which, according to Buffon, is genius. The door of Oxford and Cambridge being barred against him, he entered University College, graduating with high honours at this popular institution. In 1842 he, when eighteen years of age, entered as a student at Lincoln's Inn. In 1847, when twenty-three years of age, he was called to the Bar. He struggled long for recognition, devoting every moment to severe and unremitting study, often prolonged through the night; so severe was his application he made serious inroads upon his health. He had to wait eighteen years for his silk gown. He was called within the Bar, in 1865, when forty-one years of age. His earnings, for the first year, amounted to 52 guineas; for the second, 346 guineas; for several years it remained almost stationary. It is said, he began to think he had mistaken his vocation. But time and chance happen to all. He at length decided to enter political life. In 1868, when 44 years of age, he was elected to the House of Commons as a Liberal for Dover. Here his opportunity soon presented itself.

The Bankruptcy Bill of 1868 was before the House and Jessel made a speech, so clear, concise and logical, showing such a masterly grasp of the subject, in all its phases, as took the House by surprise. It particularly arrested the attention of Mr. Gladstone. Subsequently, when the office of Solicitor-General became vacant, by the promotion of Sir Robert Collier to the position of a member of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, the position was offered to Jessel, by Mr. Gladstone. His foot was now on the lower rounds of the professional ladder. He scored success after success. In a short time he forged his way to the head of his profession. He was flooded with business and his practice increasing, by leaps and bounds, in a short time, reached the large sum of twenty-five thousand pounds per annum. On the death of Lord Romilly, in 1873, he was promoted to the exalted position of Master of the Rolls, when 49 years of age, and

five years after being first elected to the House of Commons. It soon became apparent, a great judge, if not prophet, had arisen in Israel. He readily acquired a great reputation for the rapidity and satisfactory manner with which he disposed of the causes brought before him. His position, in the Court of Chancery, was second only to that of the Lord Chancellor. He thoroughly believed in the doctrine, that man was not made for the law, but law for man. His swiftness of apprehension and his unerring instinct in equitable questions made it apparent, he was the right man for the work of the Bench. He believed with Burke,-" that natural justice or equity consists in doing what is right in the circumstances of each particular case." Lord Selborne said of him." he possessed the happy faculty of always hitting the right nail on the head." He refused to be bound by precedent, when it interfered with substantial justice. He had no patience with technicality, and counsel soon learned it and governed themselves accordingly. From 1873 to 1881 Jessel sat as a judge of first instance, in the Rolls Court, being at the same time a member of the Court of Appeal. It was said of him by one well qualified to know, a counsel, who practised before him, in the Rolls Court:-" Never during the nineteenth century, was the business of any Court performed so rapidly, judicially and satisfactorily, as it was when Jessel presided." He rendered invaluable aid in remodelling and perfecting the Judicature Acts. On March 16th, 1883, he sat for the last time, discharging his duties, in the Appeal Court, with his usual ability and promptness of despatch, clearly showing his great powers had not lost their cunning. Five days after, on March 21st, 1883, when fifty-nine years of age, he passed away. He fell at the post of duty. His Imprimatur stamped on the Orders and Rules of the Judicature Acts of the High Court of Justice, itself a monumental work, will perpetuate his name and fame in all coming time.

As a great law-builder he will take his place by the side of Henry II., " the lion of justice," and Edward "the English Justinian."

I.,

The following sketch of his career, by the Law Times, is a fine tribute to his memory:

"He was Master of the Rolls, at a memorable period of legal history. The Judicature Acts, completing the fusion of law and equity, were passed while he was judge of first instance, and were still new to the Courts, when he died. His knowledge of all sub-, jects and his mastery of every branch of law, with which he had to concern himself, as well as of equity, caused it to be said, when he died, that the success of the Judicature Acts would have been impossible without him."

.

With such amazing intuition did he grasp the crucial point of a case, when presented, he often manifested impatience, when dull, prosing counsel would insist in going over again and again the same arguments. On the other hand, however, he was kind and considerate towards young and diffident counsel, as the following incident serves to show. A nervous junior appeared at the Rolls with his first brief. His leader being absent, he suggested to the Court that the case should be allowed to stand until his leader appeared. The opposing counsel refused to accede to the request, trusting to gain a temporary advantage; whereupon Jessel, in the kindest manner, asked the young man to state his case. The judge, then, re-stated it, so clearly and concisely, deftly indicating the crucial point upon which the issue turned, and then addressing the defendant's counsel, asked "What have you to say to the case as presented?" In reply, when challenged, he had to admit he could not answer it.

