate condition, and we know not what course to pursue. Permit me to say in reply, that the condition of sinners, is in fact a dreadful one, and so far as relates to any thing which they, of themselves, will ever do to obtain salvation, it is desperate. And the sooner they are made sensible of this, the better; so that they may give up every hope, except in the sovereign mercy of God, and may find rest to their souls by trusting in an almighty Saviour. We cannot vary the directions which Christ and his apostles give to sinners, and which require them to love God and obey his word without any delay. We cannot accommodate our instructions to the depraved hearts of men; nor can we admit, that their depravity is any kind of excuse for their refusing to repent and obey the gospel. And we cannot substitute any volition or resolution arising from a selfish heart, in the place of that love which God requires. Instead of contenting ourselves with requiring of sinners any act which is destitute of holiness, because they are destitute of holiness, we must in the name of God, enjoin upon them the duty of becoming holy; not the duty of resolving to love God and believe in Christ, but the duty of actually loving and believing; and must charge them with being highly criminal, and altogether inexcusable, if they do not immediately perform this duty. And we must tell them, and endeavor to make them feel, that just so far as they find it difficult or hard to love God, or to believe in the Lord Jesus Christ, they show themselves to be exceedingly sinful, and deserving of the divine displeasure. And it seems to me unquestionable, that what we do, by giving instruction and by urging gospel motives, for the direct purpose of bringing sinners to repent, to believe, and to love, will be much more likely to accomplish the great object

aimed at, than any efforts we might make to excite them to the performance of those acts which fall short of repentence, faith and love.

Secondly. The principle which I have maintained respecting the influence of the affections over the acts of the will, furnishes an easy and satisfactory explanation of what the Scripture says as to the bondage of sinners, and what the old writers say as to the slavery of the will. The sacred writers represent, that the wicked are in a state of servitude, and that none are free, but those who belong to the kingdom of holiness. To be in a state of servitude or bondage in the Scripture sense, is to be under the dominion of sin, to be governed by depraved affection. To be free, is to be free from the bondage of sin, and be under the dominion of holiness. The old divines spoke of freedom and bondage in the same sense. And unless you keep this in mind, you will be liable to mistake the meaning of many of the best writers of former days. When they asserted that since the fall, the human will is deprived of its freedom, and is under bondage, they meant something very different from what is meant at the present day, when it is asserted that free will belongs to all men alike, whether good or bad. Freedom of will, as now commonly understood, is an essential property of a moral agent. But freedom of will was formerly understood to be the property of those only who are the followers of Christ, and denoted freedom from the dominion of corrupt affection. In the controversy which took place respecting free will in the time of Luther and Calvin, and afterwards, those who maintained the freedom of the will, denied the natural and entire depravity of man. They held that the will is not naturally under a wrong bias, not subject to a sinful heart. Those who denied the freedom of the will, held that man is by nature depraved, that all the acts of his will, while unregenerate, are influenced by his corrupt heart, and that none enjoy freedom from the slavery of sin, but those who are brought into the liberty of the sons of God." According to this use of the words, which fully corresponds with the Scripture use, our saying that the will of every natural man is enslaved,

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would mean, not merely that his will is governed by his affections, (which is common to all whether good or bad,) but that it is governed by sinful affections. And our saying that the will of those who are holy is free, would mean, not that their will is free from the dominion of the affections, (which is not the case with any,) but that it is free from the dominion of sinful affections. And it is certainly with very good reason, that the degraded state of those who are in subjection to depraved affection, is called bondage and slavery; and that the happy state of those who are delivered from the dominion of depraved affection, and whose will is brought under the dominion of holiness, is called freedom and liberty.

Finally; as it appears that the determinations of the will, and of course all the voluntary actions, are governed by the affections, and as the state of the affections is the basis and the substance of character; we see how indispensable it is, that we should have the renewing of the Holy Ghost. The great and essential work of the Spirit is, to rectify the state of the affections, to renew the heart. This work is not effected by any efforts of our fellow-men, nor by any acts of our own will. It is specially, preeminently the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus we see that the philosophy of the mind, rightly understood, teaches the same humiliating truth with the Scriptures, that we are in a state of moral ruin, utterly lost, and that there is no help for us but in God.

NUMBER V.

HOW THE AFFECTIONS ARE INFLUENCED BY PREVIOUS AFFECTIONS.

I HAVE already endeavored to show, what influence the will has upon the affections, and the affections upon the will. I shall now attend to the manner in which our affections are influenced by antecedent affections.

It is indispensable to the right understanding of this subject, as well as of many other subjects in mental philosophy, to consider, that the operations of the mind generally result, not from any one cause exclusively, but from various causes combined. We are taught by experience, that a particular operation or state of mind follows a particular cause; and to this cause we are accustomed to refer it. And it may be that this cause has not only a real and uniform influence, but a chief influence. And we may direct our attention to this influence only; and so may be ready to conclude, that nothing else has any influence in causing the mental operation or state. Whereas, a further consideration of the subject may show, that this operation or state results from a variety of causes, some near and some remote.

It seems hardly necessary to remark, that when we use the words cause and effect, and other words of similar import, in relation to the mind, we are to give them a meaning correspondent with the nature of the subject. It is perfectly according to common usage, to apply these words to the mind as well as to the material world, although not in precisely the same sense. And why should any one suppose, that it is not as admissible to make this use of the words cause and effect, as to take any words which have been applied to body, and apply them to mind? Who would object to our using the word move, and its derivatives, to denote an influence exerted on the mind, because they also denote an influence on matter? An adherence to such a principle would lead to an entire revolution in our modes of speech, and would divest language of its greatest beauty and force. Be it so, that the use of words for which I now contend, is metaphorical. It is not, therefore, any the less just and suitable. The propriety of such a use of the words cause and effect appears in this, that there is as real and uniform a relation between cause and effect in mental science, as in physical. A cause is that from which an effect flows, that which has an influence to produce an effect. An effect is that which flows from something else as its cause, or is produced by the influence of a cause. Now, that which we call a mental or moral cause, has an influence as real and certain as a physical

cause, although the nature of the cause and effect in the one case is exceedingly different from what it is in the other. Do you say, there is so wide a difference in the nature of what we denominate cause and effect in the two cases, as to expose men to mistake, if we employ the same words in both? The difference, I admit, is obvious and entire. And this very circumstance is sufficient to prevent all mistake.

a

We sometimes speak of cause and effect in a mixed sense, mental cause being connected with a bodily effect, and a bodily cause with a mental effect. Numberless phenomena of this kind are involved in the connection of body and mind. There is a mutual influence. A volition, which is a mental act, causes a bodily act; and an affection of the body often causes a mental

act.

We now proceed to the subject introduced above, namely, the manner in which our present affections are influenced by those which occurred in past time.

One way in which a previous affection has an influence upon present affections, is by being distinctly recollected. When brought by an act of memory before the mind as an object of contemplation, it becomes, like any other object of attention, a means of exciting present affections. It is, however, only one of the means, -one of a variety of things which operate as causes of present affections. Those very emotions which arise in view of a past affection, may result in part, and even chiefly, from other causes. And those other causes may greatly modify the appropriate influence of the recollected affection; so that the emotion which that recollected affection produces, may be very different from what it would be, if that were the only cause concerned. The cause which operates in this case, is a complex cause, and the principal part of it is the state or habit of the mind. Indeed, the recollection of past affection may rather be considered as the occasion of bringing out the affection which naturally results from the state of the mind. It is this which determines the particular influence of the external motive. If an intelligent being has a holy state of mind, it is the law of his nature, that in all ordinary circum