for our volitions, or our affections, how can we be accountable for anything?

"Inquirer" says: "If God has made free agents, has he not given them the power of choice, after all the motives which the nature of the case admits, are placed before them?" Certainly he has given such a power; and we exercise it every day. But in what way? Let " Inquirer" tell how he exercises this power of choice. In all his more important and deliberate choices, does he not carefully weigh the motives or reasons which come before him, and then decide in accordance with those which appear to him the strongest? And does he not feel that he is a free and accountable agent when he uses his power of choice in this way? In cases where our power of choosing has its most free and perfect exercise, do we ever choose in any other way? And if at any time we will and act suddenly, without deliberation, and from the impulse of some strongly excited passion; is not this very impulse of passion the motive which governs us? I predict that Inquirer," and all other men, in the free exercise of the power of choice, will determine, will, or choose, either according to what appear to them the strongest reasons, after deliberation, or under the influence of some strongly excited passion, which leaves them no time for deliberation.

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"Inquirer" says: "Dr. Woods will see, on looking over page 191, that he has made a singularly incorrect statement of the orthodox doctrine respecting the influence of Adam's sin. As the words now stand, they represent the orthodox as maintaining that native depravity and all our sinful actions and volitions, which are the invariable consequence of Adam's sin, are fatalism, entirely precluding free, accountable agency." One and another have said to me: How could "Inquirer" make such a mistake? I ascribe it not to any intention of his to misrepresent, but to his hasty attention to the paragraph referred to. In the closing part of my remarks on cause and effect, it was my object to point out the consequences of adopting the theory of the Essay. This object was pursued in the passage referred to by "Inquirer" which any one may read for himself. First, I state the orthodox

doctrine as to the invariable connection between Adam's sin and the sinful volitions and actions of his posterity. Having done this, I turn to the Essay, which maintains that such an invariable connection of antecedent and consequent proves the existence of such a “producing cause," as as "excludes free agency." I then show what must follow from the theory of the Essay; namely, either that the orthodox doctrine on this subject is true, and so, according to the theory of the Essay, that our depravity and all our sinful volitions and actions, being the invariable consequence of Adam's sin, are matters of fatalism, entirely precluding free agency; or else that there is no such connection, and that the orthodox doctrine is false. Thus, what I expressly represent as a consequence of the theory which I oppose, "Inquirer" thinks I represent as the doctrine of the orthodox.

After closing his remarks very candidly and kindly, “Inquirer" returns to the general subject in a postscript, and advances some things to which he doubtless expects me to reply. He says: "Dr. Woods makes us mere passive recipients in all our passions and desires." But these are his words, not mine. To the word passive, as explained by Edwards and Day, and as generally used by the older divines, I have no objection. A man is passive in this sense of the word, when he is the subject of an influence from another, or is acted upon by another, how active soever he himself may be. Thus a man is said to be both passive and active in his repentance and obedience. He is the subject of the divine influence, or is acted upon by the Spirit; and he himself acts, that is, repents and obeys, in consequence of that influence. God works in believers, and, in consequence, they work. But “Inquirer" doubtless uses the word passive as opposite to active, and recipient as opposite to agent. Now as every reader will see, I have taken great pains to show that, in this very matter, we are, in the most proper sense, agents; that in our affections and desires we are truly active; and that these mental actions are of as high an order, at least as our volitions. I everywhere oppose the idea, that, because our affections and desires are exercised spontaneously in view of appropriate objects, and are not controlled

by a previous act of the will, we are not therefore free and active in them, or accountable for them. I hold that we are free, specially free in these mental acts-free, certainly, in as high a sense as in those external acts which are completely dictated and controlled by a volition.

