those objects presented to the senses; that knowledge, in the higher sense, is acquired by study; that the regular action of the mind requires a sound state of the brain, etc. Now we have no power, by any act of the will, to alter these laws of the mind, or to produce any mental action, except in conformity with them.

Again, it is found to be a law of the mind, that the affections are excited in view of suitable objects, and that the influence of external objects is according to the character and state of the mind. And who has power to make it otherwise? What man of sense will ever attempt to interfere with these settled laws? If through ignorance we should think we could move our hearts to love or hate by the mere force of volition, without having a suitable object before us, or if we should think that, with an object in view, we could, by a volition, excite any affections in ourselves, except in accordance with the character and state of our minds, we should soon be convinced of our mistake.

These remarks are made to illustrate the position, that we have no power, by a volition, to contravene the laws of nature, whether as to matter or mind, and no power to accomplish anything, except in accordance with those laws. The whole range of our voluntary agency is confined within these limits.

This brings me to the business of showing, positively, what is the power or influence which belongs to the will; or more properly what power we ourselves have by the acts of our will. This may be briefly described thus. By availing ourselves of the laws of nature, we can voluntarily produce an endless variety of effects. In this way we can secure a harvest, promote bodily health, cure diseases, improve our intellectual and moral faculties, and obtain the advantages and comforts of life.

It evidently follows, that the greatest extent of voluntary power requires a complete knowledge of the laws of nature. Knowledge is power only as it enables us to avail ourselves of these laws. If we are ignorant of them, how can we turn them to any useful purpose? Without a knowledge of the laws which regulate events in the physical and moral world, we are utterly unqualified to act our part as intelligent, accountable beings. With

out a good degree of this knowledge, all our efforts would be made at random, and the result would be altogether uncertain, and so the motives to exertion would be inefficacious.

Our voluntary power, considered in this light, manifestly admits of an almost unlimited increase. Take the power we have, by an act of the will, to direct our attention to one thing or another, and to fix and detain our thoughts on any particular subject. We are conscious of possessing this power now in a certain degree. But we may not be aware to what a vastly higher degree it is capable of being increased by suitable exertion. The power possessed by such men as Newton, Locke, and Edwards, to confine their attention steadily, and for a long time, to a particular subject, and to exclude all thoughts pertaining to other subjects, was acquired by diligent and continued efforts. Other men may acquire the same. And if a man had his mind raised to the highest improvement of which it is susceptible, he would possess this power in such perfection, that he could, without difficulty fix his thoughts on any subject he might choose, with the utmost intenseness, uninterruptedly, and for such length of time as the case should require. The voluntary control which we commonly possess over our thoughts — what is it, compared with that to which we might attain? No man, however conscious of present inability thus to command his thoughts, has any right to conclude that his inability cannot be effectually removed by the diligent, persevering discipline of his own mind. It is the same here, as in regard to the voluntary control, which a man, by long use, acquires over his bodily motions. No one, however great the activity and adroitness which he has acquired, can say, that he has raised his voluntary power to its highest possible limits.

And yet it is a law of our nature, and doubtless a wise and benevolent one, that this voluntary power should be extended over a part only of our bodily organs. Our sensations are, in themselves, all involuntary. When the proper objects are presented, the sensations follow without any act of the will. Indeed the will has no power to prevent them. The action of the heart, of the blood, and of the digestive organ is also involuntary. The con

tinued life and growth and health of the body, instead of being under the control of volition, result from their appropriate physical causes. Over these causes our will has an influence, though that influence is very limited. But if the appropriate causes exist, the effect takes place without any dependence on the will; while it is on the other hand equally true that, without those causes, the will can do nothing towards producing the effect. Who that has been at all observant of the laws of his nature, ever attempts, by a direct act of his will to increase or diminish the pulsations of his heart, the circulation of his blood, or the growth or health of his body? All the voluntary power which we possess in these and many other respects, is indirect, i. e. it operates through the medium of other things which we can in some measure control. in some measure; because it is evident that our bodily state is in a great degree dependent on causes over which we have little or no power. So that it would be contrary to fact to say, that man has anything like a complete power, either direct or indirect, over all his bodily organs.

