all ordinary circumstances, such would be his feelings and conduct. Whatever may be said of certain extraordinary cases, this connection of our feelings and actions with our previous disposition must be considered as a fact in all common cases; and especially in those cases where particular feelings and actions may be anticipated as a matter of course.

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I do not, however, mean by these remarks to imply that the disposition or propensity of our mind is the only cause of our feelings and actions. For this disposition, without the influence of outward motives, that is, without the influence of circumstances suited to call it forth, would never produce the effects referred to. The feelings and actions must be regarded as effects flowing from the combined influence of the dispositions of the mind, and of all the circumstances which bear upon them. So that when we say, a man's disposition is such as will cause these or those particular feelings, and lead to these or those actions, the meaning must be, that such a disposition will have such an influence when the appropriate circumstances occur.

Let me here advert, in few words, to a very obvious distinction between what we call powers or faculties of mind, and what we call disposition. The mental faculties which belong to a man qualify him to act in various ways, but do not account for his acting in any one particular way, rather than others. A man possessed of distinguished intellectual faculties, may be an eminent statesman, or merchant, or a minister of the gospel, or highwayman, or pirate. He is able to excel in anything which he undertakes. But from his ability to do so many things, we cannot infer that he will do any one particular thing, rather than another. I name to you a young man of brilliant talents, and I ask you what course a young man of such talents, under the influence of auspicious circumstances, will be likely to pursue. You say, you cannot tell, unless you know something of his disposition, or the tendency of his mind. Here is the distinction I have in view. By his powers or faculties, a man is made able to pursue many different courses, right and wrong. His disposition leads him to pursue one particular course, rather than another. Hazael had

powers of mind sufficient to enable him to use his authority to the benefit or the injury of the people. It was his disposition that led him to those acts of barbarity which the prophet predicted. And we shall find it to be true universally, that whenever we would form an opinion as to the conduct which we are to expect from any one, we make it our chief object to determine what his disposition is.

I have intended to say nothing on this subject which would militate against the well known fact, that in many cases, a man'sfeelings and actions are at variance with the disposition which he formerly had. His disposition may have changed; and his new disposition may as strongly prompt him to a new course of affection and conduct, as his former disposition prompted him to his former course. This is the case with every one who is renewed by the Spirit of God. Besides; there may be different dispositions or propensities at the same time,-propensities which may clash with each other. In this case, one or the other of the propensities will prevail, according to its comparative strength, and the influence of circumstances. And was it not so with our original parents? They had evidently possessed from the first, a disposition to reverence and obey God. But that right disposition had not acquired confirmation, and was liable to be overcome by other propensities belonging to their bodily or mental constitution, when acted upon by temptation, and when the effectual aids of divine grace were withheld. When our first parents apostatized, what did they do but follow those propensities of theirs which were excited and rendered powerful by temptation, their pious disposition not being sustained and rendered predominant by divine influence? I make no account here of the common difficulties which pertain to the introduction of evil; nor would I advance anything confidently on that mysterious subject. All I would suggest is, that our first parents, when they sinned, did follow their inclinations, or did act according to their propensities; indeed according to their pious inclination which had previously governed them, but according to those other inclinations which had, up to that time, been kept in subjection, but which, under

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the influence of temptation, came to oppose and overcome their disposition to obey God, his effectual grace being withheld. Their pious disposition was in fact overcome; and it was evidently overcome by other propensities within them, acted upon and strengthened by temptation. From these inferior propensities, thus excited and rendered predominant, their disobedience flowed.* And what intelligent agents, possessed of the same attributes, and being in all respects in the same state inwardly, and the same circumstances outwardly, would not have acted in the same manner? I hold it to be a truth too plain and certain to need proof, that causes perfectly alike, acting upon subjects perfectly alike, will produce like results.

