If

'Tis not my work to justify these opinions of Plato, and his scholar Aristotle they were men, and though wise and learned, subject to error. they erred in these points, it hurts not me, nor the cause I maintain, since I make no other use of their books than to shew the impudence and prevarication of those, who gather small scraps out of good books to justify their assertions concerning such kings as are known amongst us; which, being examined, are found to be wholly against them; and, if they were followed, would destroy their persons and power.

But our author's intention being only to cavil, or to cheat such as are not versed in the writings of the ancients, or at least to cause those who do not make truth their guide, to waver and fluctuate in their discourses, he does in one page say, "That without doubt Moses' history of the creation guided these philosophers in finding out this lineal subjection:" and in the next affirms, "That the ignorance of the creation occasioned several amongst the heathen philosophers to think that men met together as herds of cattle:" whereas they could not have been ignorant of the creation, if they had read the books that Moses writ; and having that knowledge, they could not think that men met together as herds of cattle. However, I deny that any of them did ever dream of that lineal subjection, derived from the first parents of mankind, or that any such thing was to be learnt from Moses. Though they did not

perhaps justly know the beginning of mankind, they did know the beginnings and progress of the governments under which they lived; and, being assured that the first kingdoms had been those which they called "heroum regna," that is, of those who had been most beneficial to mankind; that their descendants in many places, degenerating from their virtues, had given nations occasion to set up aristocracies; and they also falling into corruption, to institute democracies, or mixed governments; did rightly conclude, that every nation might justly order their own affairs according to their own pleasure, and could have neither obligation nor reason to set up one man or a few above others, unless it did appear to them that they had more of those virtues which conduce to the good of civil societies, than the rest of their brethren.

Our author's cavil upon Aristotle's opinion, "That those who are wise in mind are by nature fitted to be lords, and those who are strong of body ordained to obey," deserves no answer; for he plainly falsifies the text: Aristotle speaks only of hose qualities which are required for every purpose; and means no more, than that such as are eminent in the virtues of the mind deserve to govern, though they do not excel in bodily strength; and that they who are strong of body, though of little understanding, and uncapable of commanding, may be useful in executing the commands of others: but is so far from denying that one man may excel in all the perfections of mind and body, that he acknowledges

him only to be a king by nature who does so, both being required for the full performance of his duty. And if this be not true, I suppose that one who is like Agrippa Posthumus, "corporis viribus stolide ferox,"* may be fit to govern many nations; and Moses or Samuel, if they naturally wanted bodily strength, or that it decayed by age, might justly be made slaves, which is a discovery worthy our author's invention.

SECTION II.

EVERY MAN THAT HATH CHILDREN, HATH THE RIGHT OF A FATHER, AND IS CAPABLE OF PREFERMENT IN A SOCIETY COMPOSED OF MANY.

I AM not concerned in making good what Suarez says: a Jesuit may speak that which is true; but it ought to be received, as from the devil, cautiously, lest mischief be hid under it: and Sir Robert's frequent prevarications upon the scripture, and many good authors, give reason to suspect he may have falsified one, that few Protestants read, if it served to his purpose; and not mentioning the place, his fraud cannot easily be discovered, unless it be by one who has leisure to ex

*Tac. ann. l. i. 3.

amine all his vastly voluminous writings. But as to the point in question, that pains may be saved; there is nothing that can be imputed to the invention of Suarez; for, "that Adam had only an economical, not a political power," is not the voice of a Jesuit, but of nature and common sense: for politic signifying no more in Greek, than civil in Latin, it is evident there could be no civil power where there was no civil society; and there could be none between him and his children, because a civil society is composed of equals and fortified by mutual compacts, which could not be between him and his children; at least, if there be any thing of truth in our author's doctrine, "that all children do perpetually and absolutely depend upon the will of their father." Suarez seems to have been of another opinion; and observing the benefits we receive from parents, and the veneration we owe to them to be reciprocal, he could not think any duty could extend farther than the knowledge of the relation upon which it was grounded; and makes a difference between the power of a father, before and after his children are made free; that is in truth, before and after they are able to provide for themselves, and to deliver their parents from the burden of taking care of them: which will appear rational to any who are able to distinguish between what a man of fifty years old, subsisting by himself, and having a family of his own, or a child of eight, doth owe to his father: the same reason that obliges a child to submit intirely to the will of his parents, when he is utterly ignorant of all things, does permit, and often injoin, men of ripe age to

examine the commands they receive before they obey them; and it is not more plain, that I owe all manner of duty, affection, and respect to him that did beget and educate me, than that I can owe nothing on any such account to one that did neither.

This may have been the opinion of Suarez: but I can hardly believe such a notion, as "that Adam, in process of time, might have servants," could proceed from any other brain than our author's; for if he had lived to this day, he could have had none under him but his own children; and if a family be not complete without servants, his must always have been defective; and his kingdom must have been so too, if that has such a resemblance to a family as our author fancies. This is evident, that a hard father may use his children as servants, or a rebellious, stubborn son may deserve to be so used; and a gentle and a good master may shew that kindness to faithful and well-deserving servants, which resembles the sweetness of a fatherly rule: but neither of them can change their nature; a son can never grow to be a servant, nor a servant to be a son. If a family therefore be not complete, unless it consist of children and servants, it cannot be like to a kingdom or city, which is composed of freemen and equals; servants may be in it, but are not members of it. As truth can never be repugnant to justice, it is impossible this should be a prejudice to the paternal rule, which is most just; especially when a grateful remembrance of the benefits received doth still remain, with a necessary and perpetual