should suppose, that a man in the same state of mind with respect both to disposition and motive, may make two different and oppoposite determinations, and may do it at the same time. But I think he cannot really mean this; and if not, what is the point of difference?

Fourthly. All agree that we have power to make different and opposite choices at different times and in different circumstances. Our choice at one time is in fact different from what it is at another time. An unrenewed sinner chooses to disobey God and enjoy the pleasures of sin. The same person when renewed by the divine Spirit, chooses to obey God and forsake the pleasures of sin. The power thus to vary our choices under the influence of different motives, objective or subjective, evidently belongs to all

men.

Fifthly. It is a point in which all will agree, that, in any case, we might have made a different choice instead of the one we did make, if we had been disposed to do it, or had found sufficient inducements. A man who chooses the life of a farmer, might have chosen the life of a mariner, if he had been so inclined, or had found sufficient inducements. This, I apprehend, is the meaning of those who say, that we might have chosen, or had power to choose, differently from what we did;-not that we might at the same time have made another and opposite choice in connection with the one we made; but that we might have made another choice instead of it, if we had been disposed to do it, or if our inducements had been sufficient. These are the necessary conditions of choice; and without them choice cannot be. If a man should tell us that he put forth an act of mind which he called choice, without any inclination or inducements, we should say, he mistakes the meaning of the word.

Sixthly. All agree that we may hereafter make a choice contrary to what we now make. There may be such a change in our views, feelings, and circumstances, as will naturally lead to a change in our practical determination.

Seventhly. Whenever we make a wrong choice, all agree that we ought to have made a different choice, and that our not doing

it was our own fault. There are in truth motives or inducements of such intrinsic value, that we ought to be influenced by them to a right choice; and if in any case we do not make such a choice, it is not because we are not free agents, but because we are sinful agents, not because we are destitute of any of the endowments of moral, accountable beings, but because we are inclined to pervert those endowments; not because we have no power to choose, but because the power we have is under an evil. bias.

Eighthly. I suppose there is a general agreement in this also, that a man does himself determine the influence which external motives shall have upon him, by the dispositions and habits of his own mind, or by his own inward character. A good man, by his pious dispositions, determines the influence which gospel truths shall have upon him. It is because he "has an honest and good heart," that the motives presented in the Scriptures excite his love, and lead him to obedience. Our Saviour asserts this connection between the state of the heart and the voluntary conduct, when he says, "A good man out of the good treasure of his heart bringeth forth good things; and an evil man out of the evil treasure of his heart, bringeth forth evil things." We expect a man will have love, pity, generosity, or the opposite, excited by the objects placed before him, according to his prevailing disposition. And if any one judges on any other principle, we say, he is ignorant of human nature.

If any one inquires whether we have not power to choose contrary to our inclinations and to the inducements presented before us; I reply, that we doubtless have power to choose contrary to some of our inclinations, and some of the inducements placed before us. But have we power to choose and act contrary to all our inclinations, and to all the inducements placed before us? Did any man ever learn that he has such a power by acting it out? If not, how does he know that he possesses it? Can any man think such a power desirable? If he had it, would he ever exercise it? And of what value is a power which is never to be exercised? A power to choose according to our inclinations

and desires, and under the influence of rational inducements, is a possession of great value. But a power to choose independently of all our inclinations and motives, and contrary to them, is a power to do an absurdity; and a power to do an absurdity is itself an absurdity.

But some appear to think that, in every case, choice and voluntary action might have been contrary to what it was, supposing all the motives, external and internal, and all the circumstances of action, to have remained perfectly the same. They think this is the main point, and that it is the very thing implied in the power of a contrary choice. In reference to this, I cannot do better than to quote the words of an author, who was no advocate for the scheme of moral or philosophical necessity, but who judged according to common sense and consciousness. The author referred to, (Dr. Whately,) says: "If nothing more is meant," (that is, by the doctrine of necessity,)" than that every event depends on causes adequate to produce it, that nothing is in itself contingent, accidental, or uncertain, but is called so only in reference to a person who does not know all the circumstances on which it depends; and that it is absurd to say anything could have happened otherwise than it did, supposing all the circumstances connected with it to remain the same; then the doctrine is undeniably true, but perfectly harmless, not at all encroaching on free agency and responsibility, and amounting to little more than an expansion of the axiom, that it is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be.”