IV. When we attribute a predominant disposition to a man, our meaning is, that he has a principle of action which is likely to continue, and to unfold itself in the same way as heretofore; though not that it is absolutely immutable in all possible circumstances. Man is subject to change. Our confidence in him must of course have limitations. But so far as our confidence in any one goes, it rests on the supposed permanence of his present disposition. If we have no reason to think that a man who has exhibited a right character, will continue to feel and act as he has done, we consider him as fickle, and unworthy of our confidence. We never look upon past conduct as evidence of character, and we scarcely speak of a man as having a character, except on the supposition that his present state of mind will continue and will act itself out as it has done. Let a man make ever so clear an exhibition of love and kindness at the present time; still you would not confide in him as a friend, and would not ascribe to him, even now, the disposition of a friend, if you should expect that the next feelings of his heart would be feelings of enmity. Without some degree of permanency in a man's state of mind, he cannot have what is called character, cannot be properly denominated either a friend or an enemy. Whenever any one

is denominated thus, the idea is involved, that, in ordinary circumstances, he will continue to be what he now is.

* See Dwight's Theology, Serm. 27, 4th head.

It is evident, that the continuance of the same feelings and actions in any person results chiefly from the continuance of the same disposition, or state of mind, though I do not by any means exclude the influence of outward circumstances. But there are strong reasons against supposing, that the continuance of the same kind of affections and conduct is owing principally, much less entirely, to outward circumstances. One reason is, that we find the same kind of affections and conduct under a great diversity of outward circumstances. Tender parents will love their child, whether he is virtuous or vicious, whether he affords them pleasure, or occasions them trouble and sorrow. They will love him, whatever their love may cost them. A miser continues to love his money, whatever changes may pass over him. He loves it in health and sickness. His heart cleaves to it in the hour of death, though he knows it can never be of any use to him. The unrenewed sinner will continue to disobey the divine law, whatever motives may be set before him, and in whatever outward circumstances he may be placed. The true Christian will continue to feel and act as a Christian. Neither life nor death, nor things present, nor things to come, can hinder his love to his Saviour. It is so with the man of true integrity and virtue. No temptation can prevail upon him to swerve from uprightness, and to do a dishonest deed. Now surely this continuance and uniformity of feeling and conduct cannot be owing chiefly to external circumstances. For these circumstances are exceedingly various; and if they had a governing influence, we should suppose the effects would vary accordingly. To account for the uniformity of feeling and action which takes place in such circumstances, we must refer to a uniform and stable cause. And if this is not found in anything extraneous to the mind, it must be found within the mind itself. It does indeed appear to be true, that in all instances in which the feelings and actions are the same, there is, in some important respect, a uniformity of mental view, and that the uniformity of feelings results from this. But this very uniformity of mental view, from which uniform feelings arise, must itself result from a úniform state of mind. The man

who continues to have the same prevailing apprehension of things, evinces that he continues to have the same prevailing disposition or state of mind. So it is with the mental view of the unrenewed sinner, of the Christian, of the miser, of the upright man, and of all who have a fixed character.

But there is another reason against supposing, that uniformity in the affections and conduct is owing chiefly to the influence of outward circumstances; namely, that in the same circumstances the affections and conduct of different men are essentially different, and even opposite. Nothing is more common than to find that, while everything extraneous to the minds of two men is the same, the feelings which they uniformly have towards a particular object are different, those of one, feelings of attachment; those of the other, feelings of aversion. This difference of emotions, so constant and uniform, cannot be accidental. It must have a cause; and a cause as uniform as the effect. But the cause cannot lie in the outward circumstances, as they are alike. It must then be found within. But the minds of both are equally possessed of reason, conscience, will, self-love, and all the natural powers and capacities. The cause or occasion of these different feelings must therefore lie in the habitual disposition or state of their minds; a thing obviously distinct from their natural powers. Two men, one of them a sincere Christian, the other, a violent opposer of religion, are informed of the conversion of a sinner. The one is filled with emotions of pleasure; the other, of displeasure. To what is this owing? Common sense answers, to their different dispositions. And the connection between their prevailing dispositions, and the emotions which arise in their minds in view of such an event, is so close and certain, that if you know beforehand what their dispositions are, you are ready to predict what those emotions will be. You know a man like David Brainerd, and are fully acquainted with his predominant disposition. I ask you, what emotions will be excited in his mind, when the conversion of a sinner, or the success of a benevolent enterprise is mentioned? You say, emotions of joy. And you ground this affirmation upon what you know of his disposition, or the