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How is error possible?

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a given physical excitation will have a definite and fixed But the results of this reaction, in turn, are

mental reaction.
under the control of fixed mental law.

How, then, is error possible either in perception or in reasoning? But if error be as necessary as truth, what reason is there for distinguishing between them? No system of necessity can answer these questions so as to save knowledge. No system of metaphysical necessity is compatible with either science or philosophy. In every such system all beliefs are effects only, and are fully explained by their antecedents. They are not deduced from grounds, but are produced by causes. A rational belief, on the other hand, is one which has grounds as well as causes; and to discern its rationality we must have a standard of truth in the mind, and we must be able to apply it to our beliefs, and to accept or reject them accordingly. Freedom is necessary to reasoning. In a system of necessity all beliefs are de facto and none are de jure; or if this distinction should exist for an observer outside of the circle of necessity, we who are in the circle could never distinguish the de facto from the de jure in belief. For to do this we must be able to control our thoughts according to some law of truth, and this by hypothesis is impossible. And allowing it to be possible, we are still greatly embarrassed as materialists; for a great many conflicting and contradictory beliefs exist. Matter is engaged in producing a great variety of opinions on many important subjects; and it is interesting to know which are to be accepted. Probably the materialist would urge us to accept his views, and would give us his word of honour for their truth. Unfortunately words of honour have no value in logic, and we need something more. The most natural assumption would be that those views are most likely to be true which matter produces most freely; and hence we might test the truth by taking a vote. But sadly enough, the average brain is not so made as to grind out materialism or atheism. Matter in its thinking has a strong tendency towards theism and spiritual conceptions of things; and it has even devoted much attention in the past to metaphysics. Of course these views are false, but how are we to escape them unless the nerves take a new direction? If the human mind were something which is capable of free reflection, and which develops variously according to its circumstances, we might account for much variation by the mental environment; but of course this is not the case. It

is indifferent to a molecule where it is; and it ought to be indifferent to any complex of molecules. In particular, it is hard to see how the organism can be affected by its mental atmosphere. Prejudice and superstition might influence minds; but they do not seem adequate to influence material movements. Besides, if they could, they are themselves the outcome of material activity. If there be prejudice, superstition, and stupidity in the world, matter is to blame for it. It is matter that hath made both us and our opinions, and not we ourselves. If, then, there could be any distinction between reason and unreason in this system we should be forced to allow that along with a little right thinking matter has done a vast deal of wrong thinking. It has an inherent tendency to irrationality and falsehood. It is the sole source of theologies, superstitions, and anthropomorphisms, as well as the sun-clear truths of advanced science. If we were persons with faculties which could be carelessly used or wilfully misused, these things might be laid to the charge of individual carelessness or stupidity, or dishonesty; but as we are not such persons, all these things must be charged to matter itself. This conclusion remains if we call matter the unknowable, the mysterious one, or anything else which may strike our fancy. In every system of necessity we have to posit in being, along with reason, a strong tendency to unreason which throws discredit on all knowledge. According to the materialist himself, for one sound opinion matter has produced a myriad unsound and grotesque ones. But even yet we have no ground for distinguishing the rational from the irrational. In the old philosophy the distinction between rational and irrational belief is, that the former rests on grounds which justify it, while the latter is groundless. But the new philosophy cancels this distinction. entirely, and reduces all beliefs to effects in us. It recognises production only, and allows of no deduction. All our beliefs

are explained by their causes, and none have any rational advantage over any other. The only distinction is of relative extent; and the only standard possible, unless we yield to pure ipsedixitism, is to take a vote, and view rational beliefs as those which are most wide-spread and enduring.

Our nerves being in motion along this line, they next point out that the possibility of error can be reconciled with the validity of knowledge only in the fact of freedom. Error must

Freedom in reasoning.

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be the outcome of carelessness and volition, if knowledge is to be saved. If it be a necessary consequence of being, knowledge is overturned. The question of freedom is commonly supposed to have only a moral bearing; and its significance for the theoretical reason is entirely overlooked. The utmost that is generally claimed is that if it be denied, moral distinctions vanish; we insist, in addition, that rationality also vanishes. Discussing the question entirely in the realm of duty has the disadvantage also that questions of passion and interest are especially prominent in that field; and thus there is great room for talking of the strength of motives and of the necessary victory of the strongest. In this way both the subject and the debaters often become sadly confused; and hence it is of advantage to extend the debate into a different realm. Now the essential nature of freedom is not the power to act without a motive, but the ability to choose an end, or law, and to govern one's activities, mental and executive, accordingly. This government may take the form of guidance or of repression. The being who cannot do this is neither moral nor rational. A rational activity demands just such a power. The aim of reason is to bring the de facto order of mental experience into the de jure order of thought. The mental mechanism under the laws of association brings us mental states in any and every order just as experience furnishes them. As thus produced they are simple facts, and are all on the same plane of actuality. The distinction of true and false, rational and irrational, does not yet exist. This first emerges

