ing a different effect from a marine policy on goods. Assuming that that is the law, I can only say that average clauses are now almost universally inserted in fire policies on goods; and when the defendants agreed that the 4d. per ton per week was to cover insurance against fire, it must be taken that they meant, and were understood to mean, that, if they became their own insurers, they would insure that is to say, upon the terms of having an average clause implied in their insurance contract. If, therefore, an average clause is necessary, I hold that an average clause is now so common that I must read an average clause into this contract with the defendants. I incline to the view, in the absence of authority, and no authority has been cited to me-that an aver age clause is not necessary in a case of this kind." Payment-Remittance by Post-Implied Bequest. Mitchell-Henry v. Norwich Union Life Ins. Society' is another and rather interesting decision of Bailhache, J. The defendants sent a written notice to the plaintiff, stating that a sum of £48 5s. 6d., shortly falling due to them from him, should be paid at their office, and asking the plaintiff "when remitting," to return the notice. The plaintiff sent to the defendants by registered post a packet containing £48 in Treasury notes. This packet was stolen before it reached the defendants, and they never received the money. Bailhache, J., held that by the use of the word "remitting" the defendants had impliedly authorized the plaintiff to remit through the post in the ordinary way, but that it was not ordinary to send so large a sum as £48 in Treasury notes by post, and that the plaintiff had, therefore, failed to prove that he had paid the defendants their debt. Life Insurance-Concealment of Material FactKnowledge of District Manager. Of Avrey v. British Legal and United Provident Ass. Co. it is sufficient to say that it is a decision of the Full Court that the knowledge of a district manager of an insurance company of the true facts in regard to the insured was the knowledge of the company; and that the subsequent acceptance of the premiums by him was a waiver by [1918] 1 K. B. 123. the company of the breach of the clause in the proposal form which forbad any information which ought to be made known to the company regarding the assurance being withheld; and that the policy was in full force. Discovery-Particulars Traverse of Plaintiffs' Negative Allegation. In [1918] 1 Ch. for February there seems to be only one short point decided requiring notice here. It is in Weinberger v. Inglis," and is a decision of Astbury, J., to the effect that where the onus of establishing a positive or negative allegation lies on the plaintiff, the Court will not order the defendant to give particulars of his traverse of that allegation. Common Carrier - Liability as Insurer. Bailhache, J., has contributed several interesting recent judgments. Belfast Ropework Co. Limited v. Bushell is another. The question was whether the defendant, who described himself as an automobile engineer and haulage contractor, was a common carrier, and, therefore, liable as insurer for the value of some hemp damaged by fire in transit when being carried by him. Bailhache, J., holds that, inasmuch as he reserved to himself the right of accepting or rejecting offers of goods for carriage, he was not a common carrier of such goods, and consequently not liable. He says (at pp. 214-5): "One would suppose that there ought to be some simple test by which it could be determined without difficulty whether a man is a common or a private carrier, but now that the old idea that to be a common carrier by land a man must carry between fixed termini, or at any rate within defined districts, is abandoned, I confess that I find considerable difficulty in framing the question the answer to which would be conclusive one way or the other. If one asks whether a carrier is prepared to carry for all who choose to employ him, the answer would in almost all cases be yes. Every carrier, common or private, who seeks employment for his lorries or carts desires all persons who have goods to be carried to come 7 [1918] 1 Ch. 133; 87 L. J. (Ch.) 148. 8 [1918] 1 K. B. 210. to him. It is only to the extent to which such persons resort to him that his business flourishes. If one asks whether a carrier is prepared to carry at a reasonable rate the answer would again be yes. No carrier, common or private, would profess to charge unreasonable rates. If one asks whether a carrier is bound to carry at any reasonable rate that may be offered, that is only another way of asking whether he is a common carrier. The same difficulty presents itself if one asks whether he would be liable to indictment if he refused so to carry. To answer that question it must first be determined whether he is a common carrier or no. For the purposes of my present decision I fall back upon this question. Did the defendant, while inviting all and sundry to employ him, reserve to himself the right of accepting or rejecting their offers of goods for carriage whether his lorries were full or empty, being guided in his decision by the attractiveness or otherwise of the particular offer and not by his ability or inability to carry having regard to *his other engagements? Upon the facts as found by me I answer that question in the affirmative, and in my opinion that answer shows that he is not a common carrier." 