Modes of faith and manner of life.

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uprightness in business relations, and kindliness of disposition and action, are appealed to. Such a mode of procedure is unjust to both interests. It is not in the separation of creed and conduct, but in the mutual and harmonious union of the two that man reaches his full stature. And no one can afford to be indifferent about "modes of faith" unless he is prepared to leave it an open question whether his "life is in the right." He may shut his ears against the din of contending sects, but if he forbids the entrance of the truth whose meaning is in dispute, it will be at the expense of living power. For when is the life in the right, and how does it become and remain in this condition? Is it not when knowledge and action aid and guide each other? when simple faith in the doctrines of Christianity gives support to, and stands confirmed by, fervent and faithful adherence to its practices? However true and devoted the outward manner of life, it must have originated, not apart from, but in union with, conviction. A more or less clear apprehension of truth and of obligation to it lies as the motive power, concealed and unacknowledged it may be, in character. And the neglect of this must in the long-run act disastrously. The warm heart may at times control the cool sceptical head-the earnest life may hide for a while the absence of settled principles; but it is for the most part the very opposite. Where no regard is paid to doctrinal straightforwardness or stability, it will become evident in the growing unsettledness and lack of beautiful consistency in the whole spirit and style of the man. The honest and good heart, how

ever much it may be valued in itself, will furnish but a disappointing and profitless harvest where it is not sown with the living, fruitful seed of the kingdom.

There is yet another objection of a philosophic as well as practical kind that cannot be passed over in silence. To what advantage this study of dogma, and why should one trouble one's-self, it is asked, in determining the truth or falsity of any particular doctrine? There is no necessity in the nature of things for coming to a decision, and it will make little matter to man's present state and future prospects what decision he comes to in regard to religious opinions and articles of faith. For, it is argued

3. Men belief. It comes to them

not by act of will, but by circumstances beyond their control, like the place of their birth: it is beyond their interference to alter as much as their natural colour. And so they are not blameworthy, however much they may be commiserated, for the presence or absence, the truth or falsehood, of theological views. A creed is an accidental encumbrance that may be laid upon a man or lifted from off him according to his physical condition or moral surroundings. He cannot control his mind in such matters, or force himself to accept doctrine. And thus no one is to be commended or condemned for his belief or for the lack of it. There is no room for judgment upon ourselves or others. Such a condition of things reminds us of Gibbon's account of the Paganism of Rome: "The various modes of worship which prevailed in the Roman world were all considered by the people as equally true, by the philosopher as equally false, and by the magistrate as equally useful."

But upon what evidence is this theory of non-responsibility built up? Has it the logic of reasoning, or the teaching of history, or the facts of individual experience, as its basis and as the material of its construction? None of these are appealed to, but only the supposed deductions of a materialistic philosophy and the vague assertions of a poetic theosophy. And between the two, man's soul, with all its moral powers and spiritual activities, is got rid of,-degraded by the one to the level of brute nature, sublimated by the other to the essence of divinity. Perhaps in such a case argument would be as much out of place in our contention as it is wanting in what is thus presented before us. Certainly it is not called for to overthrow the opposition, or to maintain against any assaults of this kind the citadel of truth. One might well rest contented with a simple denial of the proposition that man is not responsible for his belief. It falls to the ground for lack of proof, whereas man's responsibility may readily be vindicated in different ways. Diversity in moral judgments between civilised and heathen nations, and variety of estimate in regard to the importance of particular doctrines, do not afford any valid objection. These are perfectly compatible with the duty of "proving all things and holding fast that which is good." Nor do they in any measure sanction the idea that religious truth is unknowable in itself or unimportant in its character.

Man responsible for his belief.

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Rather such divergencies argue the liberty and right to form opinion, and thus indirectly involve what they are supposed by many to discountenance, the moral necessity of gaining and using right notions of God and of man's relationship to him. If man is accountable for his actions, it must be because he is a free and moral agent. And to this consciousness bears witness. But the disposition that gives its character to the action is equally a matter of accountability, for however fixed the original temperament may be, it is not lawless and unregulated, but controlled by reason and conscience. Nor is the region of thought and opinion to be regarded as altogether outside the sphere of moral responsibility. The mental condition is in measure at least dependent upon the use or abuse of opportunities and means of knowledge. Ignorance and misunderstanding are blameworthy when caused by neglect or wilfulness. And so our faith or lack of faith may be due to action or inaction on our part, and on this account, as well as from the fact that feeling, desire, will, restrain and modify our appreciation and apprehension of truth, we are compelled to acknowledge responsibility for belief.

