perfectly definite, and our reasoning freed from all uncertainty and confusion.

What has now been said of the natural sciences, is eminently true of the mind. Let any one begin by noticing a class of mental operations which have a common resemblance; call them thoughts, or ideas, and refer them to a faculty of the mind, which he denominates understanding or intellect. Let him proceed to another large class, which he calls emotions, feelings, volitions, etc. and refer them, if he pleases, to a power of the mind, to which he gives the general name of will. Let him comprehend all the mental operations in these two classes, and refer them to the understanding and will, as the all-comprehensive powers of the mind. But it will not be long before he will find this classification far too general for the purposes of science, or even of common discourse. The operations or states of the mind are so various, that he cannot sufficiently designate them by these general terms; and of course, he will have occasion to form various subordinate classes, and to distinguish them by particular terms. This process of classifying ought to proceed just as far as we discover new and more particular relations and differences of mental phenomena, and have occasion accurately to express them, either for the purposes of science or of common life. And the number of classes formed will, of necessity, be multiplied, in proportion to the advances we make in an exact knowledge of the mind. Accordingly, we are never authorized to affirm, that the classification of mental operations has proceeded to its utmost limits. Suppose we discover some new relations of our mental acts; or suppose it becomes necessary to take more particular notice of certain relations, which have before been known, though but slightly considered. Either of these circumstances will lead us to form a new class of mental phenomena, and to refer that class to a power of the mind, designated by a new name.

It should, then, be kept in view, that the classes which we form of mental acts, and the mental faculties to which we refer them, are to be multiplied more or less, according to the state of our knowledge, and as convenience requires. No other limits can be set to classification.

But in what way can the further classification which is found necessary, and which we have actually made in our own thoughts, be most conveniently marked? In regard to this, different methods may be pursued. First; a new word may be coined, to designate the new class. But this is frequently found inconvenient. Secondly; a word which has been applied to other subjects in a sense somewhat analogous, may be applied to the new class of mental phenomena, and when thus applied, may have a peculiar, technical, or scientific sense. This is very common, and no one considers it liable to objections. Thirdly; in case two words have heretofore been used to denote a larger and more general class of mental acts; one of the more particular classes formed, may be denoted by one of those words, and the other class by the other.

This last mode, or something like it, may be adopted, and has actually been adopted, in regard to the words affection and volition. Heretofore, these words were frequently used as nearly synonymous. And they are still used so by some writers. According to this, all the affections are acts of the will, i. e. volitions; and all the volitions are affections. Here the will is regarded as the general faculty, to which all the feelings, emotions, dispositions, and determinations of the mind are to be referred. And all these feelings, emotions, etc. are sometimes called voluntary; by which I suppose may be meant, that they are acts of the will, taken in the sense above mentioned. Now the practice of using the words affection and volition in so indeterminate a sense, has occasioned much needless obscurity and dispute. The fact is unquestionable, that the acts of the mind which have been thus comprehended under one class, and referred to one general faculty, are, in some important respects, different from each other. And disregarding this difference has often rendered language exceedingly vague, where it should be perfectly definite. This evil has been more or less felt by thinking men generally. And something has been done to remove it, even in common discourse. An attempt has been extensively made, and with considerable success, to divide this large set of mental acts into two classes, and to appropriate

