The cause of the would-be lawyers is being taken up by many prominent women, and Lord Buckmaster is again bringing before the House of Lords his Bill to secure the admission of women as solicitors. Before long we shall doubtless hear of Miss Portia, K.C., M.P.

A most important point on the law of British nationality was decided in Rex v. Francis, Ex parte Markwald (34 T. L. R. 273). It will be recollected that in Calvin's Case (7 Co. Rep. 5a), it was held that notwithstanding the existence of two separate kingdoms (England and Scotland) at the date of the decision, yet every subject of James I. born after his accession to the throne of England in 1603, no matter in which country he was born, was a subject of both. Allegiance is due to the King as a person and not to him as the Sovereign, and the Lord Chancellor of that day, with the unanimous concurrence of twelve other judges, held that a Scottish-born subject of the King was no alien in England. Now in Rex v. Francis the Divisional Court has held that an alien who, born in Berlin, enters Australia and is duly granted there a certificate of naturalization under the powers conferred by the Commonwealth Constitution Act, 1900, sec. 9, is a subject of the King only in Australia and remains an alien in other parts of the King's Empire, including the United Kingdom. As the Law Journal

says

"This seems to hold that there are many King Georges, one for. each great self-governing part of the Empire, and that a man can be subject of the King in one of these divers capacities, but not subject in another. The decision is all the more striking because only four years ago, in Gavin, Gibson & Co. v. Gibson ([1913] S. K. B. 379), Mr. Justice Atkin had emphatically held that a man born in the State of Victoria is not a subject of Victoria, but of the King throughout the Empire-there are no different classes of subjects based on difference of birth-place."

Mr. Justice Atkin pointed out in that case that the effect of Calvin's Case was to establish that throughout the Empire the King acts everywhere as the same individual, and that all subjects everywhere are his

subjects, not those of any particular state or colonythat a subject of the King in one part of the Empire is equally his subject elsewhere. It is true that in the case with which Mr. Justice Atkin was dealing the status of the subject was acquired by birth, whereas in Markwald's Case it was acquired by naturalization, but that seems rather an inadequate ground for any distinction. The Imperial Act of 1914, the British Nationality and Status of Aliens Act, 1914, provides for certificates of naturalization granted in the Dominions having validity throughout the Empire, but the provisions of the Act have first to be adopted by the Dominions, and so far only Canada and Newfoundland have done so.

The Committee appointed by the Board of Trade to consider the position of British manufacturers and merchants in respect of pre-war contracts which was presided over by Lord Buckmaster, have issued their report. It is a document of great interest and deals with those obligations the fulfilment of which has been prevented or impeded by the war, the remedial measures which are necessary or desirable being also fully considered. The position both under the common law and under Acts of Parliament passed since the outbreak of war are dealt with, and the Committee think that the position at common law may be stated in general terms as follows:

(1) Prima facie if a man binds himself unconditionally to do that which turns out to be impossible he will be held to his bargain and have to pay damages for his failure to perform.

(2) If, however, the impossibility arises from a cause that neither party can reasonably have contemplated when the contract was made, and as to which the terms of the contract make no provision, a man will not be so bound; the matter being unforeseen he is not taken to have promised unconditionally, nor, for the same reason, has he stipulated for any condition of excuse.

(3) If, relief from the burden of a contract because performance proves to be impossible is given, it is because the Court holds that it was an implied term of the contract that it should be dissolved in the event which has arisen and created the impossibility.

(4) Impossibility for this purpose means commercial impossibility. Mere increased cost of performance, unless to an enorm

ous and extravagant extent, does not make it impossible. A man is not prevented from performing by economic unprofitableness, unless the pecuniary burden is so great as to approximate to physical prevention.

(5) If the contract is dissolved under this doctrine, the rights and obligations of both parties disappear as from the date of dissolution. But till that date the contract is good; therefore any payment made or any right accrued, according to the terms of the contract while it was in force, will not be disturbed or varied.

