I have extended my remarks to such a length, because I conceive the point under consideration to be of primary importance, and because I think it would conduce in a high degree to our benefit as Christians, and to our usefulness as ministers, if we could bring ourselves to such a habit of mind as to make it our single inquiry, what doctrine God has revealed in his word; but never to make the inquiry, so incompatible with the character of Christians, whether the doctrine which God has revealed is true. You may perhaps think it needless to dwell longer on the genera] principle I have stated. But I am desirous of giving so clear an illustration of it, that no one can fail of understanding it aright. Let me therefore apply it to the question of Christ's character. This is a subject of pure revelation. Our inquiry is, what do the Scriptures teach? But a difficulty arises. How can it be that Jesus Christ is God, when there is only one God, the Father? What influence shall a difficulty of this kind have upon us in determining the meaning of the divine testimony? None. Suppose we are totally unable to reconcile the doctrine of Christ's divinity with the doctrine of the divine unity. What then? We are not required to reconcile them. Our business is to determine philologically and historically what the inspired writers taught, just as we determine what Athanasius or Arius taught. The only difference between the two cases, which I need to notice, is this; that the very doctrine which the inspired writers taught is the doctrine which we are unhesitatingly to receive as true; but as to the doctrine of Athanasius or Arius, we are to believe it or not, as we find it supported by proper evidence. The one is directly binding upon our faith; the other not. But the method of determining what doctrine was taught, is substantially the same in both cases. Now suppose you make it your object to inquire what doctrine Athanasius taught. Would you think it proper that your views. of the consistency or inconsistency of his doctrine should influence. you in determining what his doctrine actually was? You would look for the usus loquendi. You would take into view all the circumstances of the writer, and of the time when he wrote. But in ascertaining what doctrine he held, you certainly would not

first inquire whether, agreeably to your mode of reasoning, the doctrine was philosophically correct, and then conclude that it was his doctrine or not, according as it agreed or disagreed with your notions. No enlightened and impartial man ever proceeded in this manner in determining what opinions were maintained by any uninspired writer. And no one can with propriety proceed in this manner in determining what doctrines were maintained by the inspired writers. Suppose a man should release his mind, as the German Rationalists have released theirs, from the idea that the sacred writers were inspired, and from all sense of obligation to believe what they taught. He could then pursue the question, what doctrines they taught, without being embarrassed with any reasonings about the consistency or inconsistency of those doctrines. So some of the most learned Rationalists have pursued it. And so ought we. Those Rationalists have in some important instances, decided, that the Scriptures teach the doctrines which we hold. In this we agree with them. But we go farther, and hold this sense of Scripture to be according to truth, and make it the foundation and rule of our faith.

But you ask, whether in determining the meaning of the divine declarations, we are not to have respect to the moral sentiments and feelings which are inseparable from the constitution of human nature. My answer is, that if in any case, we do this, it should be with great caution. If the divine declaration is unambiguous, and its meaning obvious, it is to be received on the ground of its own authority, whether it agrees or not with our moral sentiments and feelings; and for this plain reason, that our moral sentiments and feelings may rest on defective or partial views of things. God commanded Abraham to offer up his son Isaac as a sacrifice. Abraham had the same moral sentiments and natural feelings as we have. If his moral sense had been consulted, must it not have decided, that killing a man, especially a son, would be exceedingly unnatural, inhuman and wicked, and that a kind and merciful God would forever disapprove of it? How could Abraham then believe that God actually commanded it? Certainly he could not, if he had formed his opinion of the meaning of the

divine declaration in the manner above mentioned. But he had one moral sentiment, which was paramount to all others, and controlled all others; and that was, that whatever God says is right. He knew that God commanded him to perform the deed. He consulted not with flesh and blood; he consulted not with his own sensibilities, as a parent; he,consulted not even with the sentiments which belonged to his moral nature respecting the evil of slaying a man. Nor did he inquire how this command could be consistent with the previous promise of God, or with the command not to kill. He yielded entirely to the authority of God's command. He had higher confidence in God's perfections, than in the dictates of his own moral nature; and he acted against all those dictates, except that one which was superior to all others, and which is indeed the highest moral principle proper to the human mind, namely; that God is to be believed and obeyed. In any such case, it is evident that an attempt to model the meaning of God's word according to our own speculative notions or natural feelings would lead us far astray, and that the right meaning of God's word is that which readily suggests itself to the docile, obedient, pious heart.

