has added to this area.

Asia Minor, Syria, and Meso

potamia must have some tutelage before they are ready to assume self-government. These dependent parts of the world should not be the exclusive preserves of any nation. Narrow colonial policies were too much a contributing cause of the war for the nations to permit them to continue. The development of the backward parts of the world economically and in self-government is a matter of international concern. If international control of them does not prove feasible now, it should be made clear that the nation vested with political control of a dependent country is in the position of a trustee and is answerable to the League of Nations for the performance of its trust. From this it would follow that the mother country should have no preferential treatment in the tariffs of the colony or protectorate. As they are international wards, the trade of the dependent parts of the world should be open equally to all.

In any consideration of equality in tariff matters the preferential tariffs of the self-governing British dominions cannot be passed over. These political divisions of the world-Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the South African Union - are sui generis. Nothing like them exists anywhere else. They are not "colonies" in the old sense of that word. Except for a theoretical veto retained by Great Britain but now never exercised, they have complete domestic autonomy. They may enact any legislation they desire, including tariff laws that exclude British goods for the purpose of developing their home manufactures. On the other hand, they have not fully the status of "nations." Their foreign affairs are in large part conducted from London, where their voices are having an increasing influence. They must adhere

The

to the treaty obligations of Great Britain even if the terms of those treaties conflict with their domestic legislation. In spite of these limitations, however, the selfgoverning dominions of the British Empire have many of the characteristics of "nations." Canada was allowed practically a free hand in negotiating the reciprocity agreement with the United States in 1911. relation between Great Britain and the self-governing Dominions has been referred to as the "Britannic alliance" and as "an alliance of free nations." In the Covenant of the League of Nations these Dominions are admitted as units with all the rights of independent nations. They cannot, it would seem, claim this position of equality with independent nations and still retain the right to discriminate against their copartners in the international organization. Argument from analogy cannot, it is true, alone decide the wisdom of the preferential tariffs of the British Empire. But comparisons suggest themselves. In their economic effect there is no difference between preferences granted by Canada and Australia to Great Britain and preferences granted by Brazil to the United States, and politically one may be as much a source of international ill-feeling as the other. Penalty duties levied by the United States against certain countries for the purpose of getting special favors are not wholly unlike the surtax which New Zealand levies on all foreign goods while granting to British goods the lower duties in the general tariff. From an international standpoint there is not a fundamental difference between preferences established by self-governing parts of the British Empire and special reciprocity arrangements between nations.

This argument, however, is not pressed as conclusive. 4 Reconstruction Programme of the British Labour Party.

It is intended merely to be suggestive. The real question is one of desirability. Is it wise for the British Empire to attempt to monopolize trade by means of preferential tariffs? It is doubtful whether even from Great Britain's standpoint such a course is desirable. Arguments based on political and sentimental ties are not likely to be convincing with excluded peoples, and the resentment against the British Dominions because of their discriminatory tariffs will increase. From an international standpoint preferences between widely separated and different political divisions of an empire are as undesirable as reciprocity between nations, and if the British Empire should insist on preferential arrangements, it is hardly in a position to ask other nations to give up their discriminatory measures.

The crucial question in considering tariff discriminations is this: Shall unconditional most-favored-nation treatment be accepted as the principle to guide nations in their dealings with each other? If the answer to this question is in the negative, it will be a recognition of the right of every nation to make such special or exclusive tariff arrangements as it can. If the answer is in the affirmative, as it should be, it would seem to be desirable that the self-governing dominions of the British. Empire, which are "nations" so far as fiscal policy is concerned and under the Covenant of the League of Nations should accept the responsibility of "nations" within the meaning of the unconditional form of the most-favored-nation clause.

Out of the war should come a recognition of the principle that tariff discriminations are contrary to international wellbeing. There should be an end to national narrowness. An attitude of justifying one nation's shortcomings by pointing to those of another should be

ended.

The subject of tariff discriminations should be approached from the standpoint of the world's welfare. The most that any one nation can expect to have is equality of treatment. Preferences may profit for a time, but in the long run they are injurious to the parties immediately affected, and they are clearly objectionable from the standpoint of world commercial policy.

Preferential tariff treatment should be a subject for general international agreement. No one nation is at fault, and none should be asked to act alone in the abandonment of a discriminatory policy. The principle of the open door should be recognized as applicable to all dependent parts of the world, and the unconditional form and interpretation of the most-favored-nation clause should be accepted as binding on the British dominions as well as on nations. If then there are to be any exceptions to the general rule of equality of treatment, either by preferential tariffs or customs unions, these should be passed upon by an international conference. But we must not stop here. Machinery must be devised for making these principles effective. The principle of equality of treatment may be nullified, as it often has been, by open exceptions insisted upon by individual nations and by concealed discriminations.

Concealed discriminations constitute one of the methods by which the principle of equality of treatment may be made ineffective. Their existence has led some public men to despair of the general application of the principles of the open door and unconditional most-favorednation treatment. Critics have said with considerable justification that nations that carry out their international obligations in good faith are at a disadvantage in competition with nations that do not hesitate to evade

the spirit while accepting the form of equality of treatment. Concealed discriminations, as has already to some extent been pointed out, may be found in tariff classifications by means of which commodities that are peculiarly the product of one country are favored under an appearance of equality; by the undervaluation of home products sent to colonies; by discriminatory customs and sanitary regulations; by unequal port and navigation rules; by the Government ownership of land and trading companies in colonies; by exclusive concessions to private corporations; and by the even more subtle method of financial and political control. Faced with these conditions, some public men have proposed to abandon the equality-of-treatment principle and to attempt the use of retaliatory measures for the purpose of obtaining the removal of concealed discriminations. In clear cases such a step would no doubt be justified, but a general acceptance of such a principle would drive the world backward into the old vicious circle of trade rivalries, discriminations, and war. Much more desirable is it for nations, recognizing the desirability of the equality-of-treatment principle, to devise means for making it effective by supplementing it with machinery that will ferret out and bring into the open objectionable and concealed discriminations. Publicity itself will remove many of them. To others may be applied penalty duties in case negotiations fail.

The most controversial phase of the subject of equality of treatment relates to the exceptions that it is claimed are justified under it. Cases undoubtedly exist where geographical or political ties, or the two together, justify, even from an international standpoint, preferential arrangements or a customs union. Among these may be