(6) Finally, the Court can only declare the contract dissolved or not dissolved. If it is not dissolved it remains effective accord: ing to all its terms in their full force. The Court cannot in any way alter its terms or modify them, or in any way vary or adjust the rights and obligations of both parties. And if it is not dissolved, and there is a breach, the Court cannot mitigate or lessen the full measure of damages to which the other party is legally entitled by such breach.

(7) If the obligations undertaken become illegal either by reason of the other party to the contract becoming an enemy or by reason of a duly constituted authority lawfully prohibiting its performance, the contract is dissolved, unless the illegality is of so temporary a character that the time for the performance of the obligations may not have elapsed before the illegality ceases.

(8) In certain cases the principle stated above may to some extent be modified by the provisions contained in the contract.

(9) In this case the parties to the contract will be bound by the provisions of their own agreement, and this may prevent the contract from being at once dissolved even if a duly constituted authority lawfully prohibits the performance of the obligations undertaken. Such general provisions, however, if suspensory in their nature, can not prolong a contract indefinitely, and if the conditions produced by the war continue beyond the period for which the contract was originally to be performed, the contract would then be dissolved. To hold otherwise would be to make a new contract for the parties and to substitute it for one which has been frustrated and thus to make the obligations originally undertaken substantially different.1

The remedies proposed by the Committee are grouped under four heads:

"(1) The cancellation of pre-war contracts by legislation; (2) The provision of compensation for losses sustained in fulfilling pre-war contracts from public funds; (3) The readjustment of payments made for the excess profits tax with a view to cover eventual losses suhtained at any time in the fulfilment of pre-war contracts; (4) Some method of revising the terms of pre-war contracts so as to make them fair and reasonable under the altered circumstances. But the Committee are unable to recommend

1 This report is of special interest in view of Mr. Mayer's able discussion of the cases in his Article in the March C. L. T.-ED. C. L. T.

that further legislative interference should forthwith take place in business transactions in the absence of more convincing evidence that the existing law has been tried and failed."

Sir Edward Carson, until recently a member of the War Cabinet, has announced his intention of returning to practice at the Bar. Sir Edward's career at the Bar has been in many respects remarkable. He left Irish practice after the fall of the Salisbury Government in 1892 and was called to the English Bar in April, 1893. As he was at that time an Irish "silk," it was obvious that he would not remain an English "junior" very long, and in 1894 he was called within the Bar. No man has been "in and out" of general practice more than Sir Edward Carson. In 1900 he became Solicitor-General, and this, of course, took him out of the Courts, except for cases in which he appeared for the Crown. In 1906, when the Balfour ministry fell, he returned to general practice. During the ensuing years he and the present Lord Reading were in almost every big action, and never were two advocates more fairly matched, although Lord Reading (then Mr. Rufus Isaacs, K.C.), was six years Sir Edward Carson's junior. In 1913 Sir Edward threw himself so heartily into the Ulster agitation that he returned all his briefs and gave up his practice. He came back to the Bar for a brief period after the war broke out, and then in March, 1915, on the formation of the first Coalition Government, he became AttorneyGeneral. Once more he retired from general practice and briefs had to be returned. In October of the same year he resigned his office and returned to practice. In December, 1916, when the second Coalition Government was formed, Sir Edward Carson became First Lord of the Admiralty, and in July, 1917, he left the Admiralty and became a member of the War Cabinet without portfolio. The deaths and promotions of the last few years have left him with few rivals at tre Common Law Bar, and there is no doubt that he will find plenty of work awaiting him.

Sir Frederick Smith, the Attorney-General, has returned to England on the conclusion of his visit to the United States. To a representative of the Press Association he said that during his American tour he had travelled altogether 16,000 miles and addressed 43 meetings representing a total number of about 140,000 people.

The list of aliens to whom certificates of naturalization were granted during January contains the name of Professor Sir Paul Vinogradoff, the distinguished Corpus Professor of Jurisprudence in the University of Oxford, a position which he has held since 1903.

W. E. WILKINSON.