or

But the measure of

responsibility, however variable a quantity—and it differs in individual cases according to the strength of evidence and the advantages, mental and social, of the man,—does not at all affect its reality. Whatever modifications take place are in the way, not of subverting, but confirming the fact, for they only show the limitations and variations under which this essential principle of human nature and experience may exist. Arguing from man's condition and circumstances in the world, appealing to the consciousness of each individually, we reach the same result. Not that all will confess in words either the feeling or the fact. But taking the simple self, unwarped by prejudice, and under no necessity to find a reason or excuse for unworthy conduct, from it we receive the fullest testimony. And even the very intensity of opposition may furnish evidence in favour, for "why the invectives against dogmas except upon the supposition that men are responsible for framing and maintaining them? If they are not, men should be left alone; if they are, they are to be thought of as worse and better for their intellectual creeds."

The sense of responsibility beyond all doubt exercises a

most powerful and wholesome influence over the whole man. Let it be properly realised, and the high moral character bears witness to its effective inworking; but let it be loosened or lost, and the honesty of purpose and uprightness of action are certain to suffer thereby. Every-day observation and experience will abundantly prove this, whether we consider individuals or communities of men. Regard for religious belief, thorough acceptance of a true and pure doctrinal system, ennobles the mind and enriches the moral life, whereas the rejection or the neglect of this weakens the motive powers and stunts the living graces of real manhood. This is the conclusion to which we have come after thus considering what is said on the one side and the other. And however imperfectly the work has been done by us, certainly it is a work in itself that deserves and will repay fullest treatment by the most competent hand. One who seems as much at home, and as truly in earnest, in religious as in political matters, and who never speaks without commanding the deepest attention and respect, thus bears witness to the importance of this question of doctrine:-"To uphold the integrity of the Christian dogma, to trace its working and to exhibit its adaptation to human thought and human welfare, in all the varying experience of the ages, is, in my view, perhaps the noblest of all tasks which it is given to the human mind to pursue. This is the guardianship of the great fountain of human hope, happiness, and virtue."1

ROBERT SANDERS.

A

ART. III.-Conscience and the Blood of Sprinkling.

VERY strong argument for the strictly substitutionary, propitiatory, justice-satisfying character of the sacrifice of Christ may be presented and pressed from the fact of his blood being called the "blood of sprinkling," and spoken of, as it is so often in Holy Scripture, as having such bearing on the conscience the peace, the purity, and the health of the

conscience.

1 Gladstone's Essays, vol. vi. p. 144.

Present negative theology, Socinian.

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Such argument is, in these days, assuredly not unnecessary, as must be known to all who are acquainted with the lines on which modern theological speculation runs. In the earlier decades of the century the Socinian view of Christ's death as an example-an example of patience under suffering-was almost the only theory antagonistic to the Westminster doctrine of propitiation which the Church was called on to contend against. And very noble and satisfactory were her contendings. Nor are they yet to be dispensed with. For that such a doctrine is eminently and fatally destructive of the truth as it is unto salvation we need scarcely say; and poorly equipped, indeed, for the office of the ministry must that unfortunate man be, who has not a heart-hatred for Socinianism, and a quiver well filled with deadly arrows against its soul-destroying errors, and especially this fundamental one. For no intelligent theologian can hesitate to give us his hearty concurrence when we say that in view of this leading tenet, Socinianism is even worse than Popery itself. Roman Catholicism has never abandoned the great leading truth of Christianity. Many even of her perversions of the truth are built on the great leading doctrine that the sacrifice of our Lord Jesus Christ was truly a propitiation for the sins of mankind. The very Mass itself might be mentioned as a testimony to this great truth. And while many of her tenets are fitted with diabolical ingenuity to make it void, still it is there, rendering these perversions themselves unintelligible without it. So much so is this true, that no intelligent Christian, if shut up to make a choice between Romanism and Socinianism, could have a moment's difficulty; because while by a simple combination of grace and providence, though born and brought up under the influence of Romanism, it might be possible to throw off the superincumbent mass of Romanising perversions, and find and feed. upon the catholic truth of Christ and him crucified, there is nothing in Socinianism to favour the "precious redemption" of souls at all. We trust to meet in a better world with many who have lived and died in the communion of the Romish Church, a hope which the entire ignoring of anything to be called real "reconciliation with God" on the part of the votaries of Socinianism renders simply impossible.

And, indeed, Socinianism is, and ever will continue to be,