v. Chester E. Clark, that the application of a wellknown contrivance to an analogous purpose is not invention, and is, therefore, not good ground for a patent. An annotation follows by Russel S. Smart, of the Ottawa Bar. There seems to be no case in R. J. Q. (27 K. B.) for January and February requiring special notice here; nor in R. J. Q. (53 S. C.) for January. 5 37 D. L. R. 1. A. H. F. L. SOME RECENT SUPREME COURT AND EX- IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. QUE.] [NOVEMBER 28TH, 1917. GIROUX V. THE KING. Criminal law-Indictment—Without preliminary inquiry-Option Speedy trial-Jurisdiction-Criminal Code, ss. 825, 826, 827, 828, 873. A bill of indictment was preferred to the Grand Jury against the appellant and a true bill was found. The appellant was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. On the day fixed for the trial, the appellant moved to be allowed to elect for a speedy trial under the provisions of Part XVIII. of the Criminal Code, and the presiding judge, with the consent of the Crown prosecutor, granted the motion. The appellant was subsequently arraigned in the Court of Sessions of the Peace and found gulity. Held (IDINGTON and DUFF, JJ., dissenting), that the judge of the Court of Sessions of the Peace had jurisdiction to try the offence. Appeal dismissed. Laflamme, K,C., for appellant. SASK.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. [NOVEMBER 28TH, 1917. ROGERS V. CALGARY BREWING AND MALTING. Co. Bank and banking-Bill of exchange-Cheque-Payment-Present ment-Delay. The appellant sent to the respondent a cheque drawn on the Estevan Security Company, and the Bank of Montreal, acting as agent for the respondent, sent the cheque direct to the drawer by post. out of Instead of insisting upon prompt payment of the cheque the funds which the appellant then had available with the Security Company, the Bank of Montreal gave to the latter almost one pany on another bank, which was disallowed; immediately after the Security Company went into insolvency. month's delay, and then accepted a draft of that com Held, That the appellant was discharged of his liability to the respondent for the amount of the cheque. DAVIES, J., though not dissenting formally, was of the opinion that the case should be sent back for a new trial, so that the cause of the delay might be explained and the responsibility thus determined. Contract-Municipal law—Interpretation-Extension of city limits— Added area-Exclusive rights. An agreement was made in 1905 between the city appellant and one D., the assignor of the company respondent, whereby D. was given the privilege of supplying natural gas "throughout the said city." In another agreement made in 1911 amending the above, it was provided that the respondent should be permitted to charge certain prices for gas. Held, DAVIES and IDINGTON, JJ., dissenting, that the privilege granted to D. was not limited to the area of the city appellant as it existed at the date of the agreement, but extended to the various extensions of the city's boundaries which were subsequently made. City of Toronto v. Toronto Railway Company (1907), A. C. 315, 37 Can. S. C. R. 430, distinguished. The agreement contained a provision that "the city shall not grant to any person, firm or corporation," similar privilege as the one granted to D., and referred also to the " exclusive rights and privileges hereby granted." Held, SIR CHARLES FITZPATRICK, C.J., dissenting, that the grant to D. was not exclusive as against the city appellant itself. Appeal dismissed with costs. Lafleur, K.C., for appellant. Bennett, K.C., and Sinclair, K.C., for respondents. ALTA.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. [NOVEMBER 28TH, 1917. CITY OF CALGARY V. DOMINION RADIATOR CO. Mechanic's Lien-Notice in writing-Verbal notice-Registration -Alberta Mechanics Lien Act, s. 32, as amended in 1908. Held, SIR CHARLES FITZPATRICK, C.J., and IDINGTON, J., dissenting, that to enforce the mechanic's or the material man's lien, under 66 the Alberta Mechanics Lien Act, a notice in writing of such lien and of the amount thereto," must be given to the owner or person having superintendence of the work on behalf of the owner," according to section 32 of the Act, as amended in 1908. Per SIR CHARLES FITZPATRICK, C,J., dissenting, such notice in writing is not intended to affect the validity of the lien, but merely to determine the extent of the owner's liability. Appeal allowed with costs. E. Meredith, K.C., and C. F. Adams, for the appellant. R. P. Robertson, for the respondent. N. S.] