stances above mentioned, and in no other. Pity cannot be excited, except by the actual view or the thought of suffering in a fellow creature.

We

Suppose a man placed under all the influences suited to make him pleased with the melody and harmony of sounds, and continued through a long life in such circumstances, without the least emotion of pleasure in hearing the most exquisite music. should say, that he is not susceptible of pleasure from music. Again. Suppose a man, who has long been in a situation most favorable to the cultivation and development of parental affection, to be an utter stranger to any feeling of the nature of parental love. If we should find any one in this state, whether he came into it by the original structure of his mind, or by the practice of intemperance and cruelty; we should say, he is "without natural affection," he has no susceptibility to parental love.

These examples are introduced to show what is commonly meant by the word under consideration, and when it is suitable to speak of a person as destitute of a particular susceptibility. A susceptibility to a particular kind of emotion, is that state or quality of mind, which gives rise to such emotion, when fit occasions occur. But when on the fittest occasions, and under all the variety of circumstances, a person remains a total stranger to it, never having anything of that nature arise in his breast; we say, he is not susceptible of it.

But, suppose another case. Let a man be sick of a malignant fever, and consequently incapable, while in that state, either of the pleasure of eating, or of any proper appetite for food. If we should say of such a sick man, that he is susceptible of an appetite for food and of the pleasure of eating, we should say it hypothetically; meaning that he has a constitution from which such an appetite and such pleasure will arise, when he is in a sound and healthy state. His disease is all that prevents.

All that is necessary in such cases, is, to keep in mind the conditions on which the particular feelings or actions referred to, depend, or the circumstances which are indispensable to their existence; and when we would express ourselves with exactness, to ascribe the susceptibility to a man, on those conditions.

These remarks will aid us in answering the question, whether man, in his fallen, unsanctified state, has all the moral susceptibilities which belonged to him originally in his state of innocence, and which would belong to him now, if he should be sanctified; or, to be more specific, whether man, while he continues unrenewed, is susceptible of love to God, and other holy affections. Those who hold the doctrine of total depravity are agreed in believing, that man, while unrenewed, is wholly destitute of holiness; that however favorable the circumstances of his education; however numerous and powerful the motives to piety which are held up before his mind, and with whatever skill and fidelity they may be presented, and however long the trial may be continued; he will never, while unrenewed, have any holy affection. Now this being held by all concerned, what difference can remain except as to the use of words? The only question would seem to be, whether we can properly speak of depraved man while unrenewed, as susceptible of holy affection.

Here let it be kept in mind, that we are speaking of man's moral state, and are using words in a moral sense. Accordingly if any one says, that man is susceptible of holy love without the renewing of the Holy Ghost, his meaning would evidently be, that man, depraved as he is, may have holy love in his heart without the sanctifying influence of the Spirit; and of course, that a man's having holy affection is no proof that he is renewed by the Holy Spirit, and consequently, that man's being in his natural, unregenerate state is no certain proof that he is destitute of holiness. Now all this is directly contrary to the word of God.

If by man's being susceptible of holy affection in his unrenewed state, be meant only, that he possesses all the natural faculties: which are necessary to the exercise of holy affection, and that nothing more is necessary, but that God should give him a new heart, or should renew him in the spirit of his mind; in this. sense he is doubtless susceptible of holy love. But this would be using the word in an uncommon sense, and in a sense not suited to the subject. The fact is, that when the word is used in its moral signification, and it is said, that unregenerate man is really

susceptible of love to God, it is implied, that he may have such love in his unregenerate state, and even that he has a tendency, or an aptitude, to holy love. This obvious implication of the word is a sufficient reason why we should not affirm, without qualification, that man in his natural state is susceptible of holy affection,that he is as susceptible of it as one that is renewed. Does not any such representation as this tend to make the impression on the minds of men, that there is no essential difference between the moral state of the regenerate and the unregenerate, and thus to set aside the necessity of a moral renovation by the special influence of the Spirit.