Inquirer" asks, how the command to love God and our neighbor is to be obeyed, and what is the nature of the obligation which lies on the sinner to exchange his enmity for love." According to the scheme which he seems to adopt, I should find it impossible to make any reply. For if the affections are not a part of our moral agency, for which we are justly responsible, I see not how they can be commanded, or what obligation can lie upon us to exercise them. But according to the view which I have taken of the matter, it is easy to say something in the way of reply. Love and hatred, and all the affections and emotions which we exercise in view of moral objects, are free, unforced, moral acts, for which we are justly accountable. God addresses his law to us as active, moral beings, and requires us to love him, and forbids our enmity. This command is right. For there is nothing more certain, than that we ought to love and obey such a being as God, and that we are blame-worthy and inexcusable for hating him. But if we take the other view of the subject, the view of those who hold that our affections and emotions are not moral acts, how can we dispose of the difficulty? How can we vindicate the law for requiring that we should exercise the affection of love, in which we are not moral agents, and for which we cannot be responsible? "Inquirer" speaks of this as a "dark, dark place." It would be very dark to me, if I should adopt the theory of my opponents. But, if I mistake not, the subject is illuminated by a light which is sufficiently clear; and nothing is necessary, but that we open our eyes to behold it. It is true at least, that we may know all which is of practical use. That we are intelligent, active, accountable beings, is an ultimate fact. The sacred writers never say a word to prove it, but always assume it as a well known fact. And they seem never to have imagined, that any one could doubt it. Whatever the laws of the mind are;

in whatever way our affections and desires are excited; under whatever influence our volitions are produced; and whatever may be found to be true in any other respect; the certainty of our moral, accountable agency is not for a moment to be questioned. It is not a subject of reasoning, but of consciousness. Treat it as a subject of speculative reasoning, and you involve it in darkness. But treat it as a fact of consciousness, and all is clear. I have said it is an ultimate fact. And we cannot go beyond what is ultimate. We cannot reach further than this, either on the right hand, or on the left. We cannot ascend to a greater height, or go down to a lower depth. This fact bounds our knowledge; except that we may look up, and see and adore the only wise God who created us. His work is perfect, and cannot be mended, With respect both to body and mind, we are fearfully and wonderfully made. As to the mode of teaching the nature and relations of man, his duty, his sin and ill-desert, and the way of recovery to holiness and happiness, we have the instructions and the example of those who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It is safe to follow their guidance. It is not safe to follow any other.

It is not well to introduce questions on the great subjects of religion, which the word of God will not help us to answer, and which must gender doubt and strife. When "Inquirer" asks how this and that can be; who can answer? And if I should ask him, in reference to one or another of his principles, how it can be; could he give an answer? The best and only safeguard against an unsettled, skeptical state of mind, is to avoid the habit of dwelling upon the speculative difficulties which hang about every important subject; to adhere closely and reverently to the word of God; to feed upon its precious truths, and to live in obedience to its precepts; and finally, to cherish a constant, lively sense of our weakness and danger, and a cordial reliance upon the teaching of the Holy Spirit.

I now close. I hope I shall not be severely blamed, for writ ing so much, or for not writing more. I have not indeed remarked on every particular point suggested by "Inquirer."

But I have not passed over anything which I supposed important. And I have not passed over anything because I thought it difficult to give an answer. Nor have I done it, because I am reluctant to tell what I think. I have frankly and unreservedly disclosed my views, and my mode of reasoning on every subject which has come under consideration; and I am willing to do so on every other subject; so that what is right may be approved, and that what is wrong may be corrected. Let those who differ from me do the same. Let us all unite in avoiding concealment, and equivocation, and every degree of undue confidence in ourselves, and of uncandid or unkind feeling towards others; endeavoring to join soundness of doctrine with the spirit of forbearance and love, and always remembering that bitterness of feeling, or the want of sincere brotherly kindness, towards any of the ministers or disciples of Christ, is one of the worst of errors.

I cannot but wish, that I had been able to think and write in a manner more worthy of the subjects which have been brought before me, and more adapted to advance the cause of truth. Still it has been my aim to do that, and only that, which will accord with the word of God, and both in asking and answering questions, to keep in mind the all-revealing day. I hope that "Inquirer" will look with favor, if not with entire satisfaction, upon what I have done. For whatever my defects or my errors in this performance may be, I have endeavored to speak the truth in love. My correspondence with my unknown friend, though not of my proposing, has been of the most pleasant kind. I thank him for the respect and candor which are apparent in his inquiries. What he and I have written is now before the public. The Lord grant, that it may so work in with the thoughts and reasonings of others, as in the end to contribute something towards illustrating and confirming the theory of divine truth.