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA. [NOVEMBER 28TH, 1917. Statute ARCHIBALD V. THE KING. Construction · Mandamus - Nova Scotia Fishery ActFishing license-Municipal corporation-2 Geo. V. c. 18 (N.S.) -6 and 7 Geo. V. c. 27 (N. S.). By sec. 2 of the Nova Scotia Fishries Act of 1912, 2 Geo. V. c. 18, every resident of the province is given the right to go on foot along the banks of any river, stream or lake, and to go on or across the same for the purpose of lawfully fishing therein, except as to the land of an occupant licensed under the Act. From sec. 3, the provision that such right should not apply "to lands situate in a municipality where no by-laws imposing any licenses are in force" was eliminated in 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V. c. 27). By sec. 6, any municipality "may by by-law provide for the issue of licenses under this Act," and for regulation of the fees, and by sec. 7 the clerk is required to keep a record of the licenses issued and the fees paid. Held, DAVIES, J., dissenting, that the provisions of sec. 6 respecting the issue of municipal licenses cannot be construed as imperative, and on the neglect or refusal of a municipal council to pass the said by-law, a resident entitled to fishing rights in the municipality may obtain the issue of a license to fish by writ of mandamus. Held, also, DAVIES, J., dissenting, that such writ may be directed to the clerk of the municipality. Per DAVIES, J.-The writ should have been directed to the municipal council requiring it to pass the necessary by-law. Appeal dismissed with costs. J. J. Power, K.C., for appellant. J. S. Rogers, K.C., for respondent. IN THE EXCHEQUER COURT OF CANADA. CASSELS, J.] [JANUARY 22ND, 1918. THE KING V. RITHET AND THE ATTY.-GEN. OF B. C. Constitutional law-Dominion and Provincial rights-Revenues— Bona Vacantia-Secs. 102 and 109 B. N. A. Act 1867. Held, having regard to the provisions of sec. 102 of the B. N. A. Act, 1867, which refer to certain revenues, over which the provinces at the date of the Union had, and have, power of appropriation, as passing to the Dominion except such portions as are reserved to the provinces under sec. 109, it is apparent that all royalties of every kind were not intended to belong to the provinces under the wording of section 109. Royalties arising from lands, mines, minerals and from escheats, as referred to in sec. 1 of the Imp. Act 15-16 Vict. c. 39, passed to the provinces, but it was not the intention of the B. N. A. Act to give to the provinces royalties such as bona vacantia, and the like. E. L. Newcombe, K.C., and C. P. Plaxton, for plaintiff. Patent Thing in common use—Adaptation to new but analogous use-Lack of invention. When a contrivance is well-known to the public, the change from its old use to a new but analogous use is not invention." Abell v. McPherson, 17 Gr. 23; 18 Gr. 437, followed. Harwood v. Directors Great Northern R. W. Co., 11 H. L. 654; Dalby v. Lynes, 64 Fed. Rep. 376, referred to. Plaintiff's patent for "improvements in methods of producing overalls" substantially resolved itself into a claim for manufacturing two seam overalls with a continuous band, or side-facing sewn with a double-needle machine, on a slit in advance of the seam. Held, that the sewing of the continuous band with a two-needle machine is an operation that might properly be the subject of a claim by the inventor of a sewing-machine, but would not be subject-matter for a patent to one merely using the machine to sew the continuous band. 2. That as the slit in advance of the seam had been anticipated in shirts and other garments, the mere application of it to an analogous purpose in the manufacture of overalls was not invention within the meaning of sec. 7 of the Patent Act. E. K. Williams, and T. J. Murray, for plaintiff. |