I

say

But the most important question still remains, namely, what voluntary power we possess over our affections. This must be ascertained in the same way as our power in all other respects, — by: an appeal to our own experience and consciousness. We have already seen, that the affections are called forth, or excited, by a view of proper objects. Whether these objects are denominated motives, occasions, or causes, it matters not. They are the uniform and immediate antecedents of the affections. No act of the will comes between the view of a proper object and the excitement of an affection. Should we attempt to thrust in a volition here, it would be out of place, and wholly ineffectual. Let an affectionate parent look upon a dear child who has been long absent. Does his heart wait for an act of the will to kindle its love? reason he should do so strange a thing as to will not to love ; would his heart obey? Or if the same parent should hear of the death of his child, would he wait for an act of the will to cause sorrow to fill his heart? And if he should put forth a volition not to feel sorrow, would his heart be obedient? The

Or if for some

same as to the pious affections of a regenerate man. When the glorious character of God is presented to his view, he loves and adores. He does it at once, without any influence from an act of the will. Indeed if a man in such a case should find any occasion for an act of the will to excite his love, it would prove his heart to be in a bad state. If the goodness of God and its manifold fruits are contemplated by a man of right spirit, grateful emotions will spontaneously arise. And if he turns his thoughts to the evil of sin, his abhorrence will at once be excited. In all such cases, it is the nature or quality of the object he contemplates, and not an act of his will, that excites the emotions. In other words, the affections of the heart, whether of one kind or another, do not depend on a volition as their proximate cause, but on the presentation of a fit object.*

'

If the principles which we have laid down are correct; it will be easy to settle the question, whether the affections are voluntary. We usually call those things voluntary, which take place in consequence of a volition, or of which a volition is the uniform and immediate antecedent. It is not common to speak of anything as voluntary, because it follows indirectly from a volition, or because an act of the will has an influence upon it through the medium of something else. By a voluntary act, Whately says, "we take a medicine which quickens the circulation of the blood:" but we do not, on that account, call the quicker circulation of the blood voluntary. "So also, though we cannot by a direct effort of volition excite or allay any emotion; we may by a voluntary act, fill the understanding with such thoughts as will" have this effect. But is it according to common usage to call such an effect voluntary? As the affections are not the immediate or direct result of volition, it is clear they are not directly voluntary. You may say they are indirectly voluntary, because a volition operates upon them and controls them indirectly. But even this indirect influence of the will is by no means essential to the excitement of the affections.

* As the practical views which occupy several pages of this Essay, together with the quotations from Whately and other writers, are, for substance, contained in the Lectures on moral agency, they are here omitted.

The affections are not generally excited in this way. For fit objects or motives are very often brought before our minds, without any volition or thought of ours. But in these very cases, the affections are of the same nature, and stand in the same relation, to the objects which excite them, as in other cases. Yet they do not result from a volition either directly or indirectly. That is, they are not excited by volition, nor are those objects which do excite them, brought before the mind by a volition. Any man who will reflect on his own past experience will find, that in instances too many to be numbered, those objects have been presented before his mind, without his choice, and not unfrequently thrust upon him contrary to his wishes, which have nevertheless elicited the deepest and strongest emotions.

On this point, are not some distinguished writers chargeable with an oversight? They allow that the affections are not excited directly by an act of the will, but by a view of fit objects, in other words, by proper motives. Still they call the affections voluntary; and they hold all the moral affections to be so,overlooking the obvious fact that, in a multitude of instances, if not generally, the objects of the affections are brought before our minds without any volition of ours, and that in such instances no act of the will has any influence on the affections in one way or another. This fact however is not to be, considered as having any influence in regard to the nature of the affections..

In a former number I endeavored to show, that the affections. which any one exercises in view of the various objects or motives which come before him, will be according to his disposition, character, or state of mind. There is no truth more confidently believed, or more uniformly acted upon, by men of practical wisdom, than this, and none which is capable of more satisfactory proof from Scripture and common experience. Ministers of the gospel especially, have it exemplified before them continually in the different effects which the same truths produce upon men of different habits or states of mind. But this is a truth, which most writers on mental philosophy overlook, taking it for granted, that all men are in such a state that moral considerations or motives,