But if I have rightly understood the writer of the Essay, he holds that this very principle, which Whately says is undeniably true, and perfectly harmless, is the essence of fatalism. The doctrine which he represents as the opposite of free agency, and the great doctrine of fatalism, is, that in the moral world, as well as the natural, the same consequences invariably result from the same anteceḍent circumstances. It is manifestly implied in what he and others advance on this subject, that they mean to speak of the antecedent circumstances as the same in all respects. All the dispositions, habits, and desires, everything intellectual and

moral, and everything extraneous to the mind, in a word, the mind itself, and everything which can have an influence upon the mind, are to be regarded as perfectly the same. Now my position is, that when this is the case, the same consequences invariably follow. And I hold, with Whately and others, that this is selfevident, and that to assert the contrary is absurd. If any man thinks that he has the power actually to make a contrary choice when all the antecedent circumstances are the same; I must request him to think again. And if he still insists that he possesses such a power, it is no more than reasonable to call upon him for proof. Let him give an instance, in which he has in some way exercised it, or if he never has done it, let him do it now, and thus end the controversy. But if, though a man really has this power, he never has exercised it and never will exercise it, then, after all, the existence of the power does not amount to much, and does not in the least interfere with the doctrine, that the same consequences do in fact result from the same antecedent circumstances. In this point of view, the question whether a man has the power, is of no weight. For if he has it, but never uses it, the result will be the same as though he had it not. And so, according to the Essay, the existence of the power of the contrary being never exercised, would do nothing to shut out fatalism, because, notwithstanding such a power, there may in fact be an invariable constancy in the result of moral causes.

I hardly know how to account for it, that the author of the Essay and some other writers should represent free agency as consisting in the power of a contrary choice. The power and the only power which we really use, is the power to choose and act as we do. We can indeed make a different choice at another time and in other circumstances. But have we power to make

a different choice at the very time that we make the choice we do? Let it be that we have such a power. I say that we cannot use it, except by choosing at the very time differently from what we do choose. But how can this be? At the very same time that we choose to speak the truth, how can we use the power of

a contrary choice, and choose to speak falsehood? Now, how strange it is, that any one should represent free agency as consisting in a power, which, if it should exist, would never be used, and the use of which would imply a contradiction? Does moral agency consist in the power to cause the same thing to be and not to be, or to cause a thing and its opposite to be at the same time?

a power to make a particular choice and a contrary choice at one and the same time? The choices I make and the actions I perform are the choices and acts of a free moral agent. And the power to choose and act as I do, is all the power that is necessary to my moral agency. Who can reasonably wish for more power, than that which he exercises in the variety of choices he makes, and in all the variety of his actions?

But

As an exemplification of the general principle which I maintain, take the words of Christ: "If any man love me, he will keep my words." Obedience is the invariable consequence of love. And disobedience is the invariable consequence of the want of love. "He that loveth me not, keepeth not my words." has not a man who is now destitute of love, power to obey? Yes, on the proper condition. He cannot render a true obedience to Christ, without love. That any one should choose to obey, and actually obey, when he has no love, is contrary to the nature of obedience. His power to obey is then conditional, and the conditions are such as arise from the nature of the mind, and the nature of voluntary action. These conditions are often expressed, and, when not expressed, are understood. And practical men understand them alike. When they wish to induce a man to make a choice different from what he has made, instead of appealing to the absolute power of the will, they labor at the well known conditions of the new choice. In this way, and in this way only, they hope to succeed. There are uniform laws in the moral world, as well as in the natural; and to attempt to accomplish anything irrespectively of those laws, would be as unwise and fruitless in one case as in the other.

I shall take the liberty to close my remarks on this subject by a few quotations from a writer, whom no one can charge with the