stances, outward objects will excite holy emotions; and that if he has an unholy state of mind, outward objects will excite unholy emotions. So in the natural world. Heat will harden or soften, according to the nature of the substance on which it acts. This general principle is as true in mental science as in physical; although the causes and effects in the one are, in their nature, so different from what they are in the other. The relation of our affections to the divine law, and our being worthy of praise or blame on account of them, does not imply that they arise in the mind without appropriate moral causes.

It is not meant by any of the remarks above made, that the affections always flow on in an unbroken series, and that no cause whatever can interfere to prevent this; for, although the state of the mind and the outward objects commonly acting upon it, naturally tend to this result, there may be extraordinary causes which will mingle their influence with these, so that the series of similar emotions will be broken, and those of a different kind excited. For example, a moral agent, under the influence of strong temptations, changes from holiness to sin; and a sinner, under the special influence of the Holy Spirit, becomes holy. But the occurrence of these changes under the operation of extraordinary causes does not prove, that a continuance of the same affection is not likely to result from the ordinary causes above mentioned, namely, the state of the mind and outward motives. Nor does it prove that these ordinary causes may not, in due time, become so powerful, as to preclude any change in the character of the affections. Unquestionably this will be the case both with the holy and with the unholy in the future state.

In the second place, the affections we exercise have an influence in regard to subsequent affections, by means of their influence on the state or habit of the mind; or, upon the mind's aptitude to the exercise of particular affections. That there is such an aptitude or tendency of the mind to put forth certain emotions rather than others, under the influence of the same external objects, is a fact well known. This aptitude shows its highest power, when a particular object excites an affection most readily,

most frequently, or most strongly. The natural tendency of any affection which is exercised, is to increase the aptitude of the mind to the exercise of the same affection. This tendency may be counteracted, or its effect varied, by other causes. But every exercise of mind, taken by itself, plainly has this tendency. Thus benevolent emotions give the mind a greater aptitude to the same emotions. The consequence of every act of love to God, supposing us free from all opposite influences, is, that we shall be more apt to love him hereafter. It is on this principle that Christians grow in grace. Every exercise of holy love has a good influence upon their character, in proportion to the purity and strength of the exercise. A few holy exercises, in which all the intellectual and moral energies are roused to intense action, contribute more to the growth and confirmation of a holy principle and habit, than thousands of exercises which come from a divided or sluggish heart. The same is true of malevolent affections. The emotions of anger and revenge naturally tend to increase the aptitude of the mind to the same emotions; and this effect will be in proportion to the strength and violence of the antecedent emotions.

But this natural tendency of our affections, like that above mentioned, is frequently modified by other causes. A particular affection may be attended with such circumstances, that it will be followed by a less aptitude to the same affection than existed before.*

A due consideration of the statements above made will help us to account for that low, earthly state of mind, that spiritual blindness and death, which Christians so often have occasion to deplore. This state is to be considered in connection with its causes. It is in a great measure to be traced to what has been faulty in us in times past. Every sinful feeling which we have heretofore exercised, has left its stamp upon our hearts. That moral state which we lament, is to be regarded as resulting chiefly from the general current of our moral feelings in past time. Every vain thought, every proud, resentful, or unkind feeling, every corrupt desire,

* Several illustrations of this principle, together with its practical uses, are here omitted, as they are for substance contained in the Lectures on moral agency.

which has lodged within us, has had an influence not limited to the time when it took place, but reaching to all following time, and helping to constitute our permanent habit. Thus our present condition may truly be regarded as a kind of index to the antecedent states of our mind,— the sum of the impressions made upon us by the affections we exercised the previous moment, the previous hour, and day, and month, and year, and all previous time. How often have we learned by experience, that our feelings through the week have an effect upon us on the Sabbath, and our feelings on the Sabbath, through the week? How evident it is that the thoughts and feelings indulged in childhood and youth have an effect upon character, in manhood, and even in old age! The wrong states of mind of which we are at present conscious, and which may sometimes appear unaccountable, are, in many cases, owing to what took place ten, twenty, or even fifty years ago. And it is not to be doubted, that the state in which the wicked will find themselves in the future world, will be the fair result of all their dispositions, thoughts, affections, and actions, during the time of their probation. With what awe should we be inspired, when we contemplate this constitution, which God has given to our immortal minds! With what fear and trembling should we consider the fact, that an unholy affection, exercised in early childhood, will be followed by a sinful, impenitent life, and a sinful and miserable eternity, unless the grace of God interpose to turn things from their natural course.

REMARKS ON CAUSE AND EFFECT.*

I HAVE read with no ordinary interest, the Essay in the last number of the Repository "on Cause and Effect, in connection with Fatalism and Free Agency. The Editor says, the name of the writer is withheld, on account of very peculiar circumstances. As there are no such circumstances in my case, I shall offer remarks on the Essay in my own name. The writer of the Essay may be one, for whom I entertain a very sincere esteem and affection. I choose to think that he is so; and it will be most agreeable to my feelings to proceed in my remarks with the apprehension distinctly in my mind, that the anonymous author of the Essay, who has given such evidence of ability to write well, possesses also a sincere love of the truth, a full conviction of the narrow limits of human intelligence, humility, candor, reverence for the Scriptures, and every other quality which belongs to the Christian character. Such an apprehension may have a salutary influence upon what I am to write, and it will at least render my employment in writing pleasant.

After all, my concern will be with the subject. And while I shall take the liberty to call in question some of the principal positions which I find in the Essay, it will be my endeavor to guard scrupulously against everything which would be unjust or disre

* First published in the "Am. Bib. Repository," 1840, in reply to "An Essay on Cause and Effect in connection with Fatalism and Free Agency." See Am. Bib. Rep. for Oct. 1839.

spectful to the writer. Indeed I shall refer to the Essay chiefly as an occasion of introducing several topics, which require special attention at the present day.

As the subject under consideration is of a philosophical or metaphysical nature, the following remarks are intended for those, who have a capacity for metaphysical inquiries, and who have so far attended to matters of this kind, that they are prepared to begin where the present discussion begins, without any pains on my part to explain the common principles of mental science.

But I should hardly deem it proper to busy myself in preparing remarks upon the topics here introduced, were it not that they have a bearing upon some very important principles of revelation.

Let it, however, be remembered, that our mode of thinking on this subject cannot alter the facts in the case. If all the men in the world should happen to think, that our being uniformly influenced in our volitions by motives, and our choosing invariably according to the strongest motive, is inconsistent with free moral agency, it would not make it so. Should they be ever so confident, that moral necessity, as explained by Edwards, Day, and others, is the same as fatalism; still it would not make it the same. If it is a law of our nature, that our volitions invariably follow that which is, on the whole, the strongest motive; then, whatever may be our speculations, this law will stand and we shall conform to it in practice, and shall choose and act under the influence of the strongest motive, without the least infringement of our rational or moral freedom. I think the writer of the Essay does himself act on this principle, though against his speculative theory. There were reasons, I suppose, for and against his publishing his Essay; and probably he will find, on reflection, that these reasons were very carefully weighed, and that the most important reasons finally prevailed. So also there were, doubtless, reasons for and against his giving his name to the public. But the special reasons which he had against it, were unquestionably the most weighty in his mind; otherwise, I could not account for it, that he deliberately chose concealment. And who can doubt,