effect; it may end in nothing by various ways, and it may be that equity, however invoked, may refuse specific performance, and so the vendor may remain owner, unaffected by the agreement without the aid of any Court. But whether he does or not, he is still owner and can convey his ownership, subject of course to any equitable right which the purchaser may have; he has none at law except a personal action against the vendor if he should refuse or be unable to carry out the contract." The case of Canada Grace v. Keubler, deals with the question somewhat, but does not decide the point at issue. Next, let there be noted, an Article written by Mr. J. E. Hogg, the author of the Torrens System in Australia, which appeared this year in the January number of the Canadian Law Times (p. 31) where he discusses very much the same question, which Article appeared after this Article was in the course of preparation. A perusal of that Article shows clearly the controversial nature of the point raised herein, and near the conclusion of his discussion, at p. 36, he says that the most reasonable view would seem to be that the case of Eyre v. McDowell, which formed the basis of the old English decision, does not apply to registered land. That case decided that the registration of a judgment after conferring on the creditor the remedies of a mortgagee did not give a judgment creditor priority over any registered purchaser or mortgagee, but merely affected the interest of the debtor. Mr. Hogg's conclusion seems to be that if the judgment debtor had been the registered owner of land that the registered judgment would attach. The Article is also interesting in showing the trend of decisions dealing with the point and evidently when it was written the Ontario case of Robinson v. Moffatt had not been called to his attention. Note next the case of the Union Bank v. Lumsden, where it is said that a registered execution did attach; 4 (1917) 3 W. W. R. 983. 5 31 W. L. R. 80. and further the case of Weidman v. McClary Mfg. Company, which I have just had an opportunity of reading, and the judgment of Haultain, C.J., and the cases there cited, but on p. 218 of the report he says: "Under the second heading, how can a mere charge affect a purchaser?" In answer thereto I wish to submit the following argument: A mortgagee can give a mortgage of a mortgage, and can validly charge a mortgage security for the whole or any part of the balance of the mortgage money, and the chargee has two remedies, he can sue the original mortgagor in an action for debt, or he can sell the land on default of payment to realize the amount of the charge. Likewise a vendor, while he remains the registered owner, may validly charge his interest in the agreement either by an assignment of the whole of the purchase money and giving a transfer of the lands, or the vendor may charge any part of the purchase money by way of mortgage, and the chargee has likewise remedies against the land by selling the land to enforce the vendor's lien; or he may sue in an action. of debt for the purchase money. Can it be denied then that a vendor's interest is an interest in land, and that it can be charged under the Manitoba Judgments Act? If not, the decision in Robinson v. Moffatt must be bad law. Winnipeg, March, 1918. 6 (1917) 2 W. W. R. 210. A. H. G. MURRAY. THE DOMINION INSURANCE ACT, 1917, AND PROVINCIAL RIGHTS. An inherent fault of federal systems of government is their liability to conflicts of jurisdiction between the central and local authorities. It is one product of the "written" Constitution. The draftsman must always be on the horns of a dilemma-for the general and the particular alike prove a pitfall, and yet those are the only forms of language he can employ. In truth, human speech does not possess the forms which can in perpetuity express the ideas entertained by the makers of such Constitutions. In the permutations of time, too, both the words used and the ideas that underlie them lose their original significance and shape, and a species of evolution takes place in spite of the apparent rigidity of the instrument. The weakness of a federal in comparison with a sovereign State is that as a rule development to meet a change of conditions is an outcome of contest between the higher and the lower powers. The British North America Act suffers from these defects, as many cases serve to illustrate. The problem of reconciliation between the general and the specific or the greater and the lesser authority is, perhaps, as insoluble as the occurrence of conflict is inevitable. But not every dispute need lead to war. Infinitely preferable are the methods of peace,-discussion, compromise and settlement. To cut the Gordian knot by appeal to the Privy Council is a course which has little to recommend it, when so much could be achieved by co-operative statesmanship. Will there always be a legal battle before the Dominion and the provinces can arrive at a mutual recognition and adjustment of their respective rights and duties? The question is peculiarly pertinent to the legislation indicated by the title of this paper. The jurisdiction over insurance matters in Canada has a litigious history and bids fair to have a litigious future. Con current authority has long been asserted and exercised by the Dominion and the Provinces, with the natural consequence that the business has been carried on under overlapping laws and a dual system of control. It must be admitted that the subject cannot be regarded solely from the standpoint of constitutional law. The insurance business is highly technical, and a competent department is required for efficient supervision. It may indeed be expedient in the public interest that the federal government should administer the law of the land under such circumstances. But these are secondary considerations if provincial autonomy is jeopardised, and the Dominion rides roughshod over provincial rights. The situation is unfortunate for the companies and other interested parties. Let us hope that they will not forever lie between the upper and the nether millstones. The judgment of the Privy Council in the Insurance Reference Case,' provides a fresh starting point for an examination of the constitutional aspect. Two questions were submitted in that reference by the Dominion and the Provinces to the Supreme Court, and taken by way of appeal to the Privy Council. The questions were to this effect: 588. 1 (a) Are sections 42 and 703 of the Insurance Act, 1 Reference re Insurance Companies, 48 S. C. R. 260, [1916] 1 A. C. 2 Section 4 is as follows: In Canada, except as otherwise provided by this Act, no company or underwriters or other person shall solicit or accept any risk, or issue or deliver any receipt or policy of insurance, or grant any annuity on a life or lives, or collect or receive any premium, or inspect any risk, or adjust any loss, or carry on any business of insurance, or prosecute or maintain any suit, action or proceeding, or file any claim in insolvency relating to such business, unless it be done by or on behalf of a company or underwriters holding a license from the Minister of Finance.' Section 70 provides that (a) In Canada, for or on behalf of any individual, underwriter or underwriters or any insurance company not possessed of a license provided for by this Act in that behalf and still in force, solicits or accepts any risk, or grants any annuity or advertises for, or carries on any business of insurance or prosecutes or maintains any suit, action or proceeding, or files any claim in insolvency relating to such shall on summary conviction insurance a penalty be liable to 1910, or any and what part or parts of the said sec-tions ultra vires of the Parliament of Canada? (b) Does section 4 of the Insurance Act, 1910, operate to prohibit an insurance company incorporated by a foreign state from carrying on the business of insurance within Canada, if such company does not hold a license from the Minister of Finance under the said Act, and if such carrying on of the business is confined to a single province?' The scope of the submission was obviously limited -a matter for regret, as an opportunity to thresh out the real issue was lost. The principal features of their lordships' judgment may be thus summarised. The Dominion legislation now repealed was ultra vires because it operated to deprive individuals of civil rights within their provinces. Analogously, it was ultra vires in so far as a provincial company was concerned, because it worked an interference with the status of such company, a proposition which is the counterpart to, the decision given in the John Deere Plow Company Case. Section 4 was unjustifiable also because it asserted an authority to "regulate by a licensing system a particular trade in which Canadians would otherwise have been free to engage in the province," and such power could not be read into the words "Regulation of Trade and Commerce." Further the authority to enact those sections could not be based on the general authority of parliament to pass laws for the peace, order and good government of Canada. As to the second question, it was held that parliament has jurisdiction "by properly framed legislation" to require a foreign company to take out a license, even for business within a single province, and the authority was found in the heads of section 91 assigning the subjects "Regulation of Trade and Commerce" and "Aliens" to the Federal Government. In the argument before the Judicial Committee, Messrs. Newcombe and Upjohn endeavoured to uphold the contentions of the Dominion by asserting its |