the word disposition, or inclination, or some other word of like import. All men are in the habit of referring to that state of mind which such a word expresses, as the circumstance which accounts for it, that particular, specific affections arise in the mind of any one in view of a particular object. But how shall we refer it intelligibly? We cannot point it out by the word power, or faculty; because a man's having a power or faculty, as the words are commonly understood, only renders him capable of acting, but does not influence him to act in one particular way, rather than another, or even to act at all. We cannot point it out sufficiently by the mention of a previous act of the mind; because we know that, under the influence of new circumstances, men are often led to a train of feelings, purposes, and actions different, in some respects, from any which have appeared in them before. And we never consider a particular act, whether bodily or mental, as evidence of what a man's future actions will be, any further than we can determine what his prevailing disposition is. In order, therefore, that we may speak intelligibly and truly, we must have a suitable word. And if there were no such word, as disposition, inclination, etc., now in use, we should find it necessary forthwith to make a word, for the specific purpose above mentioned.

In common discourse, and in the Scriptures, the word heart answers the purpose referred to, as it generally designates the source of the affections. Thus in Mark 7: 21, "From within, out of the heart, proceed evil thoughts, adulteries, fornications," etc. And if we should use the word affections, to denote the capacity, power, or capability of the mind, as well as its acts, we should be supported by good authority. The mind is often said to be endued with affections, as permanent attributes. And when we speak of exercising or eliciting, cultivating and improving, strengthening and elevating the affections; the word is used, in many cases at least, to point out not so much the actual feelings of the mind, as its capability or habit of feeling. So it is with the word passions. So it is with imagination, which sometimes denotes a power or faculty, and sometimes an exercise of that

power. So it is even with memory. Though it more commonly signifies a faculty of the mind; it sometimes signifies the exercise of that faculty, the same as remembrance. This is true of the word disposition. It may denote either an actual feeling or emotion towards an object, or the previous aptitude of the mind to the exercise of such emotion. We are familiar with this variable sense of the word Will, denoting now the power of the mind, and now the act. There are many other words which have this twofold use. And this is a case in which, generally, we are not in the least exposed to mistake. For in good writing or speaking, the circumstances make it manifest, whether a word is intended to point out a faculty or an act.

The general remarks which have been made on the words disposition, propensity, principle, etc., are coincident with the opinions of Edwards and Dwight, who have, in a high degree, the confidence of the churches. With these authors agree other standard writers generally.

In the following quotations, we have the views which Dr. Dwight very plainly expressed on the subject.

"I do not deny, on the contrary, I readily admit, that there is a cause of moral action in intelligent beings, frequently indicated by the words Principle, Affections, Habits, Nature, Propensity, Tendency, and several others. In this case, however, as well as in many others, it is carefully to be observed, that these terms indicate a cause, which to us is wholly unknown, except that its existence is proved by its effects. We speak of human nature as sinful, intending not the actual commission of sin, but a general characteristic of man, under the influence of which, he has committed sins heretofore, and is prepared, and is prone, to commit others. With the same meaning in our minds, we use the phrases, sinful propensity, corrupt heart, depraved mind; and the contrary ones, holy or virtuous disposition, moral rectitude, holiness of character, and many others of the like import. When we use these kinds of phraseology, we intend that a reason really exists, although undefinable and unintelligible by ourselves, why one mind will, either usually or uniformly, be the subject of holy voli

tions, and another, of sinful ones. We do not intend to assert, that any one, or any number, of the volitions of the man whom we characterize, has been, or will be, holy or sinful; nor do we, indeed, design to refer immediately to actual volitions at all. Instead of this, we mean to indicate a state of mind generally existing, out of which holy volitions may, in one case, be fairly expected to arise, and sinful ones, in another: such a state as that, if it were to be changed, and the existing state of a holy mind were to become the same with that of a sinful mind, its volitions would thenceforth be sinful; and vice versa. This state is

the cause, which I have mentioned; a cause, the existence of which must be admitted, unless we acknowledge it to be a perfect casualty that any volition is sinful, rather than holy. This cause is what is so often mentioned in the Scriptures, under the name of the heart: as when it is said, "The heart is deceitful,' etc. I have already remarked, that the cause is unknown, except by its effects."

