in the preface to his papers on the Unity of Nature which he proposes to publish in a volume, "The publication of it as a series of articles in this Review, before its final appearance as a volume, will afford me, I hope, the advantage of hearing and of seeing what may be said and written of its errors or of its deficiencies."

In accordance with the above suggestion, and recognising fully the great service done by these works, we venture to inquire whether the relation of Personality to Law, constantly involved in the discussion, is rightly given-whether the theory of the reign of natural law and of the unity of Nature is not so carried out as to trench, not avowedly, but logically and really, on the sphere and prerogatives of personality.

In doing this we first notice the chapter on "The Supernatural," and the conception of that that runs through both works. Of the relation of man to Nature there are two distinct conceptions. These are clearly seen and distinctly stated by the Duke. In his first paper on the Unity of Nature he says: "And of this unity we who see it, and think of it, and speak of it-we are a part. In body and in mind we belong to it, and are included in it." That is one view. Of this he says, "It is more easy to admit this as a general proposition than really to see it as a truth and to accept all the consequences it involves. The habitual attitude of our thoughts is certainly not in accordance with it." We have here an admission which involves a strong presumption against his proposition. But he goes on to say, and this gives the other view, "We look on 'Nature' as something outside of us-something on which we can look down, or to which we can look up, according to our mood; but in any case as something in which we are exceptions, and which we can and ought to regard from an external point of view." That it is natural for us thus to regard nature as "something outside of us" he admits still more distinctly in his fifth paper. He says

"We are all quite accustomed to think of man as not belonging to Nature at all-as the one thing or being which is contradistinguished from Nature. This is implied in the commonest use of language, as when we contrast the works of man with the works of Nature. The same idea is almost unconsciously involved in language which is intended to be strictly

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philosophical, and in the most careful utterances of our most distinguished scientific men."

This he says. He also says that there is no other objection to the definition of the Supernatural given by Dr. Bushnell, which includes man, "than that it rests upon a limitation of the terms Nature' and 'natural' which is very much at variance with the sense in which they are commonly understood." The following is the definition by Dr. Bushnell as quoted in The Reign of Law: "That is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of natural cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in Nature from without the chain." Here the distinction between the natural and supernatural is clearly drawn. According to this Nature is to be regarded as a system of uniformities within which there is no self-determination, no original causation, and no freedom. This, we venture to say, is the conception of Nature in the minds of most men, and any definition of it that would include a power of self-determination, or of original causation, or of acting from without upon its ongoing as a chain of cause and effect, would be more at variance with what is commonly understood by the word Nature than one which would exclude man so far as he is free and is an original cause. Indeed, the conception of freedom, and that of subjection to natural law so as to be within the chain of cause and effect, are incompatible. The one thing which gives Nature its value as a basis of experience is its uniformity. No matter what the cause of this may be, it is independent of the human will, and the movement assumes to us the aspect of necessity. The conditions being given, the element of a uniformity that is independent of the human will is that which is essential to our conception of a Nature. Back of that there may be what is called necessity, or fate, or the Divine Will, but let there be an absolutely uniform ongoing, having, or seeming to have, its cause within itself, and we have what constitutes our conception of a Nature. We have what we need as a basis for experience, and for the responsible action of a free being.

What the Duke would include within Nature we do not precisely know. Failing to draw at the point of self-determination. and freedom the only line that can be drawn between Nature

and the supernatural, we sometimes find him, as near the close of his fourth paper, assigning to man a power over Nature which we should call supernatural. He says, "Nor can there be any doubt as to what are the supreme faculties of the human mind. The power of initiating changes in the order of Nature and of shaping them to the noblest ends-this, in general terms, may be said to include or involve the whole of them." Again, in The Reign of Law, p. 279, we find him virtually denying, as it seems to us, the possibility of freedom. He says—

"If these conclusions be true, it follows that, whether as regards that in which Force in itself consists, or as regards the conditions under which Force is used, it need not surprise us if in passing from the material world to the world of Mind, we see that Law, in the same sense, prevails in the phenomena of both."

Once more we find him, as in his third paper, using language in regard to Nature which would not only include within it intelligences superior to man, but would seem to include God himself, and so be pantheistic. He says

"We have been created, or—if any one likes the phrase better-we have been 'evolved;' not, however, out of nothing, nor out of confusion, nor out of lies, but out of 'Nature,' which is but a word for the sum of all existence -the source of all order, and the very ground of all truth—the fountain in which all fulness dwells."

