and to show, as far as the case admits, that it agrees with acknowledged principles of justice and benevolence.

Take another example. God declared to Abraham, that he should have a son, and that his posterity should be as the stars of heaven for multitude. Abraham knew it was the declaration of God, and as such he believed it, though human reason might have urged strong and unanswerable objections against it. His faith rested simply upon the word of God. The only thing which his reason had to do, was to decide, that every declaration of God must be true, and worthy of confident belief, whatever objections may seem to lie against it. And he suffered no objections in the least to influence his mind as to the meaning of the divine declaration. This is the main point. Our faith must rest simply upon the divine testimony. It was this which distinguished Abraham's faith, and rendered him worthy of being held up as an example to all believers in after times. He believed God. The word of God was the basis and rule of his faith. His reason did nothing but apprehend and believe the divine testimony.

The principle which I have now endeavored to illustrate, would be exceedingly advantageous to ministers, as well as private Christians. We are prone to forget the high authority of God's word, and to treat it with irreverence and neglect. It is too much the fashion of the day, even among Christian ministers, to form opinions respecting the various doctrines and duties of religion, in the way of general reasoning. And if there is an occasional reference to the Scriptures, it is evident that they hold only a secondary place, and that their decision has less influence than the arguments suggested by human reason. In this way, we subject ourselves to a great loss of time, and to great uncertainty and perplexity on the subject of religion. an infallible guide, and take one that is fallible.

We part with We give up the

divine authority of revelation. And if by mere reasoning we arrive at the knowledge of the truth, and then believe it merely because our reason has discovered it; such faith is not so much the faith of a Christian, as of a rationalist.

But it is said that reason and philosophy are necessary in order

in view?

--

to discover the meaning of God's word. And to show this, the declaration of Christ is adduced: "this is my body." But in this case the proper inquiries are, What was the occasion on which the words were spoken? What were the circumstances of the apostles to whom they were spoken? What object had Christ What had been his manner of speaking? What sort of metaphors had he been accustomed to use? How would his apostles naturally understand his words? Now this is not philosophizing. The apostles had no need of philosophy in order to understand this declaration of Christ, any more than they had to understand him, when he said, "I am the vine; ye are the branches." Apprehending the meaning of figurative language is not, properly speaking, a matter of philosophical reasoning, but a matter of common sense and feeling. If philosophy should be applied to the declaration of Christ, "this is my body," it must relate to the propriety and utility of metaphorical language; and so must lead to an analysis of those principles of the mind which make such language natural, and which account for its effects. But the right understanding of metaphorical language and its proper influence on the mind is no more dependent on any reasoning of this kind, than eating and digesting food is dependent on our understanding the physiology of those parts of the body which are particularly concerned in eating and digestion.

I do not say that philosophical reasoning on the subject of religion is in all cases to be rejected. My position is, that it cannot be considered as necessary in determining the sense of Scripture. And I should suppose that any one must be satisfied of this, when he considers, that those to whom the sacred writers addressed themselves, were not philosophers, and that if philosophy was necessary to the right understanding of God's word, they were incapable of knowing the truth, and were tied down to unavoidable ignorance and error." But neither Christ nor his apostles

* "The preacher is to make the truth of Scripture the burden of his communications to his people, because this is a message which can be easily understood. It is brought down to the comprehension of a common religious assembly. It is the simplicity of scriptural truth, which adapts it to all classes of hearers.” — “But of all modes of communication, the language of metaphysical philosophy is the

A

ever represent philosophical knowledge, or a capacity for metaphysical reasoning, to be at all necessary to those who would learn the truths of religion. What they insist upon as necessary is, a humble, docile, and obedient disposition, and prayer to God for the teaching of his Spirit. "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine."-"If any man lack wisdom, let him ask it of God." Instead of giving countenance to philosophizing in religion, the sacred writers directly discountenance it. When some inquired, "how are the dead raised?" the Apostle did not give them the philosophy of the resurrection. The argument he used to confute their objection was rhetorical, not philosophical. He vindicated an important doctrine of revelation by an apt analogy taken from the natural world; as Christ illustrated and enforced an important duty, by referring to the fowls of the air, and to the lilies of the field. If that reasoning which is strictly philosophical, may ever be used on the subject of religion, it must be for the purpose of illustrating a doctrine or precept already made known, and vindicating it against objections. In some cases, the philosophy of the mind may afford assistance in accomplishing these objects. And those men, who carry their habit of speculation too far, and are more in alliance with philosophy than with Christianity, may sometimes have their defective faith aided and strengthened by finding an agreement between the principles of mental science and the doctrines of revelation. But their faith would stand in no need of such help, if it relied,

least adapted to the understanding of an ordinary congregation. Philosophical preaching requires a philosophical audience." "How is a plain man to arrive at a knowledge of religious truth, by the refinements of metaphysical reasoning? Suppose he makes the attempt. He has a new science to learn; a science abounding in nice distinctions; requiring an analysis of the faculties and operations of the mind; and embracing a knowledge of the relations of cause and effect, powers and susceptibilities, motives and actions. If he looks to the pulpit for instruction on these subjects, he is involved in the mysteries of metaphysical phraseology. His minister speaks to him in an unknown tongue. He finds that he has not only a new science, but a new language to learn."-"If metaphysical philosophy had been necessary to salvation, it would seem that the Bible would have given us a new metaphysical language."

