penal offense, in order to permit the public ministry to initiate action. 2 PROCEDURE: Installation at Berne of a service for the suppression of unfair competition, whose duty it shall be (a) to furnish information to merchants regarding everything that relates to bringing suit in any tribunal of a country signatory to the conventions of Paris, Brussels, and Washington; (b) to notify the public ministry, that has jurisdiction, of cases of unfair competition. The subcommittee on unfair competition in its report recommended that every nation should make an effort to render efficacious the resolutions of the Washington convention and proposed that the Congress should restrict itself to one special phase of unfair competition, viz, corruption and corruptive practices, which affect not only the countries where they are carried on, but international commerce equally, and therefore require international intervention for their suppression. The subcommittee submitted resolutions to the effect that (1) the Congress should name a special committee to study the different phases of unfair competition which require legislative intervention; (2) the Congress should insist upon the necessity of special legislation, as uniform as possible, in all countries for the suppression of corruption. It recommended further that prohibited acts should be made punishable as a crime by the penal code of each country, but that civil prosecution should be allowed, which would enable the victims of bribery to procure compensation for injuries sustained. The Congress held that such special legislation should facilitate the prosecution of corrupt practices and should confer the right of initiative not only upon the public ministry, but also upon associations and individuals. The proposals of this Congress were never put into effect as the great war broke out a few weeks later, but now that nations are ready to resume their search for methods of dealing with unfair practices in international trade, they may prove a valuable guide. The war experience added at least one constructive element. The inter-Allied control of shipping, food, credit, and raw materials demonstrated that nations could act together to achieve a common purpose which no one country could achieve alone. Such international arrangements as have been discussed are not adequate. They have very clear limitations. They provide safeguards against certain unfair practices in countries where municipal law is highly developed. But suppose a country has no law against unfair competition? No provision is made for regulating competition between citizens of two countries competing in a third economically backward country which has a more or less irresponsible government and which cannot be depended upon to enact and enforce adequate regulations. Nor is there any provision for regulating discriminations in communication and transportation. Yet it is in these cases that danger of serious conflict lies. For the immediate future at least competition will remain the primary regulatory force in international commerce. How then shall it be made fair? In some cases the situation has been recognized as intolerable and international action has been taken. But these efforts have been piecemeal. They have not gone to the root of the difficulty. It is here that the federal experiences of the United States provide valuable guides for the international action. Either in the final treaty or in supplemental conventions the powers should agree to eliminate from international commerce unfair practices and discriminations and establish a commission or commissions under the League of Nations to investigate and give publicity to infringements of the international rules. Possibly there should be two commissions, one dealing with trade, the other with transportation, as in the United States. It will not be necessary (or desirable) to give an international commerce commission plenary power at first. That was not done in the case of the Interstate Commerce Commission, and as for the Federal Trade Commission, it was the continuation of the Bureau of Corporations which had for years done effective work as a mere investigatory body. What is important is that in establishing an international commission the nations should provide it with a set of general rules for the regulation of international commerce, should empower it to investigate and give publicity to infractions of these rules, and should permit aggrieved parties to lay their complaints before it. The interpretation and extensions of the rules would gradually establish a body of precedents, the nations would get more and more confidence in the commission, and it would gradually evolve into an organization which would effectively regulate international commerce. The necessity of such a commission is clear to anyone who knows the facts. National conservatism and national pride are holding us back. But the economic life of the world has far outrun our political organizations. The problems of international shipping and trade cannot be handled by nations singly. There must be a common body of rules and a central body to apply them. In establishing an international commission with power to regulate commerce and trade nations will not give up anything that the interests of the world warrant them in keeping. If such a forward step is not taken, what will be the penalty? Nations will return to the unrestricted, anarchistic trade methods of the past. Competition in many markets will be bitter. Each nation will feel it necessary to control colonies, to capture spheres of influence, to obtain concessions, and to build a merchant marine in order that its economic power may give it an advantage. No nation is going to rely on another to do it justice. The alternatives before the nations are return to the old unregulated competition of the past under which each nation gets all that it can according to standards of its own making, or, the preferable choice, the establishment of a body of rules on international trade and commerce and the creation of a commission under the League of Nations to interpret and ultimately to administer them. CHAPTER XIII AFTERMATH OF WAR-TIME CONTROL OF FOOD AND RAW MATERIALS Food and raw materials as factors before the war in commercial policy - Foods Significance of essential raw materials Position of Germany with reference to raw materials - Of Japan Of the British Empire - Of the United States War-time control of food and raw materials by individual nations In the United States Food and Fuel Administrations War Trade Board War Industries Board - Shipping Control Committee - Examples of national control Drift toward international control-Commission Internationale de Ravitaillement - Allied Maritime Transport Council Inter-Allied Food Council Inter-Allied Munitions Council-Inter-Allied Programme Committees on Raw Materials Permanent effect of war-time experiences Dangers from absence of international regulation - Possibilities of trade warfare suggested by war experiences and plans - Necessity for joint action among nations. - War-time experiences have disclosed with great clearness the importance in commercial policy of the control of food and essential raw materials. Prior to the war only in isolated cases did nations attempt to use their control of food and raw materials for bargaining or for other national ends. In the few cases in which this was done, it was for the purpose of exacting an export tax or regulating the price of a product. Chile had used her monopoly of nitrates to levy an export tax, which was paid ultimately by the foreign consumer. Brazil used her coffee monopoly in like manner. Germany limited the amount of potash that might be taken for export from her practically inexhaustible supply. A Government monopoly of camphor in Japan was used to limit production and to regulate prices. A semi-public sisal monopoly in Yucatan fixed the export price of that |