NUMBER III.

THE language sometimes used in books and in common discourse implies, that man is entirely under the control of his will; that his volitions guide and regulate all his bodily and mental powers. According to this representation, the will possesses the chief attribute of a despot, and man is very much in the condition of a slave. Be it so, that the master that governs him is his own will. If the power of that will is absolute, and subject to no limitation or check from truth or reason, who can be sure that it will not exercise as severe and merciless a despotism over him, as any power extraneous to his mind? And would not any man think it a less calamity to be subject to an unreasonable despotism that is distant, than to one that is always near; to a despotism without, than to one that is within?

It is my present object to ascertain what is the fact respecting the power of the will. The office of the will must be considered an important subject in mental philosophy; it is important too in a practical view. For if any one attributes to his will an agency,

either more or less extensive than actually belongs to it, he will be liable to serious mistakes in the regulation of his own mind and conduct.

The kind and extent of power belonging to the will must be determined by an appeal to our own experience and consciousness. No hypothetical or a priori reasoning can be relied upon. We ought never to inquire what power we should suppose the will would have, or what power it must have, in order to make man a responsible agent. Any such inquiry might lead us to conclusions materially at variance with the truth. Our whole inquiry is, what do we learn from consciousness and experience? Accordingly, every man is qualified to investigate the subject under consideration as far as his own experience extends. There may be questions relative to the power of the will, on which a person of little experience, or one who has not been duly attentive to the operations of his own mind, will not be able to form a correct judgment; as a man is incompetent to judge respecting the operations of the magnetic or the electrical power, in any cases which have not fallen under his notice. Suppose now a question arises respecting the power of the will in cases in which I have had no experience, or in which I have neglected to learn the proper lessons of experience. Here I am an incompetent judge; and if I would form a just opinion, I must avail myself of the requisite knowledge by referring to the experience of others. This view of the subject is of special importance, and is suited to check the overweening confidence of some who have had but a limited experience, and have withal been too little observant of the operations of their own minds.

I will endeavor to remember these remarks myself; and though I must of necessity proceed in this discussion primarily on the ground of my own experience, I will readily admit, even at my advanced age, that my experience may be defective. The voluntary power belonging to me may not have been so perfectly developed, as in some others; or if it has been, I may have failed to notice its developments so carefully, or to recollect them so exactly, as others. And it may be suitable for every man to

admit that the faculty of will, as found in him, may have less original power, and less acquired expertness, than in others, so that no one may be able to come to a right conclusion on every part of mental science, without availing himself of the experience and consciousness of his fellow-men. This is the case we well know, in all parts of physical science. How long and attentively soever any man may have observed the course of events in the natural world; he will find himself, in many cases, totally unable to judge from his own personal knowledge, what the laws of nature are, and so will be obliged to supply the defects of his own experience by the experience of others. In the study of natural science, men do this constantly, and why is it not the dictate of modesty, and of wisdom too, that something like this should be done in relation to our present subject? If the facts which have occurred in our experience, are not sufficient to teach us the whole extent of power belonging to the will, why should we not gladly avail ourselves of any well attested facts which have occurred in the experience of others?

It will be kept in mind, that I use the words will and volition in the restricted and exact sense in which they are used by Locke, Reid, Abercrombie and others, and in which I have before explained them.

I shall now pursue the inquiry, what power belongs to the will? I begin by saying negatively, the will has no power to alter the laws of nature, either in the material or spiritual world. For example, gravitation is an established law of all material bodies, and we have no power by our volitions to set aside or modify this law, or to direct or vary any events which stand related to it, except by availing ourselves of its influence. What man in his senses ever attempts to do this? Again, it is a law of nature that vegetables spring up and grow from seeds, under the influence of heat and moisture, and that animal life is sustained by food, and destroyed by continued abstinence, or by poison; and who has power by an act of the will, to make it otherwise? The same is true as to the laws of the spiritual world. It is a law of the mind, that the ideas of sensible objects are first excited by having