VOL. V.

PRESIDENT DAY's Sermon on the Christian Minister's Commission.

2

as the faith of Abraham did, with unwavering confidence on the word of God. Besides; those Christians who rest their faith entirely on the divine testimony are, much more likely to have a correct understanding of that testimony, than those who rest their faith partly on that, and partly on the deductions of speculative reason. And it is very easy to see which kind of faith does the greater honor to the word and the veracity of God.*

*On the subject here under discussion, the views expressed by President Day in the sermon before referred to are so just and seasonable, that I shall quote a few more passages.

"The evidence of Scripture truth is the testimony of God himself. Here human reason has no right to interfere. It is bound to stand aside and hear what God the Lord hath said. Reason decides, indeed, and decides intuitively, that the word of the God of truth is to be believed. It is bound to submit implicitly to the divine declarations, whatever they may be. Here is the distinction between faith and mere reason. The truths which God reveals to us, may or may not accord with the opinions which we ourselves had formed. Their previous probability or improbability is, therefore, no ground on which we are to receive or reject them, when we find them in the word of God. It is not a sound principle of interpretation, to determine before-hand what doctrines ought to be found, or are probably found in the Bible, and therefore to make it speak a language in conformity with our pre-conceived opinions. The Scriptural evidence in favor of any doctrine is wholly independent on the probability furnished by reason alone without the aid of revelation. This evidence is the simple testimony of God. It is neither weakened nor strengthened by any previous opinion which we had formed on the subject revealed. The doctrines of metaphysical philosophy ought to have no influence in determining the doctrines of the Bible. If the language of Scripture is to be so explained, as to conform invariably to probabilities suggested by reason, then it is no revelation. It makes known to us no new truths. It can decide no controverted point. For each contending party will give the passages referred to as proofs, the meaning which accords with its own opinions. This is the great reason why the various denominations of Christians make, ordinarily, no approaches towards agreement in doctrine, by discussions which professedly refer to the Scriptures as a common rule of faith. In truth, each party, instead of making the Scriptures the only standard of belief, makes his own opinions, to some extent at least, the standard of Scripture. If the book of God is to be interpreted according to pre-conceived philosophical opinions, it will not be one Bible but many. It will be made to contain as many different systems of doctrines, as there are different schemes of philosophy brought forward to give a construction to its contents. It may be necessary, in interpreting the Scriptures, to take into consideration the opinions and modes of thinking of the classes of persons to whom they were originally addressed. The true point of inquiry is, how did they, if they were candid, understand what was said to them. How did the children of Israel understand Moses? How did the primitive Christians understand Christ and his apostles?

I have extended my remarks to such a length, because I conceive the point under consideration to be of primary importance, and because I think it would conduce in a high degree to our benefit as Christians, and to our usefulness as ministers, if we could bring ourselves to such a habit of mind as to make it our single inquiry, what doctrine God has revealed in his word; but never to make the inquiry, so incompatible with the character of Christians, whether the doctrine which God has revealed is true. You may perhaps think it needless to dwell longer on the general principle I have stated. But I am desirous of giving so clear an illustration of it, that no one can fail of understanding it aright. Let me therefore apply it to the question of Christ's character. This is a subject of pure revelation. Our inquiry is, what do the Scriptures teach? But a difficulty arises. But a difficulty arises. How can it be that Jesus Christ is God, when there is only one God, the Father? What influence shall a difficulty of this kind have upon us in determining the meaning of the divine testimony? None. Suppose we are totally unable to reconcile the doctrine of Christ's divinity with the doctrine of the divine unity. What then? We are not required to reconcile them. Our business is to determine philologically and historically what the inspired writers taught, just as we determine what Athanasius or Arius taught. The only difference between the two cases, which I need to notice, is this; that the very doctrine which the inspired writers taught is the doctrine which we are unhesitatingly to receive as true; but as to the doctrine of Athanasius or Arius, we are to believe it or not, as we find it supported by proper evidence. The one is directly binding upon our faith; the other not. But the method of determining what doctrine was taught, is substantially the same in both cases. Now suppose you make it your object to inquire what doctrine Athanasius taught. Would you think it proper that your views of the consistency or inconsistency of his doctrine should influence you in determining what his doctrine actually was? You would look for the usus loquendi. You would take into view all the circumstances of the writer, and of the time when he wrote. But in ascertaining what doctrine he held, you certainly would not