It was not meant so, but if this be not an identification of God with Nature, what would be? But finally, and naturally enough, we find him so troubled with the word 'supernatural' that he wishes it banished from the language, and gives his He says, "It would be well if this word were altogether banished from our vocabulary." This is a perilous assertion for one to make respecting a word so domiciled in the language, who says a little further on of human speech that it is

reasons.

that sure record of the deepest metaphysical truths." His reasons, however, are, that "it assumes that we know all that 'Nature' contains, and that we can pronounce with certainty on what can and what cannot be found there. Or else it assumes that nature is limited to purely physical agencies, and that our own mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these." Certainly it does assume that we can know, not all that can be found in nature, but what can not be found there. And that we do know. We know that self-determination and

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freedom, and moral character, cannot be found in what is commonly called "Nature," and no confusion could be greater than would come from an attempt to blend the two. Nor does it assume that Nature is limited to purely physical agencies, or that the mind is a power and agency wholly distinct from these. As has been said, the essential idea of "Nature" is uniformity from a cause independent of the human will. Hence "Nature" may, and does, come up into mind and find a sphere there as well as in matter, since we have in that, uniformities or laws, as those of Association. Universally, so far as these are uniformities in mind not dependent on its own. choice, it has a nature, and is subject to laws analogous to physical laws. That man, as a whole, has more often been regarded as a part of Nature is true. This has been from his complex nature, and because he is so to so great an extent. All that is below him is within Nature. He is a partaker of that. If we make, as in "The Outline Study of Man," the upward movement of Nature to be by successive platforms where all that is below is constantly carried up, while at each platform, and for its formation, something new is added so that the column constantly diminishes in extent and increases in comprehension, all difficulty at this point will vanish. So far as man is material and animal, he will be included within Nature; but so far as he is self-determined and free and moral, so far indeed as he is in the image of God, he is above Nature. He must be, or, so far as we can see, God himself is not supernatural.

In this view of it, instead of the confused notion of Nature when no line is drawn, we have a system of uniformities, in itself meaningless and useless, but grand and wonderful as a basis and condition of a free and spiritual system that is as far above it as the heavens are above the earth.

In connection with the Supernatural the Duke treats of miracles; and here also we find the same tendency to extend the domain of Natural Law so as to trench on the prerogatives of personality. "The common idea of a miracle," he says, "is that it is a suspension or violation of the laws of Nature." His own idea of miracle is that "there is nothing in religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the in

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strumentality of means—that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a divine purpose." A miracle, he says, "does not involve the idea of an exercise of will apart from the use of means." "It does not involve, therefore, that idea which appears to many so difficult of conception." Again he says, "Nevertheless, so deeply ingrained in the popular theology is the idea that miracles, to be miracles at all, must be performed by some violation or suspension of the laws of Nature, that the opposite idea of miracles being performed by the use of means is regarded with jealousy and suspicion."

In these passages it is implied that for anything to be done without the use of means would be a violation or suspension of the laws of Nature; and is therefore difficult of belief. Is this true? It may well be if what he says on p. 315 of The Reign of Law be correct. He there says that "all facts which we can bring about must be so brought about by the use of means. This is true universally." He says further in the same connection that "all actions must have a cause, or, in other words, must be brought about by the use of means," thus identifying the use of means with the power of causation. What then do we mean when we say that a thing is done without the use of means? Not certainly that it is done without a cause, but that the will itself, or the personal power of the man, with nothing intervening, is the cause. This we must mean if we mean anything, and meaning this we inquire whether we do not, in all cases of personal and free agency, do something without the use of means. We walk. In doing this we use muscles as means of moving the bones, and nerves as means of moving the muscles, and the brain, if you please, as a means of giving impulse through the nerves; but go back as we may, if we are to have free causation we must reach a point where something is done directly and without the use of means. In using means a first cause must act directly without the use of means. But again, did Christ use means when he called Lazarus from the tomb? Did he when he healed the servant of the centurion in response to a faith which was commended from the very fact that it implied an expectation of its being done without the use of means? "But say the word," said the centurion, "and my servant shall be healed."