The view of Edwards on this general subject may be learnt from what he says as to the new principle which is given in regeneration. "By a principle of nature in this place, I mean that foundation which is laid in nature, either old or new, for any par ticular manner or kind of exercise of the faculties of the soul; or a natural habit or foundation for action, giving the person ability and disposition to exert the faculties in exercises of such a certain kind. So this new spiritual sense is not a new faculty of understanding, but a new foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of understanding. So that new holy disposition of heart that attends this new sense, is not a new faculty of will, but a foundation laid in the nature of the soul for a new kind of exercises of the same faculty of the will."

I might also refer to Abercrombie, and other respectable writers on mental philosophy, who speak of a right and a wrong state of mind as antecedent to moral exercises, and as having a principal influence in determining what emotions shall arise in the mind.

I shall not here inquire, what views we are to have of the moral nature and relations of this tendency or propensity of the mind to sin. For the present I have meant to consider such a propensity simply as a fact. And respecting this there is a remarkable agreement among men of sense, whether learned or unlearned.

The words, susceptible and susceptibility have of late obtained a remarkable currency. That we may judge of the correctness of the prevailing use, it is necessary to determine their exact signification. According to Johnson, susceptible means capable of admitting; disposed to admit; susceptibility; quality of admitting; tendency to admit. Webster defines susceptible thus: capable of admitting anything additional, or any change, affection, or influence, tender, capable of impression. And he gives susceptibility a correspondent sense. When it is said, the mind has various susceptibilities, the meaning is, that it is capable of various states of feeling; capable of exercising, and disposed to exercise, various emotions; that it has the quality of receiving, or an aptitude to receive, various influences or impressions.

In order to a right understanding of this subject, let the following things be considered.

First: There is no way to ascertain what susceptibilities we possess, but by experience; that is, by being conscious of the sensations and emotions which actually take place in ourselves. How could we know that we are susceptible of love and pity, of anger and revenge, if we had never been conscious of these feelings? What reasonable man ever attributes to the mind any capacity or tendency, which has not been developed by mental acts? As we think, reason, and remember, we know that we have corresponding faculties; and as we love and pity, hate and fear, we know that we have corresponding susceptibilities. How do we know that we are susceptible of pity? From the fact that we have had the emotion. But in what circumstances, or under the influence of what causes, have we had it? I answer; when we have witnessed or imagined cases of suffering. We have never had the feeling of pity on any other occasion. We contend, then, that we are susceptible of this feeling in the circum

stances above mentioned, and in no other. Pity cannot be excited, except by the actual view or the thought of suffering in a fellow creature.

Suppose a man placed under all the influences suited to make him pleased with the melody and harmony of sounds, and continued through a long life in such circumstances, without the least emotion of pleasure in hearing the most exquisite music. We should say, that he is not susceptible of pleasure from music.

Again. Suppose a man, who has long been in a situation most favorable to the cultivation and development of parental affection, to be an utter stranger to any feeling of the nature of parental love. If we should find any one in this state, whether he came into it by the original structure of his mind, or by the practice of intemperance and cruelty; we should say, he is "without natural affection," he has no susceptibility to parental love.

These examples are introduced to show what is commonly meant by the word under consideration, and when it is suitable to speak of a person as destitute of a particular susceptibility. A suscepti bility to a particular kind of emotion, is that state or quality of mind, which gives rise to such emotion, when fit occasions occur. But when on the fittest occasions, and under all the variety of circumstances, a person remains a total stranger to it, never having anything of that nature arise in his breast; we say, he is not susceptible of it.

But, suppose another case. Let a man be sick of a malignant fever, and consequently incapable, while in that state, either of the pleasure of eating, or of any proper appetite for food. If we should say of such a sick man, that he is susceptible of an appetite for food and of the pleasure of eating, we should say it hypothetically; meaning that he has a constitution from which such an appetite and such pleasure will arise, when he is in a sound and healthy state. His disease is all that prevents.

All that is necessary in such cases, is, to keep in mind the conditions on which the particular feelings or actions referred to, depend, or the circumstances which are indispensable to their existence; and when we would express ourselves with exactness, to ascribe the susceptibility to a man, on those conditions.