But after we have ascertained the doctrine of revelation, and have received it as the matter of our faith, the question often arises, whether such doctrine agrees with the common principles of reasoning, or with facts which occur in the natural or moral world. This may be a suitable inquiry, and we may sometimes find it advantageous to pursue it with all the means in our power. But the result of this inquiry is not to affect our belief of the doctrine revealed. If the doctrine agrees with the common principles of reasoning, or with known facts in the natural or moral world; this we shall consider a pleasing circumstance, and one which will enable us to silence the objections of unbelievers. This may be the case with the doctrine, taught in Rom. v. respecting the evils which are brought upon the posterity of Adam by means of his one offence. It is very easy to make out an analogy between this divine constitution, and events which continually take place. But this analogy is not the ground of our faith

in the doctrine. For should we be wholly unable to make out any such analogy, we should still believe the doctrine taught by the inspired writers, simply because it is thus taught. And supposing that to be the case, instead of attempting to do what is beyond our power, it would become us frankly to acknowledge, that the doctrine differs from the deductions of reason in other cases, and has no analogy to truths otherwise made known. An acknowledgment like this is as consistent with our cordial belief of a doctrine made known by revelation, as it is with our belief of any principle of magnetism or electricity, which has no analogy to other principles in the science of physics. Such an acknowledgment should be made by every Christian, in regard to the Scripture doctrine of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, and the doctrine of Christ's person, as including divine and human attributes. Refusing to make this acknowledgment, and attempting to find something among created beings which would be analogous to this peculiar mode of existence, has occasioned needless perplexity, and has done much to turn off the minds of men from the only true ground of Christian faith, the divine testimony.

But I have another remark, which, though it may seem very evident, deserves a careful consideration. The Protestant principle of making the Bible our only and sufficient standard requires that we should conform to it, both as to the matter and the manner of teaching.

I can best explain my meaning by an example. The sacred writers teach the important doctrine, that Christ made an atonement for the sins of men. But in what manner do they teach this doctrine? How do they set it forth? Sometimes they represent, that Christ died for us; sometimes, that he died for our sins; sometimes, that he was a sin-offering, that he bare our sins in his own body on the tree, and that God laid on him the iniquities of us all; sometimes, that he was a propitiation for our sins, that he redeemed us, that he reconciled us to God, etc. Now when we teach the doctrine of the atonement, this is the kind of representation we should make. The Scriptures use a great variety in the manner of exhibiting the subject; so should we. But

how various soever the manner in which we exhibit the doctrine, we should keep our eye upon the manner in which it is set forth in the Scriptures, and should not only avoid whatever would be inconsistent with that, but should make it manifest, that we derive our conceptions of the doctrine, and our mode of teaching, from the Bible. If we undertake to explain it, and to reason upon it; our explanation and reasoning should be such as will correspond with the current language of the inspired writers; and such as will make it natural and congruous for us freely to quote that language, and intermix it with our own explanations and reasonings. In short we must make it manifest that we delight in the Scripture representation and Scripture phraseology, and consider it best suited to the nature of the subject; and on this we must build all our logic, and all our rhetoric. Now turn your thoughts to those preachers and writers who carry their fondness for philosophical investigation into the subject of religion, and see how they exhibit the doctrine of Christ's atonement, and then say, whether there is any appearance of their regarding the Bible as their only and sufficient guide. If they do so regard it, how comes it to pass that they seldom, if ever, set forth this principle of religion in the light in which it is set forth by the inspired writers? How does it happen that a doctrine, which always appears in the Scriptures so obvious, and so full of vital warmth and energy, comes in their hands to be so cold, and speculative, and lifeless, and so remote from common apprehension?

But perhaps a question may arise in the minds of some, whether the principle I have laid down will exactly hold at the present day; whether the change which has taken place in the mode of thinking, the prevalence of a new set of errors, the new systems of education,-in a word, whether the new circumstances of man, do not call for a change both as to the matter and manner of religious instruction.

To this I reply: that no change has taken place, which materially affects the subject under consideration. Man's relation to God, to the moral law, to Christ, and to his fellow creatures, -is the same now, as it was when the Scriptures were written. Man