9 Purchase of Property by Husband in Wife's name -Intention to defeat Creditors-Presumption of Gift to Wife. Gascoigne v. Gascoigne is a decision of the Full Court very similar to one to be found in our own reports of a good many years back. It may be briefly noted: A husband took a lease of land in his wife's name and built a house on it with his own money. He used his wife's name with her consent because he was in debt and wished to prevent his creditors recovering against the property. In an action by him against his wife for a declaration that she held the property as trustee for him, the Court held that he could not allege his own fraudulent design to rebut the presumption that the conveyance was intended as a gift to his wife, and that she was entitled to retain the property for her own use, although herself a party to the fraud. Reversionary Lease to Commence more than Twentyone Years after its Date-Interesse termini - Rule against Perpetuities. [1918] 1 Ch. for March contains only one case calling for notice here, but it is a decision of Neville, J., on a point which has never 9 [1918] 1 K. B. 223. 9a 9a Mann, Crossman and Paulin v. Registrar of Land Registry, 1918] 1 Ch. 202. been expressly decided by English Courts, namely, whether a lease in futuro, not to come into effect until after the expiration of twenty-one years, is or is not good. He holds that it is, inasmuch as it confers on the lessee, not an executory, but an immediate vested interest, a right in rem capable of alienation and which passes to the executor. He holds that, with regard to the rule of perpetuities, such a reversionary lease is a vested interest which does not come within the mischief of the rule. He quotes and entirely agrees with the words of Bewley, J., in the Irish case of Redington v. Browne10: "The object of the rule against perpetuities is to restrict the inalienability of property, and limit the period for which its absolute vesting may be postponed. If the future limitation is vested in interest in an ascertained living person at the time of the execution of the instrument by which it is created, or must necessarily vest within the period fixed by law, that is to say, within a life or lives in being and a period of twenty-one years afterwards, it is not open to the objection of remoteness; and it is immaterial that the actual enjoyment in possession may be deferred for a much longer period." CANADIAN DECISIONS.11 Appointment of Woman as Police Magistrate. In D. L. R. for March 1st, 1918, we have a case of Rex v. Cyr, in which the Appellate Division of the Alberta Supreme Court have decided that a woman is under no legal disqualification in the Province of Alberta from being appointed a Police Magistrate. Stuart, J., who delivers the judgment of the Court, says, towards the end of it: "I, therefore, think that, applying the general principle upon which the common law rests, namely, that of reason and good sense as applied to new conditions, this Court ought to declare that in this Province, and at this time in our presently existing conditions, there is at common law no legal disqualification for 10 32 L. R. Ir. 347, 355-6. 11 As most of our subscribers have ready access to the Canadian Reports, it is not deemed necessary to review the Canadian cases in the same detail as the English. Only those which seem of special interest and importance will, therefore, be noticed. 12 38 D. L. R. 601. holding public office in the government of the country arising from distinction of sex. And in doing this I am strongly of opinion that we are returning to the more liberal and enlightened view of the middle ages in England and passing over the narrower and more hardened view which possibly by the middle of the nineteenth century had gained the ascendance in England. I think, therefore, that Mrs. Jamieson is not disqualified from holding the office of Police Magistrate." Automobiles-Non-compliance with Statutory Requirements-Primary Negligence. The D. L. L. for March 15th has a long and useful annotation on the law of motor vehicles by Mr. J. Freeman, in connection with the Saskatchewan case of Etter v. City of Saskatoon,13 where the Supreme Court holds that operating a motor car in violation of the statutory requirements as to registration and number plates will bar recovery of any damages sustained by reason of defects in the highway; and that under such circumstances a municipal corporation owes no duty to the driver or owner of the car except to refrain from wilful or malicious injury. Land Titles Office-Caveat-Notice. Another important decision worth calling special attention to, although, perhaps, sufficiently obvious, in this number of the D. L. R., is Grace v. Kuebler," wherein the Supreme Court of Canada held unanimously that a caveat filed in the Land Titles Office by an assignee of the rights of a vendor under an agreement for the sale of land is notice to the purchaser, who, notwithstanding it, is discharged if he innocently pays the original vendor the balance of his purchase money. The purchaser is not bound to search the register before making pay ment. A. H. F. L. 13 39 D. L. R. 1. 14 39 D. L. R. 39. |