*

the word volition to one class, and affection, emotion, or feeling, to the other. Locke made this distinction expressly, and took pains to illustrate it. He spoke of it, however, not as a new distinction, but as one which was well understood. He says, "We must remember that volition or willing is an act of the mind directing its thoughts to the production of any action, and thereby exerting its power to produce it." Again; "Volition being a very simple act, whosoever desires to understand what it is, will better find it, by reflecting on his own mind, and observing what it does when it wills, than by any variety of articulate sounds whatsoever. This caution of being careful not to be misled by expressions that do not enough keep up the differences between the will and several acts of the mind that are quite distinct from it, I think the more necessary, because I find the will often confounded with several of the affections, especially desire, and one put for the other; and that by men who would not willingly be thought not to have had very distinct notions of things, and not to have writ very clearly about them. This I imagine has been no small occasion of obscurity and mistake in this matter, and therefore as much as may be to be avoided. For he that shall turn his thoughts inward upon his mind when he wills, shall see that the will or power of volition, is conversant about nothing but that particular determination of the mind, whereby, barely by a thought, the mind endeavors to give rise, continuation or stop to any particular action which it takes to be in its power." Again; "We find in ourselves a power to begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our mind, or motions of our bodies, barely by a thought of the mind, ordering or as it were commanding the doing or not doing of such or such a particular action. This power which the mind has thus to order the consideration of any idea, or the forbearing to consider it, or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa, in any particular instance, is that which we call the will. The actual exercise of that power by directing any particular action, or its forbearance, is what we call volition, or willing." And Locke speaks of that

* Essay on the Understanding, Book ii. ch. 21.

action, and that forbearance of an action, which is consequent to such order of the mind, as voluntary; and of that which takes place without such an order, as involuntary.

Abercrombie, in his work on the Intellectual Powers, says: "Simple volition is that state of mind which immediately precedes action. We will a certain act, and the act follows, unless it be prevented by external restraint, or by physical inability to perform it." And he represents volitions as arising out of the affections and desires.

This is a distinction which seems now to be generally made, especially when the object of discourse requires philosophical accuracy. It is a plain matter of fact, that there is a class of mental acts, which answer to the above description of volitions; and that there are other mental acts which answer to the sense now commonly given to the word affections or emotions, but do not agree to this description of volitions. So that there is a real foundation for making two classes of these mental operations. And it is clear that there must be two classes formed, and designated by distinct and appropriate terms, or we cannot express ourselves clearly and definitely. We have frequent occasion to speak of those particular acts of the mind which Locke, Abercrombie, and others, call volitions. Now suppose we call them affections; or suppose we call them volitions, still using the word in the same sense with affections. How can we make ourselves to be understood, unless we go into a further explanation, and say we mean that class of affections or volitions which immediately precede particular mental or bodily actions, and which not only precede them, but ordinarily produce them? Now if we would consult convenience or correctness in our language, we must have some word appropriated to a class of mental acts, so numerous and important, and so distinguishable from others.

It is only in this way that we can free ourselves from the intolerable necessity of giving a particular description of those mental acts, whenever we speak of them, or a particular explanation of the word by which we denote them; a necessity which will always lie upon us, unless those mental acts which are so clearly

distinguishable from others, are formed into a class by themselves, and pointed out by a distinct word.

But by what word may this particular class of mental acts be most conveniently designated?

I have touched upon this question in previous remarks. And there can be no doubt as to the proper answer, considering that so much has already been done to settle the point, both by a prevailing usage, and by the authority of distinguished writers. The mental acts here referred to, may be called, and usually are called, volitions, or determinations of the will; while other mental acts formerly included, and by some still included under that name, may be called, and more commonly are called, affections, feelings, or emotions. To appropriate one of these words, that is, volitions, to one of these kinds of mental acts, and the other words to the other kind, is much more convenient, and much more according to the common mode of proceeding in other similar cases, than to invent a new word either for one or the other kind of mental acts. And it certainly makes the distinction much more plain and striking, than to apply the word volitions to both classes of mental operations, and then to go about to mark the different kinds of volitions by such epithets, as immanent and emanent, or by any other epithets. As there is so obvious and important a difference between these two sets of mental acts; the difference should, if practicable, be marked by different names, rather than by different adjectives applied to the same name. If we use the word volition, as Locke and Abercrombie do, and in conformity with prevailing usage at the present day; we denote the species of action intended, at once and very clearly, and then refer it to the will, as the faculty of the mind which is concerned in it. But if we call both these classes of mental acts, volitions, or acts of the will, we shall be obliged to distinguish the particular class intended, by such a hard and cumbersome phraseology, as emanent volitions, imperative volitions, executive acts of the will, etc. This might be tolerated, were there no other way. But as there is another way, and one perfectly convenient, and as custom has already done so much in favor of it; why should we not adopt it?