Edward Manson, barrister, and author of the Law of Trading Companies, gave the following interesting account, in the Law Times, of motion day, at the Rolls, before Jessel:

"It was a scene to be remembered. Then it was his genius shone forth. As counsel after counsel rose to state their cases before him, his rapid and unerring judgment solved the point with easy mastery, unanswerable law and logic, the while his face the

index of his powerful mind-beamed with intelligence and genial good nature. He seemed to understand the case before it was opened to him, so intuitive was his insight."

His wit was keen and laugh-provoking. The judges of the High Court of Justice proposed to present an address to the Queen, on the opening of the new Law Courts, at Temple Bar. In the address, as drafted, occurred the words," Conscious as we are of our shortcomings, etc." Jessel suggested the following alteration,- "Conscious as we are of the shortcomings of each other, etc."" Jessel's judgment, in the Lord St. Leonard's will case (1 P. D. 154), is well worth careful perusal. The will was drawn with great care and altered, from time to time, by eight codicils-will and codicils, all holograph, disposing of an estate of £300,000, At his death the codicils were found, but the will had disappeared. The Court of first instance, by Sir James Hannen, President, granted probate, upon the unsupported testimony of a single witness, Miss Sugden, and she an interested party. On appeal to the High Court of Justice the judgment of Sir James Hannen was sustained. This case occupies one hundred pages in the report. The judgments of Sir James Hannen, Lord Chief Justice Cockburn of the Queen's Bench Division and Sir George Jessel, Master of the Rolls, appear side by side. and stand as a lasting memorial of the great learning and consummate ability of three of the most eminent judges of the Victorian age. For terseness, lucidity, and logic, that of the Master of the Rolls, covering seventeen pages, is unrivalled.

This case settled beyond all question the following rules:-That the contents of a lost will may be proved by secondary evidence; that it may be proved by a single witness, though interested, whose veracity and competency are unimpeached; and that, when the contents of a lost will, or the contents of a lost codicil or lost codicils, are not fully proved, probate will be granted to the extent, it or its codicil or codicils are proved.

1 Claimed for Bowen, L.J. (Cunningham, p. 183): Ed. C. L. T.

Of the many important judgments of Sir George Jessel, that of Pooley v. Driver,' is, likewise, worthy of careful study. It is a luminous exposition, concisely expressed, of the leading principles of partnership. He admitted he was bound by the decision in Cox v. Hickman," That the right to share profits, as profits, constitutes a factor in determining the question." True, it is an ingredient, said Jessel, which the Court, sitting as a jury, is bound to observe. Only that and nothing more. But in the case before him, that of Pooley v. Driver, he had to decide whether certain stipulations entered into rendered the defendants liable to the holders of certain Bills of Exchange, drawn upon and endorsed by them. This involved the further question, how far one member of a firm of partners could bind the other members, as their agent. He declared himself unable clearly to define, within narrow limits, a partnership. No code had yet been concisely framed to embrace all its essential elements. He, then, passed on to a consideration of the fifteen. definitions given by distinguished authors and jurists, grouped in sequence, in the well-known work of Mr. Justice Lindley, no two of which are substantially alike. He subjected three of them to a critical analysis; those of the Civil Code of New York, of Chancellor Kent and Pothier. He further passed under review the several judgments of Lords Campbell, Cranworth and Wensleydale, in Cox v. Hickman, showing how incomplete and defective they were.

A careful study of these two leading cases, Cox v. Hickman and Pooley v. Driver, together with the critical judgment of Jessel, should be read and studied with care and discrimination, by every lawyer desirous of obtaining a practical knowledge of the important subject of partnership. For concise definition of terms, incisive analysis and firm grip of equitable principles, this able judgment of the Master of the Rolls, stands

15 Ch. D. 458 (1876).

28 H. L. C. p. 268 (1860).