when the mind comes to transform the actual order of fact into the ideal order of thought; and to do this the mind must be free. To bring its experience into rational order, the mind must be able to test its thoughts, to compare, to retain, or reject them as they agree or disagree with the inner law of reason. The mind must not accept thoughts as they are thrust into it, but must sit regnant over the mental mechanism of association, sifting, testing, and ordering its own course according to the law of reason. The mind makes reason its norm, searches in the chaos of sense for the rational, and rejects the irrational; and only thus does it rise to true rationality. It is plain that a mind which could not do this would be totally untrustworthy. Its beliefs would sink down into mere facts and below the dis

tinction of truth and error. And even if there be such a thing as truth, our ability to reach it depends entirely on our power to control that which is given in thought, to suspend judgment, to eliminate the irrational, and to transform the chaos of experience into the transparent order of reason. This does not mean, of course, that the mind can coerce the conclusion, but that to reach a sound conclusion it must be able to control and coerce its activities. On the materialistic theory, the mental state, or rather the physical state, does coerce the conclusion; and thus the conclusion represents no truth of reason, but only the resultant of conflicting nervous movements. It is not pro

perly a conclusion, but an effect of its causes. That these will be the same next time we do not know; and if thought be tolerably clear, a complete scepticism of reason must result. Oddly enough, the determinists generally allow such a self-control in reason. They grant a power of thinking twice and of suspending and postponing both judgment and action. They grant that though the mind cannot coerce reason, yet sound thinking does not come of itself. The inviolable law of reason may be present in the mind, yet unless the mind accept it and make it the norm of its activity, the outcome is error and confusion. Hence the care and circumspection of the scientist and the true thinker. They give all diligence to have their facts established and their premises unambiguous. In particular, they are on their guard against the misleading influence of association which tends to put on a delusive appearance of rationality. Even the associationalist assumes a power over the associations, and an ability to criticise them according to the law of reason. He interrupts the processes of association, tears apart their conjunctions, disputes the beliefs which they are said to have produced, and withholds his assent from various alleged intuitions on the ground of his criticism. But in such activity we have one of the purest examples of freedom; and in such freedom we have an absolute postulate of rationality. In order to reach truth, the mind must have a standard within itself, and it must also be self-controlling. The law of reason itself does not secure obedience. The mind must be able to choose the law and to govern itself accordingly. With this assumption of freedom we can explain error without overturning the trust of the mind in itself. Error is the outcome of a careless or wilful use of our

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freedom. Our faculties are made for truth, but by neglect or misuse they may lead to error. Without this assumption of freedom, truth and error are alike necessary and alike justified. There is no longer any standard of distinction; and one belief is as good as another as long as it lasts. The belief in the soul is a fact which things have produced in us. The belief in materialism is a fact of the same sort. Neither has any logical advantage over the other. If it were possible to reason, to examine the grounds of each belief, to compare them with some inner standard of truth, and to accept or reject accordingly, it would be otherwise; but as it is, both are at once logically groundless and necessarily produced. We do not claim that these considerations prove the fact of freedom; but we do claim that whoever will follow them to their consequences will see that freedom and rationality stand or fall together. A common assertion of the advanced thoughts is that freedom would make science impossible. It is well, then, to set up the counter-claim, that without freedom there could be neither philosophy nor science.

It is strange how old delusions haunt us. Throughout this. paper we have assumed that a power of reasoning is possible, and that there is such a thing in thought as sound logic. Hence we have assumed to judge and criticise as if logic were still in existence. While we have allowed the nerves to be all, we have assumed to remain as a critical spectator of their performances. We have also treated the materialist as if he had power at least over his thinking; and we have urged him to rectify his views, as if that were possible. And all thinkers of every school make the same assumption. The advanced thinker complains of the conservative that he fails to draw the most obvious conclusions; and this failure is even made the ground now and then for righteous indignation at the cowardice or dishonesty thus displayed. On the other hand, the conservative complains of the advanced thinker that he has not the courage of his opinions, and often falls into grievous backsliding from the faith. All alike appeal unto logic, and all alike assume both the power and the duty of being logical. The materialist may have some doubt of others' power to reason, but he has not the slightest doubt concerning his own. But these appeals to logic are all illogical, and show that we are not fairly under the influence of

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